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**-The TFIC Team.**

# PROLEGOMENA TO PRAKRITICA et JAINICA

*Edited by*  
**Satya Ranjan Banerjee**



**THE ASIATIC SOCIETY**  
1 PARK STREET ■ KOLKATA 700 016.









**Gift.**

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TO  
PRAKRITICA et JAINICA**



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**Prolegomena to Prakritica et Jainica**  
**edited by Satya Ranjan Banerjee**

**Published in March 2005**

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## FOREWORD

It is indeed a pleasure on my part to publish this present booklet entitled *Prolegomena to Prakritica et Jainica* on the occasion of a National Seminar on Prakrit and Jainism to be held on the 11th and 12th of March 2005 organised by the Asiatic Society of Calcutta. This book, though short in size, will give a kaleidoscopic view of some of the basic notions of the subject for which this Seminar is going to be held. This book will act as a torch-bearer for those who want to travel over the land of Prakrit and Jainism.

For more than two hundred years and a quarter of a century, this Asiatic Society has been serving the scholarly world by publishing oriental books and papers on Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrit, Tibetan, Arabic, Persian and others. The Asiatick Researches was a pioneering Journal where some of the articles on basic oriental subjects were published. There is hardly any oriental book at a later stage where the publications of the Asiatic Society are not mentioned. In the Asiatick Researches, Vol. IX, 1807, three reports under the title *Account of the Jains* were published. It was immediately followed by Henry Thomas Colebrooke's *Observations on the sects of the Jains*. The Journal of the Asiatic Society has also published many pioneering articles on Prakrit and Jainism. Similarly, the Jaina Āgama text, *Uvāsagadasā-sutta* in two volumes (text 1885-1890 and translation 1888, reprinted in 1989 by the Society) and the Prakrit grammar, *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa* of Caṇḍa (1880), are still the outstanding works in the field of Prakrit. So it seems that the Asiatic Society carries a long history and heritage for the dissemination of Prakrit and Jainistic studies in this country. It is, therefore, quite in the fitness of things that the Asiatic Society is going to organise a two-day National Seminar on Prakrit and Jainism to foster the subject anew, particularly in this part of the country.

The present volume contains fifteen articles of illustrious predecessors of the subject published in different books and papers. As the title suggests, this volume tends to cover many aspects of Jainistic and Prakrit studies. I congratulate the editor of this volume for the pains he has undertaken for bringing it out. I hope it will be useful for those who take interest in the subject.

1 March 2005

**Dilip Coomer Ghose**  
General Secretary  
The Asiatic Society





## INTRODUCTION

The present monograph under the caption *Prolegomena to Prakritica et Jainica* is being published by the Asiatic Society on the occasion of a National Seminar on Prakrit and Jainism organised by the Asiatic Society to be held on the 11th and 12th of March 2005. It is a historic event in the annals of the Society that it is for the first time the said Society is holding a National Seminar on Jainism. Though in the history of the Asiatic Society, Jainism was not at all unknown, because many articles and papers on Jainism were published in the Asiatic Researches and also in its Journal from its very inception, along with texts on Jaina Āgamas, there was no occasion when a Jain Seminar was ever contemplated. It is, therefore, quite in the fitness of things that after a lapse of 222 years, the present Council, particularly the President, Professor Biswanath Banerjee, thought it prudent to hold a national Seminar on Jainism—a subject which has been living in the realm of sad and doleful neglect for centuries more in the eastern part of India. As far as history is concerned, it should be borne in mind that Bengal was a champion of Jainism from her hoary antiquity. It is a fact worth noting that 2600 years ago, Vardhamān Mahāvīra came to Bengal (Vaṅga), known as Rāḍha (or Lāṭa)-deśa at that time, to preach his doctrine, and this event was recorded in the second part of the *Ācārāṅga-sūtra* which is one of the oldest Āgama texts of the Jains. And some of the historians opine that the name of the Railway station Bardhamān (formerly English Burdwan, but correctly Vardhamāna) in West Bengal is due to his visit to that place. However, it is not the place to dilate upon the history of Jainism in Bengal, but, it could be reckoned at the same time that Bengal was not a place where Jainism was quite unknown. But rather unfortunately, Jainism in Bengal was for long relegated to the land of oblivion in the contemplation of a polypus.

Keeping in mind the thrust areas of this Seminar which include the Prakrit language, literature and Jain philosophy, a monograph which is a collection of articles is prepared according to the need of the Seminar. It has three parts. In

part I, some basic notions of the Prakrit language are given. In part II, some basic historical events are culled out from some recognised and illustrious authors who have laboured much to unfurl the hidden treasures of Jain history. Some of the knotty problems of Jainism which are seldom discussed in ordinary books are also amalgamated here to give emphasis on those themes which will draw the attention of scholars. The part III deals with Jain literature in a chronological order which will help the scholars to write the history of Jainism. The entire gamut of this corpus is written on the basis of the notion that the Prakrit language and literature are the integral parts of Jainistic studies.

This monograph is made on themes. A peep into the contents will demonstrate the truth of this assertion. In editing this corpus I have to follow a little editorial discipline. In some articles proper names are printed "all-cap", such as, PISCHEL, in the main body of the text, but, to maintain parity with other articles where this "all-cap" system is not followed, I have avoided "all-cap" in a name and made them "normal". The older spellings of some names, such as, Çatruñjaya, are kept as they are and have not been tampered with recent spelling as is normally done in the books of Indology. For historical reasons, this so-called older spelling is not crushed down on the plea of reformation and modernization. Similarly, in some cases some older diacritical marks (such as, *apabhraṇśa*) are kept as they are for the sake of history, but, otherwise, normal diacritical marks are followed. Save and except this very insignificant minor editorial discipline, all the articles are printed as they are.

In fine, I should say that I must thank the President and the General Secretary who have urged me to prepare this monograph befitting the climatic condition of the Seminar. If this monograph stimulates the scholars interested in the subject, I shall deem my labour amply rewarded.

1 March 2005

Satya Ranjan Banerjee  
Library Secretary  
The Asiatic Society

# **PART I — PRAKRITICA**



## ORIGIN OF PRAKRIT

MURALYDHAR BANERJEE

Prakrit grammarians regard Prakrit to be derived from Sanskrit. Prākṛta is explained as a language having a Prakṛti or source which, in this case, is taken to be Sanskrit.<sup>1</sup> Commentators on Poetics also subscribe to this view.<sup>2</sup> This view, however, is disputed by some Indian writers. Vākpatirāja (8th Century A.D.)<sup>3</sup> states—"All the speeches enter into it (Prakrit) and come out of it just as all waters fall into the Ocean and come out of it."<sup>4</sup> Namisādhū, a Jaina scholar, (11th Century A.D.),<sup>5</sup>

1. प्रकृतिः संस्कृतं तत्र भवं तत् आगतं वा प्राकृतम् Siddha Hemacandra, 8.
  1. 1. प्रकृतिः संस्कृतं तत्र भवं प्राकृतमुच्यते Mārkaṇḍeya—Prākṛtasarvasva, p. 1. प्रकृतिः संस्कृतायास्तु विकृतिः प्राकृती मता Ṣaḍbhāṣācandrikā. प्रकृतिः संस्कृतं तत्र भवत्वात् प्राकृतं स्मृतम् Prākṛtacandrikā quoted in Peterson's Third Report 343-7. प्राकृतस्य तु सर्वमेव संस्कृतं योनिः Prākṛtasañjivani quoted by Vāsudeva in his Commentary on Karpūramañjarī, 9.11. ed. Bombay, Cf. Pischel's Grammatik der Prakrit-Sprachen, § 1.
2. प्रकृतेरागतं प्राकृतं प्रकृतिः संस्कृतम् Dhanika on Daśarūpaka, 2. 64. प्रकृतेः संस्कृतादागतं प्राकृतम् Siṃhadevagani on Vāgbhaṭālaṅkāra, 2.2.  
संस्कृतरूपायाः प्रकृतेरुत्पन्नत्वात् प्राकृतम् Premacandra Tarkavāgiśa on Kāvyaadarśa, 1. 13.
3. Gauḍavaho, ed. S.P. Pandit, Introduction, p. 100.
4. सयत्नाञ्चो इमं वाया विसंति एत्तो य णोति वायाञ्चो ।  
एति समुदं चिय णोति सावराञ्चो चिय जलाई ॥ *Ibid.*, sl. 93.
5. Namisādhū finished his Commentary in Samvat 1125, i.e., 1069 A.D.

commenting on a śloka<sup>6</sup> of Rudraṭa's Kāvyaālankāra writes as follows :

"To explain Prākṛta—Prakṛti is a natural use of speech made by all beings of the world which is not refined by Grammar, Rhetoric etc.; and a speech derived from Prakṛti or Prakṛti itself is Prākṛta. Or from the saying, "The Ardhamāgadhī speech of the gods is composed in the Prākṛta of the Ṛṣis, Prākṛta means 'first produced' (prāk kṛta)—it is the speech easily intelligible to children and women and the source of all other speeches. It is of a homogeneous character like rain falling from the clouds; the same speech being distributed in various countries and being specialised by refinement is later differentiated into Sanskrit and other speeches. For this reason, the author of the text first mentions Prākṛta and then Saṃskṛta and other speeches. It is called Saṃskṛta on account of being refined by Pāṇini and others in the rules of their Grammar."<sup>7</sup>

Hemacandra, following other Prākṛit grammarians in his grammar maintains Prākṛta to be derived from Saṃskṛta.<sup>8</sup> In his later work the Kāvyaānuśāsana<sup>9</sup> he

पञ्चविंशतिसंयुक्तैरेकादशमसमशतैः ।

विक्रमात् समतिक्रान्तैः प्रावृषीदं समर्पितम् ॥ Jacobi Bhavisayattakahā, p. 174., Quoted by Gune Bhavisayattakahā, Intro., p. 57.

6. Vāgbhaṭāṅkāra, 2. 12.

7. "प्राकृतेति—सकलजगज्जन्तूनां व्याकरणादिभिरनाहितसंस्कारः सहजो वचनव्यापारः प्रकृतिः, तव भवं सैव वा प्राकृतम्। 'आरिसवयणं सिद्धं' देवाणं अद्भ्यमागहा वाणी' इत्यादिवचनाद् वा प्राक् पूर्वं कृतं प्राकृतं बालमहिलादिसुबोधं सकलभाषानिबन्धनभूतं वचनमुच्यते। मेघनिर्मुक्तजलम् इवैकस्वरूपं तदेव च देशविशेषात् संस्कारकरणाच्च समासादितं विशेषं सत् संस्कृताद्युत्तरविभेदानाजोति, अतएव शास्त्रकृता प्राकृतमादौ निर्दिष्टं तदनु संस्कृतादीनि। पाणिन्यादिव्याकरणोदितशब्दलक्षणेन संस्करणात् संस्कृतमुच्यते।"

8. See above, p. 1 footnote no. 1.

9. That 'Siddha Hemacandra' is an earlier production is clear from its mention in the Kāvyaānuśāsana (ed. Kāvyaṃālā 70.) p. 2 Śloka 2 'शब्दानुशासनेऽस्माभिः साध्वोवाचो विवेचिताः।'

arrives at the very opposite stand-point maintained by Vākpatirāja and Namisādhu and speaks of the speech of Jina “as not artificial, as sweet-worded and as transformed into all other speeches.”<sup>10</sup> In his Deśināmamālā which was written after his grammar and the Kāvyañuśāsana<sup>11</sup> he maintains the same view. In the opening stanza of the Deśināmamālā he salutes the speech of Jina (*i.e.*, Ardhamāgadhī Prākṛta) as the origin of all other speeches. In support of his view that Ardhamāgadhī has developed into all other speeches, in the Commentary on it he quotes a stanza already quoted in the Kāvyañuśāsana—“The speech of Jina was understood by the Gods as divine speech, by men as human speech, by Śavaras as Śāvari speech and by the brutes as their own speech.” It is also possible Hemacandra as a pious Jaina held this view even when he wrote his grammar in which, however, he adopted the stand-point of Sanskrit origin of Prakrit for convenience of treatment.

Indian writers on Prakrit Grammar and Lexicography and Rhetoric adopt a threefold classification of Prakrit. Though they employ slightly different phraseology to express these classes the following names<sup>12</sup> are generally accepted, *viz.*, (1) Tatsama, (2) Tadbhava, (3) Deśī.

This classification is evidently based on the orthodox

10. अकृतिमत्त्वादुपदां परमार्थाभिधायिनीम् ।

सर्वभाषापरिणतां जैनीं वाचमुपास्महे ॥ Kāvyañuśāsana, p. 1., sl. 1.

In the Commentary on it Hemacandra seems to follow Namisādhu in regarding Prakrit to be ‘of a homogeneous character like rain falling from the clouds.’ (एकरूपा हि भगवतोऽर्द्धमागधीभाषा वारिदविमुक्तवारिबदाश्रयानुरूपतया परिणमति।)

11. Mention is made of Siddha Hemacandra and Kāvyañuśāsana in Deśināmamālā, I. 3. Com.

12. The equivalent terms for the three classes are : (1) Tatsama, Saṃskṛtasama, Tattulya, Saṃānaśabda; (2) Tadbhava, Saṃskṛtabhava, Saṃskṛtayoni, Tajja, Vibhraṣṭa; (3) Deśī, Deśīprasiddha, Deśīmata; for full reference see Grammatik der Prakrit-Sprachen, Strassburg (1900), § 8.



view of the origin of Prakrit from Sanskrit. Accordingly the word 'Tat' in the first two classes means Sanskrit and these two classes respectively denote (1) Prakrit words borrowed from Sanskrit without any change of form, and (2) Prakrit words borrowed from Sanskrit with change of form. The third class denotes those words which cannot be derived from Sanskrit and are supposed to belong to different provinces. It may be translated as 'provincial'.

Hemacandra defines Deśī to be "such words as are not derived by the rules of his grammar and even when derived are not current in Sanskrit dictionaries nor can be derived by any 'gauṇī lakṣaṇā', i.e., the metaphorical use of words."<sup>13</sup> Such words are further defined as "not including all provincial dialectical words but only such Prakrit words as are current through ages without beginning."<sup>14</sup>

Let us now take up the views of the modern Orientalists on the origin of Prakrit.

The Rev. R. Caldwell, in his *Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian Languages* (Longmans, London, 1856) tries to explain the origin of the Northern Indian Vernaculars by the influence of the Scythian and the Dravidian languages over Sanskrit when the Aryan settlers first mixed with the Non-Aryans in Northern India. "According to this theory", he writes, "the grammatical structure of the spoken idioms of Northern India was from the first and always continued to be, in the main, Scythian; and a change which took place when Sanskrit acquired the predominance as the Aryans gradually extended their conquests and their colonies, was rather a change of vocabulary than of grammar,—a change not so much in the arrangement and vital spirit as in the material of the language."<sup>15</sup>

Rev. Caldwell not only considers the morphology of

13. Deśīnāmamālā, present Ed., p. 1, 3.

14. *Op. cit.*, p. 1, 4.

15. *Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian Languages*, p. 37.

the Northern Indian Vernaculars as of Non-Aryan origin but he discovers many Dravidian words even in Sanskrit Vocabulary.<sup>16</sup> He gives a list of thirty-seven Sanskrit words which he regards as certainly borrowed from the Dravidian tongues. Of these 'aṭavi' (forest), ambā (mother), 'kalā' (fine art), 'śava' (corpse), 'nānā' (several), 'nīra' (water), 'bhaj' (to share) and 'mīna' (fish) may be mentioned as examples. Whether such words were naturalised in Sanskrit from the Dravidian tongues or borrowed from Sanskrit by those languages remains an open question. That these words are a property of Sanskrit may be proved by literary evidence of more than two thousand years but we possess no literary evidence of their existence in any of the Dravidian tongues even approaching the earlier centuries of the Christian era.

To meet this extreme view it is but enough to refer to the Comparative Grammar of the Modern Aryan Languages of India by Mr. J. Beames (1872), the three volumes of which work are a reasoned refutation of the view of the Dravidian Origin of the Northern Indian Vernaculars held by Rev. Caldwell and his followers. Mr. Beames shows that this view is untenable because it is geographically, historically and philologically impossible and absurd. The Dravidians were separated from the Aryan Colonists of Northern India by the Mundas lying between both and any borrowing by the Aryans from the Dravidians instead of from the Mundas with whom they came in direct contact is geographically impossible. It is also historically impossible. We must first answer the question when did the Aryans first come in to contact with the Dravidians ? Was it in the Vedic age ? Or after the Mahomedan Conquest ? If it was in the Vedic age then how can the Prakrit dialects, the vernaculars of Northern India of the intermediate period and of which we possess literary records in the Pali literature, in the Jaina

16. Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian Languages, pp. 439-48.

canonical literature and the Asoka inscriptions preceding the birth of Christ by several centuries and which are the immediate predecessors in the line of descent of the modern vernaculars of Northern India—show a synthetic and inflexional structure like the Sanskrit ? They ought to have shown an analytical structure like the modern vernaculars of Northern India which is ascribed to the influence of the Dravidian tongue. Are we to suppose then that the Dravidian invasion of Northern India took place from the country of Tamil and Telugu speaking races about the time of the Mahomedan invasion or a little before it in order to give birth to the modern vernaculars of Northern India which show an analytical structure ? It is also philologically impossible. The Dravidian family of languages are agglutinative while the modern vernaculars of Northern India, show an analytical structure in some respects still retaining their inflectional character. They substitute for some case-affixes and tense-affixes independent words which are inflected but they show no sign of agglutination like the Dravidian languages. How is the descent of an analytical language still retaining its inflexional character from an agglutinative family philologically possible ? Where is the precedent or analogy for it ? Is it not more reasonable to suppose that the modern Indo-Aryan vernaculars are the lineal descendants of the Prakrits which are mainly synthetic and inflexional but sometimes show an analytical tendency which has fully developed in their next stage which is represented by the Modern Indian Vernaculars ?

So long as a linguistic phenomenon can be accounted for by the laws of internal development of a language there is no justification for ascribing it to extraneous influences. The development of analytical character is only a stage in the development of synthetical languages and is found where synthetic families of languages have been in existence. An exact parallel to the development of the analytical modern Indo-Aryan vernaculars from the

Synthetic Prakrits and Sanskrit<sup>17</sup> is found in the development of the Romance languages—Italian, French, Spanish and Portuguese from Latin. If this is possible in Europe purely by a power of internal development why in India to explain the same phenomenon the influence of Non-Aryan languages should be considered as necessary, is not comprehensible.

Mr. M. Collins, in his remarks on "The Sanskritic elements in the Vocabularies of the Dravidian Languages" by S.A. Pillai, detects a Dravidic substratum in the structure of languages of Northern India as would be seen from the following extract :

"These borrowings (*i.e.*, from Sanskrit) whatever modifications they may present, affect only the vocabulary. In structure the Dravidian languages of the South have remained true to the old type. With the race or races who occupied the greater portion of Northern India in primitive times the case is different. These came at a very early period into direct contact with the encroaching Aryans, and here we find a state of things quite analogous to that which obtained in those parts of Europe into which Roman soldiers and Roman settlers successfully penetrated. The Romance languages may well be called Prakrits of Latin, and there can be little doubt that the history of these new languages in Europe is closely akin to that of the rise of the Middle Indian languages of India. In each case a period of more or less complete bilingualism must have preceded the establishment of the supremacy of the invading speech; and in each case the victorious language emerged greatly modified by the speech habits of the invaded areas. In Prakrits and in the Romance languages the local sounds, the local idioms, the local sentence-structure made their influence felt upon the adopted speech."<sup>18</sup> In support of

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17. By Sanskrit is meant here the spoken Vedic, the prototype of Sanskrit.

18. Remarks of Mr. M. Collins quoted by S.A. Pillai, M.A., L.

his statement, Mr. M. Collins gives certain resemblances which, he adds, amongst others point unmistakably to the existence of a Dravidic substratum in the languages of Northern India.

Mr. Bejaychandra Majumdar, in his "History of the Bengali Language" adopts this view of Dravidian influence both in phonology and morphology of Bengali. He writes—"such an eminent scholar as Sir Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar considers such changes in the oldest known Prakrit as ধম্মো (*dhhammo*) for ধর্ম (*dharma*), সঙ্কল্পো (*saṅkappo*) for সঙ্কল্প (*saṅkalpa*), সিলোক (*siloka*) for শ্লোক (*śloka*) etc., to be due to the natural vocal tendencies of the Aryan speakers themselves. Explanation for these changes was not sought outside the mouth of the speakers as the influence of the Dravidians who now reside far away from the limits of Northern India could not be thought of forty years ago, when the Wilson Philological Lectures were delivered. In fact the Dravidians could once be the neighbours of the Aryans in the Northern country did not suggest to the scholars. I have mentioned before that according to the Dravidian traditions, all the dominant tribes of South India migrated from Northern Provinces to Peninsular India. It is a distinct and a definite characteristic of essential nature, in the Tamil language, that an initial of a word can never be formed of double consonants and compound letters formed of consonants of different *varga* can occur nowhere in a word. If we refer the change under consideration to essential peculiarities of the Tamil Speech, our problem is secured. Compounding of r with m as in *dharma* and l with p as in *San̄kalpa* cannot be tolerated according to this rule, and to maintain the long sounds of the compound letters in question, the very letters have to be doubled.....

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T. in his Dravidic Studies No. III—"The Sanskritic elements in the Vocabularies of the Dravidian Languages" (1919), pp. 56-57.

When by about 1865 Bishop Caldwell suggested that the Tamil 'कु' (*ku*) as dative denoting suffix was identical with Oriya 'कु' (*ku*), Bengali 'কে' (*ke*) and Hindi 'को' (*ko*) denoting exactly the dative case, a host of critics rose up to throw away the right suggestion of the Bishop."<sup>19</sup>

The fault of such arguments is that they prove too much. If the Dravidian people could influence the speakers of the Aryan speeches in 'dim past' to such an extent why do we not find its trace in Vedic language when they first came in contact with the Aryans in Northern India and why the letter changes, borrowings of vocables and the analytical phenomena first appear in the Prakrits—and more conspicuously in the modern Indo-Aryan Vernaculars—long after the Dravidians had migrated to the Southern Peninsula has not been answered either by Mr. Collins or Mr. Majumdar. Moreover why the agglutinated elements as soon as they are joined to the roots and bases of the modern Indo-Aryan vernaculars are changed into suffixes and some times add new suffixes to them showing thereby the inflexional character of these languages unaffected by the incorporation of these elements has not yet been explained by the advocates of Dravidian influence on these Aryan Vernaculars.

Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterji in "The Origin and Development of the Bengali Language" (Calcutta, 1926) is more discriminating in adopting the view of the Dravidian substratum in the modern Indo-Aryan vernaculars. He suggests that the dative suffix 'ke' of Bengali can be either 'kr̥ta' or 'kakṣa' in the locative. It is not unlikely that the two postpositional words have converged into this one form. In the plural of the dative তাদেরকে (*tāderke*) (to them) we can see that an analysis into *tasya + ādi + Kera + Kakṣe* or *into + 'Kṛte'* is equally possible. Thus he derives the suffix 'Ke' from both or either

19. B.C. Majumdar, History of the Bengali Language, pp. 58-59.

of the two Aryan words 'Kṛte' and 'Kakṣe' and not from the Dravidian 'Ku'.<sup>20</sup>

Again he remarks, "The case suffixes and post positions are placed after the noun of multitude agglutinated and this system has its parallel in the agglutinative system of Dravidian, e.g., মানুষগুলাকে (*mānuṣagulāke*) (to men) cf. Tamil 'manindangalukku'. Here of course we have only a fortuitous resemblance, there being no genetic connection between the very late Indo-Aryan 'gula-ke' and the Dravidian 'gal-ukku.'"<sup>21</sup>

Elsewhere he writes, "The above are cases where we can look for Dravidian influence in the inherent principle of formation only quite legitimately. But in the development of NIA post positions and affixes which took place towards the end of the first millennium A.C. and in the first Century of second millennium it would be too much to expect direct borrowing from Dravidian or building up on the model of Dravidian, as it has been suggested in a number of cases by various scholars."<sup>22</sup>

Here Dr. Chatterji admits the force of the objection that such borrowings are historically impossible and are nothing but instances of accidental coincidence.

The origin of the Prakrits and of their offspring—the Northern Indian Vernaculars Beames finds in the spoken Sanskrit as distinguished from the literary and to this he applies the term Middle Aryan.

Taking up the same line of investigation Dr. J. Muir thus sums up the views of German scholars on the question of Sanskrit being a vernacular from which the Prakrits have later developed.

"It appears from the passages cited from the works of Professors Lassen and Benfey, that these distinguished

20. S.K. Chatterji, "The Origin and Development of the Bengali Language", Vol. II, pp. 761-762.

21. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 733.

22. S.K. Chatterji, "The Origin and Development of the Bengali Language", Vol. I, p. 173.

scholars assume that Sanskrit (by which, no doubt, must be understood, a language, in some respects different from the later Sanskrit and more akin to the Vedic dialect) was once a spoken tongue regarding this as a fact which admits of no question. While Professor Weber is of opinion that the only Indo-Aryan speech which existed at the very early period to which I refer had not yet been developed into Sanskrit but was still a vernacular tongue."<sup>23</sup>

Weber's own words<sup>24</sup> have thus been translated by Muir—"In its earliest period the Indo-Aryan speech had not yet become Sanskrit, *i.e.*, the language of the cultivated men, but remained still a vernacular tongue, whilst in its second period the people spoke not Sanskrit but Prakritic dialects which had been developed out of the ancient Indo-Aryan vernacular contemporaneously with Sanskrit."

That the orthodox view of the origin of Prakrit from Sanskrit is untenable and both Sanskrit and the Prakrits are derived from earlier Prakrits is a conclusion which seems inevitable from the following considerations :

1. Literary languages are always and everywhere developed from spoken, popular dialects by literary culture and become at last fixed and stereotyped by grammar. Spoken dialects may be compared to a flowing stream constantly changing in successive generations. Literary languages may be compared to branches or canals issuing out of it—in which the flow of the current has been arrested by dams and anicuts built across, causing the water to stagnate in the bed. The literary languages being thus separated from the parent stream of the spoken dialects gradually diverge from them—and at last their difference from the spoken dialects becomes so great that they cease to be intelligible to the common people speaking the popular dialects. Language being a creation of society to serve the purpose of communication of thoughts among

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23. The Original Sanskrit Texts (1874), Vol. II, p. 144.

24. Indische Literaturgeschichte, p. 1.



its members, when a literary language owing to its divergence from the popular speech ceases to be intelligible to the people—it is discarded and becomes a dead language. The need is then felt for creating new literary languages which arise from the stream of popular dialects intelligible to the people of those particular ages and after a short career die again like their predecessors. The history of the origin of Sanskrit, Prakrit and the modern Indo-Aryan vernaculars illustrates this law of development of spoken and literary languages. The Indo-Aryan vernaculars of the successive ages, the spoken Prakrits form the everflowing parent stream. The literary languages of those ages—Vedic, Classical Sanskrit, Pali, Ardhamagadhi, the Prakrit dialects of the plays, the literary Apabhramśas, the modern Aryan vernaculars of India in their literary forms—were all created successively from the spoken Prakrits of their own ages of the different provinces when the older literary languages became unintelligible and dead. Thus the new science of Comparative Philology confirms the view of Vākpatirāja and Namisādhu expressed more than a millennium ago that the spoken Prakrits are the source of the literary languages.

2. The presence of Prakritisms in the Vedas proves that there were spoken Prakrits even in the Vedic age which have been lost not being preserved in literature and the later literary Prakrits must have been descended from these earlier spoken Prakrits and not from Vedic which is a literary language nor from the later Classical Sanskrit, the divergence from which of the literary Prakrits is much greater than from the Vedic Sanskrit.

3. Tadbhava words differ from Tatsamas in three respects. First, by absence of certain letters found in the Sanskrit form. Second, by presence of certain other letters in place of those found in the Sanskrit form. Third, by the presence of additional letters not found in the Sanskrit form. The first class of difference is called by Prakrit

grammarians 'lopa' or elision, the second is called 'varṇādeśa' or substitution of letters, the third 'varṇāgama' or augment. As descriptions of purely grammatical processes without any reference to historical transformation; or genealogy of words, the terms may be allowed. But if they are taken to mean a historical transformation of words from pre-existent Sanskrit into Prakrit arising in course of time they are not an exact representation of facts and are open to objection. Regarding 'lopa' it may be said, there are varying degrees of it found in the Tadbhavas—from slight decay as in the Aśoka inscriptions or Pāli to the disappearance of several intervocalic consonants reducing the words into strings of vowels as in Mahārāṣṭrī. In the former the words can be easily recognised as of Sanskrit origin, in the latter they are transformed beyond recognition. The first kind of Tadbhavas are called by Hoernle,<sup>25</sup> *Siddha Tadbhavas* and the second class of Tadbhavas are called *Sādhyamāna Tadbhavas*. The former are regarded by him as late Tadbhavas, the latter as old Tadbhavas. This view explains the different degrees of decay in the Tadbhavas by the theory of earlier or later introduction of the words from Sanskrit. The difference of decay may also be explained by supposing that the more decayed Tadbhavas were introduced from the spoken vernaculars into the literary Prakrits at a later time and were already in a more advanced stage of decay than the less decayed Tadbhavas and that neither were directly introduced from Sanskrit, while the Tatsamas were borrowed by the literary Prakrits directly from Sanskrit. This assumption better accounts for the varying degrees of decay observed in the Tadbhava words and the absence of any decay in the Tatsamas than the assumption of their being simultaneously borrowed directly from Sanskrit along with the Tatsamas. It is supported also by the fact that

25. Hoernle,—'A Comparative Grammar of the Gaudian Languages', Introduction, p. xxxviii.

changes in literary dialects after they are fixed by Grammar are arrested and, therefore, the greater decay of words must be explained by their being introduced from the spoken Prakrits at a later time than the less decayed words. The existence of spoken Prakrits in the Vedic age proved by the presence of Prakritisms in the Vedic literature also confirms the above view. The explanation of the various changes in the Prakrit dialects by substitution (Ādeśa) or augment (Āgama) from Sanskrit as given by the Prakrit grammarians is entirely artificial and purely hypothetical and is meant only to serve the principle of economy the grammatical treatises aim at<sup>26</sup> and does not represent any genetic or historical development of these words from Sanskrit. They can be explained only by assuming the existence of spoken Prakrit dialects, referred to as Deśabhāṣās,<sup>27</sup> in the different provinces from which the Tadbhava words showing the latter changes were borrowed and not from Sanskrit. Of course these provincial spoken dialects were of Aryan origin. And the Tadbhava words of the literary Prakrits are thus derived from the spoken Prakrits of the different provinces and not from Sanskrit Vedic or Classical both of which are literary languages. Vedic and Classical Sanskrit itself is derived from the spoken Prakrit of a particular province, the home of Vedic and Sanskrit culture—the basin of the Sarasvatī and the Jamunā. And it was indistinguishable from that Prakrit before it became a literary tongue, in a remote, pre-Vedic age.

[Extracted from the Introduction to the Deśināmamālā of Hemacandra, University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1931]

26. See Introduction, p. xxxv.

27. The Nāṭya Śāstra, 17-24, refers to Deśabhāṣās; the Vipākāśruta and some of the other Aṅgas mention "अट्ठारसदेसीभासा" 'eighteen Deśabhāṣās'. These references are evidently to the provincial vernaculars as distinguished from the grammatical Prakrits.

## PERIODS OF PRAKRIT

SUNITI KUMAR CHATTERJI

Definite dates cannot be laid down in language history, but the period from the time of the composition of the Vedic hymns (? 1500-?1200 B.C.) to the times immediately preceding Gautama Buddha (557-477 B.C.) may be regarded as the OIA Period. The MIA period may be said to have extended from 600 B.C. to about 1000 A.C.; of which 600 B.C. to 200 B.C. would be the Early or First MIA stage, 200 B.C. to 200 A.C. the Transitional MIA stage, 200 A.C. to 500 or 600 A.C. the Second MIA stage, and 600 A.C. to 1000 A.C. the Third or Late MIA stage. The first few centuries after 1000 A.C. would be an old NIA period, during which the NIA languages enter into life.

### MIA Period : 600 B.C. — 1000 A.C.

- i) Early stage : 600 B.C. — 200 B.C. (Aśokan Prakrit and Pali as types).
- ii) Transitional stage : 200 B.C. — 200 A.C. (The Prakrits of the earlier inscriptions, — Kharoṣṭhī and Brāhmī as types).
- iii) Second MIA stage: A.C. 200 — 600 A.C. (Dramatic Prakrits — Śaurasēnī, Mahārāṣṭrī and Māgadhi, and Jaina Ardhamāgadhi as types).
- iv) Third MIA stage (Apabhraṁśa) : c. 600 A.C. — 1000 A.C. (Type — Western or Śaurasēnī Apabhraṁśa).

[Adapted from *The Origin and Development of the Bengali Language*, Calcutta University, Calcutta, 1926.]

N.B. OIA = Old Indo-Aryan

MIA = Middle Indo-Aryan

NIA = New Indo-Aryan

[Editor]

## CLASSIFICATION OF PRAKRIT

SUMITRA MANGESH KATRE

It follows from our wide generalisation regarding the term Prakrit that we have to consider a number of languages and dialects which the earlier grammarians did not include within their scope, in order to make our study of MIA as comprehensive as possible. We can, therefore, divide the whole of the MIA linguistic material into several categories—not necessarily into temporal categories such as Old, Middle and Late Prakrit—according to the type of literature where these dialects are attested. In this manner we have the following scheme:

- (1) Religious Prakrits : Pāli, the language of the southern Buddhist Canon and post-canonical works; Ardhamāgadhī the language of the oldest Jaina Sūtras, also described as Ārṣa; the Jaina varieties of Māhārāṣṭrī and Śaurasenī, and Apabhraṃśa attested in the narrative literature forming an extensive branch of Jaina literature.
- (2) Literary : Māhārāṣṭrī, Śaurasenī, Māgadhī; Paisāci and Apabhraṃśa with their sub-varieties.
- (3) Dramatic : Māhārāṣṭrī, Śaurasenī, Māgadhī and their varieties; Old Ardhamāgadhī attested in the plays of Aśvaghōṣa; minor dialects such as Dhakkī or Takkī.
- (4) The Prakrits described by the Grammarians : these include five or six dialects attested in Sanskrit plays and in MIA narrative literature such as Māhārāṣṭrī, Śaurasenī, Māgadhī, Paisāci, Cūlikā Paisāci and Apabhraṃśa, with several dialects. In this category we should include the description of Prakrits given in rhetorical or

musical compositions such as Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* or the *Gītālaṃkāra* or Namisādhū's Commentary on Rudraṭa's *Kāvyaṃkāra*.

- (5) Extra-Indian Prakrits : the language of *Prakrit Dhammapada*, fragments of which were discovered in Khotan, written in Kharoṣṭhī characters; Niyā and Khotanese Prakrit, the language of documents found in Central Asia.
- (6) Inscription Prakrits : From the period Aśoka downwards, written in Brāhmī and Kharoṣṭhī characters, found within the whole of India, and parts of Ceylon. Under these are also to be considered copper-plate grants and coin-legends, thus covering the whole domain of lithic and metal records.
- (7) Popular Sanskrit : Hindu, Buddhist and Jain. These represent the spoken forms of the Indo-Aryans after OIA became fixed within the steel frame prepared by generations of grammarians, for in this popular literature we find traces of such usages which were not recognised as proper for refined Sanskrit of the classical variety.

Such is the extent of the MIA languages which we have to take into consideration for our picture of cultural India between 600 B.C. and 1100 A.D., as an additional source to Vedic and Classical Sanskrit literature.

[Taken from *Prakrit Languages and their contribution to Indian Culture*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1945]

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# PRAKRIT GRAMMARIANS

SATYA RANJAN BANERJEE

Before discussing the grammarians of the Eastern School it would be worthwhile to arrange almost chronologically in a tabulated form the important grammarians belonging to the two schools. The table in two groups is shown below. As Grierson has not mentioned all the authors and works listed in the table, an asterisk(\*) mark is put after authors who are excluded by him.

Besides these treatises and authors mentioned in the table above, there existed a large number of grammatical works. We do not know anything about many of them except the names of authors and the titles of their works.

The Eastern School		The Western School	
Authors	Works	Authors	Works
1. Śākalya*	? Ref. in Pu, RT & MK.	1. [? Vālmīki*]	[? Some sūtras]
Māṇḍavya*	? Ref. in RT & MK	2. Namīśādhu*	Ref. commentary on Rudraṭa's Kāvyaśaṅkara II. 12
Kohala*	? Ref. in MK.		
Kapila*	? Ref. in RT. & MK.	3. Hemacandra	<i>Prākṛta-vyākaraṇa</i>
2. Bharata*	? Ref. in MK. cf. Bharata's Nāṭya-śāstra ch. XVII	<i>Commentators</i>	
	<i>Prākṛta-prakāśa</i>	i) Udaya-sau-bhāgyagaṇi*	<i>Vyutpattidīpikā</i>
3. Vararuci		ii) Nara-(Narendra)-candrasūri*	<i>Prākṛta-prabodha</i>
4. Commentators on Vararuci		<i>Followers</i>	
i) Kātyāyana* (?)	<i>Prākṛta-mañjari</i>	iii) <i>Simhadevagaṇi*</i>	Ref. commentary on <i>Vāgbhaṭaśaṅkara</i> II.2
ii) Bhāmaha	<i>Manoramā-vṛtti</i>	4. Trivikrama	<i>Prākṛta-vyākaraṇa</i>
iii) Vasantarāja	<i>Prākṛta-saṅgīta</i>	A Selection from him by	
iv) Sadānanda*	<i>Subodhini</i>	i) Narashimha*	<i>Prākṛta (śabda) Pradīpikā</i>
v) Nārāyaṇa		5. Simharāja	<i>Prākṛta-rūpavatāra</i>
Vidyāvinoda*	<i>Prākṛta-pādaṭīkā</i>	6. Lakṣmīdhara	<i>Śaḍbhāṣācandrikā</i>
vi) Rāmapāṇivāda*	<i>[Prākṛtaṭīkā]</i>	7. Appayyadikṣit*	<i>Prākṛtamaṇidīpa</i>
vii) Raghunātha*	<i>Prākṛtānanda</i>	8. Bālasarasvati*	<i>Śaḍbhāṣāvivarāṇa</i>
5. Kramadīśvara	<i>Samkṣiptasāhitya</i>	9. Śubhacandra*	<i>Śabdacintāmaṇi</i>
	<i>Prākṛtādhyāya</i>	10. Śrutasaṅgāra*	<i>Audāryocintāmaṇi</i>
6. Puruṣottama*	<i>Prākṛtānuśāsana</i>		
7. Rāmasarman (Tarkavāgīśa)	<i>Prākṛta-kalpataru</i>		
8. Mārkaṇḍeya	<i>Prākṛta-sarvasva</i>		
9. Jīva	<i>Harināmāmṛte</i>		
Gosvāmi* (?)	<i>Prākṛtapāda</i>		
10. Rāvaṇa	<i>Prākṛta-kāmadhenu</i>		
Laṅkeśvara			

Thus the *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇa* attributed to Pāṇini<sup>1</sup> can be summarily rejected in the absence of any evidence. We have meagre information about Durgaṇācārya's *Ṣaḍbhāṣārūpamālikā*,<sup>2</sup> Nāgobā's *Ṣaḍbhāṣā-subanta rūpādarśa*,<sup>3</sup> Bhāmakavi's *Ṣaḍbhāṣācandrikā*,<sup>4</sup> Vāmanācārya's *Prākṛta-candrikā*<sup>5</sup> and Kṛṣṇapaṇḍita alias Śeṣakṛṣṇa's *Prākṛta-candrikā*.<sup>6</sup> Unless these works are carefully studied, we cannot say definitely anything about them. We know only the names of Samantabhadra,<sup>7</sup> Appayajvan,<sup>8</sup> Candrasēkhara,<sup>8</sup> Nṛsiṃha,<sup>8</sup> Puṣpavanānātha,<sup>8</sup> Bhoja<sup>8</sup> and Bhāradvāja<sup>8</sup> as authors of Prakrit grammars. But no work of them has yet come to light. Works like *Deśīprakāśa*,<sup>9</sup> *Deśīprasiddha*,<sup>9</sup> (?), *Prākṛta-kalpalatikā*,<sup>9</sup> *Prākṛtabhāṣāntara-vidhāna*,<sup>9</sup> *Prākṛtasāroddhāra-vṛtti*,<sup>10</sup> *Prākṛtasāhityaratnākara*,<sup>10</sup> *Bhāṣābheda*,<sup>10</sup> *Bhāṣārṇava*,<sup>10</sup> *Bhāṣāvivecana*,<sup>11</sup> *Ṣaḍbhāṣāmañjarī*,<sup>11</sup> *Ṣaḍbhāṣāvārtika*,<sup>12</sup> *Ṣaḍbhāṣāvicāra*<sup>12</sup> are mere names, and, therefore, we are unable to pass any remark on them. We get some characteristic features of Prakrit language in the *Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa*.<sup>13</sup> But these features are extremely scanty and it is very difficult for us to ascertain to what school the author is indebted.

[Taken from *The Eastern School of Prakrit Grammarians*, Calcutta, 1977].

1. Hoernle in his edition of Caṇḍa's *Prākṛta-lakṣaṇam*, Calcutta, 1880, introduction.
2. Mentioned by Lakṣmīdhara in his *Ṣaḍbhāṣācandrikā* p. 22 of Trivedi's edition.
3. Pischel, *Gram*, *Pkt. Spr.* §39
4. Aufrecht, *Cat. Cat.* I. 679b.
5. Pischel, *Ibid*, §41.
6. Peterson's *Third Report*, pp. 342-48.
7. Pischel, *Ibid*, §41; A. N. Upadhye, *A Prakrit Grammar attributed to Samantabhadra*, IHQ, XVII, 1942, pp. 511-16.
8. Pischel, *Ibid*, §41.
9. Pischel, *Ibid*, §41 §8, §43, §34 respectively.
10. Pischel, *Ibid*, §34 §41 etc.
11. Pischel, *Ibid*, §40.
12. Aufrecht's *Cat. Cat.*
13. Vide my article, The Characteristics of Prakrit in the *Viṣṇudharmottarapurāṇa* (Text Reconstructed) in the Bulletin of the Philological Society of Calcutta. Vol II, Calcutta, 1961, pp. 124-30.



# NAMES OF THE PRAKRIT LANGUAGES

SATYA RANJAN BANERJEE

Here is a list of the Prakrit Languages arranged alphabetically. These languages are mentioned by the Prakrit grammarians and some modern scholars in their respective books.

Apabhraṃśa, Ardhamāgadhi (cf. Ārṣam), Atibhāṣā, Avahaṭṭhabhāṣā, Ābhīrā'pabhraṃśa, Āndhrī, Ārṣam (cf. Ar Mg)., Ābhīra, Ābhīrikā, Ābhīrī, Āvantī, Āvantiyā'pabhraṃśa, Inscriptional prakrits, Udici, Upanāgarā'pabhraṃśa, Odra, Auḍhrā'pabhraṃśa, Auḍhrī (cf. Auḍra), Auḍhriya (see Auḍhrī), Kāñcāpabhraṃśa, Kāñca-paiśāci, Kalingā'pabhraṃśa, Kārṇāṭā'pabhraṃśa, Kīrāta, Kaikayā'pabhraṃśa, Kaikeyī-apabhraṃśa, Kaikeya-paiśāci (cika), Kaikeya-paiśāci (cika), Kauntalā'pabhraṃśa, Kharoṣṭhī prakrit, Khotanese prakrit, Gāthā dialect, Gāndhārī dialect, Gauḍa-paiśācikā, Gauḍī-apabhraṃśa, Gaurjā'pabhraṃśa, Grāmyā'pabhraṃśa, Grāmya-bhāṣā, Caṇḍāla, Caṇḍālī, Cūlikā-paiśāci, Jātibhāṣā, Jaina prakrit, Jaina Mahārāṣṭrī, Jaina Śaurasenī, Jaina Saurāṣṭrī, Ṭakkā'pabhraṃśa, Ṭakkī, Ḍhakkī, Dākṣiṇātyā, Dākṣiṇātyā-paiśāci, Dramila, Drāmili, Drāviḍa, Drāviḍā, Drāviḍāpabhraṃśa, Drāviḍa-paiśāci, Drāviḍī, Deśaja, Deśa-bhāṣā, Deśī (bhāṣā), Deśya, Daiva (cf. Haiva, Haimavat), Nāgarā'pabhraṃśa, Niyā Prakrit, Pāñcāla-paiśāci, Pāñcālā'pabhraṃśa, Pāṇḍya-paiśāci, Pāṇḍyāpabhraṃśa, Pāli, Pāścātyā'pabhraṃśa, Paiśācikā, Paiśāci, Prākṛta-Dhammapada (cf. Kharoṣṭhī prakrit), Prācyā, Prācyā'pabhraṃśa, Barbarā'pabhraṃśa, Bāhlikī, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, Bhūtabhāṣā, Madhyadeśīyā'pabhraṃśa, Māgadha-paiśācikā, Māgadhi, Mālavā'pabhraṃśa, Māhārāṣṭrī, Mīśrā'rdhamāgadhi, Rantikā, Lāṭā'pabhraṃśa, Lenā dialect, Vārendra Bhāṣā,

Vibhāṣā, Vibhraṣṭa, Vrācaṭā'pabhraṃśa,  
 Vrācaḍā'pabhraṃśa, Vrācaḍa-paiśācika, Vaidāla,  
 Vaitālā'pabhraṃśa, Vaidarbhī-apabhraṃśa, Śakkī, Śakkī,  
 Śākārī, Śabara, Śabarī, Śābarī, Saurasena-paiśācī,  
 Śaurasenī, Saurāṣṭrī, Srāvantī, Srāvastī, Saṅkirṇa-  
 paiśācī, Saippalā'pabhraṃśa, Saimhalā'pabhraṃśa,  
 Haimavat (See Daiva), Haiva (See Daiva), Hātigumpha.

[Adapted from *A Bibliography of the Prakrit Language*,  
 Calcutta, 1977]

## THE EARLIEST MODERN SCHOLARS ON PRAKRIT

RICHARD PISCHEL

Hoefer was the first scholar to handle the grammar of Pkt. in *De Prakrita dialecto libri duo*, Berolini 1836<sup>1</sup>. Almost about the same time appeared Lassen's *Institutiones linguae Pracriticae*, Bonnae ad Rhenum 1837, based on more richly abundant materials. A supplement thereto, *die Radices Pracriticae* was published by Delius, Bonnae ad Rhenum 1839. Up to that time none of the indigenous grammars had been published, and of the entire Pkt. literature there had appeared only a small portion, of the dramas, Mṛcch., Śak., Vikr., Ratn., Prab., Mālatīm., Uttarar. Mudrār., besides Kāvya prakāśa and Sāhityadarpaṇa, all in wholly bad uncritical editions. Therefore, Lassen was able to describe mainly Ś. only, M. in accordance with the statements of the grammarians and Mg. on the basis of Mṛcch., Śak., and Prab. Under these circumstances Lassen's work is an admirable performance. With his sagacity he has effected improvements in an excellent method in numberless places in the corrupt texts, correctly utilized them and laid the foundation on which the edifice of later research could be raised up. In spite of all such qualities up till now he has found no follower. The works of Weber on M., AMg., of Eduard Müller on AMg., of Jacobi on JM. are devoted to individual dialects; they will be referred to in appropriate places. Cowell, *A short Introduction to the Ordinary Prakṛit of the Sanskrit Dramas*, with a list of

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1. Cf. Benary, *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* 1836, 863 ff.

common irregular Prākṛit words, London 1875 is based upon Vr.; it is all elementary and does not go a long way towards attainment of its goal.<sup>2</sup> Rishikesh (rather more correctly Hṛṣīkeśa) Sastri, *A Prakrita Grammar with English translation*, Calcutta 1883, attempts to re-arrange the indigenous grammars on an European pattern. But as he has used very defective texts (more correctly probably on) manuscripts, without working at them critically, his grammar is not at all usable, especially because he has referred to mostly only known rules. All new are his extracts from the *Prākṛta-kalpalatikā*, that is otherwise unknown. Haag, in his *Vergleichung des Prakrit mit den Romanischen Sprachen*, Berlin 1869, discusses a number of phonetical phenomena, that are common to known languages. Hoernle<sup>3</sup> has given a general survey of the history of Prākṛit Philology and Weber<sup>4</sup> of the recent publications (1870-1881).

[Taken from *Grammatik der Prakrit-Sprachen*, Strassburg, 1900, translated by S. Jha, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, second revised edn. 1981.]

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2. Cf. Pischel, *Jenaer Literaturzeitung* 1875, 794ff.
  3. A Sketch of the History of Prakrit Philology, Calcutta Review, October 1880. Cf. Centenary Review of the ASB. Calcutta 1885, II, pp. 157ff.
  4. Hāla<sup>2</sup> (Leipzig 1881) p. vii f. with note.



## **PART II — JAINICA**



# A BRIEF HISTORY OF JAIN RESEARCH

WALTHER SCHUBRING

§1. It was in the year 1807 that in the Asiatick Researches (Calcutta and London), Vol. IX, there appeared three reports published under the title "Account of the Jains" and collected by Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Colin Mackenzie supplemented by an abstract from his diary of 1797 and from that of Dr. F. Buchanan<sup>1</sup>, the latter containing some notes of a Jain gentleman. These publications were immediately followed by H. Th. Colebrooke's "Observations on the Sects of the Jains"<sup>2</sup>. They were based upon those researches as well as on Colebrooke's own, and it was in them that, apart from bare descriptive recording, some scholarly spirit first made itself felt by a critical standpoint taken and by facts being combined. Jain research thus dates from somewhat more than 150 years ago.

In H.H. Wilson's "Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus" we find some stray notes about the Jains, but no details are given, though, on the other hand, the author dwells upon Vol. I of the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society (1827) which contained an essay by Delamaine

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1. Buchanan published "A Journey from Madras through the countries of Mysore, Canara and Malabar" (Lo. 1807, 2nd ed. Madras 1870, comp. Guérinot JAs. 1909, p. 55). In this work the Jains are often mentioned. Buchanan's Journal kept during the Survey of the Districts of Patna and Gaya in 1811-12", ed. by V.H. Jackson, Patna 1925, contains a description of his visit to the place where Mahāvīra died. Comp. Jacobi Spaw 1930, p. 561.
  2. Printed in Colebrooke's Miscellaneous Essays, 2nd ed., (1872) vol. II, 191-224.



and one more by Buchanan (=F. Buchanan Hamilton), both with the title "On the Srawacs or Jains" and followed by a few remarks of the latter and of W. Ffrancklin about some Jain temples, by Colebrooke's account of two inscriptions, and by Wilson's own review of Colebrooke's study "Sect of Jina" in his "Essays on the Philosophy of the Hindus"<sup>3</sup>. In the same year, 1827, Francklin's "Researches on the Tenets of the Jeynes and Boodhists" were published, the first book that had the Jains in its title. Its descriptive portions are readable even now, whereas this cannot be said of its mythological and speculative deductions.

We abstain from cataloguing here which was printed after 1827, since this can be found in Guérinot's Bibliography (s.b.). We must confine ourselves to mention that "Sketch" of Wilson, because it represents the most important treatment of the subject at that time. He gives a report on the numerable Jain manuscripts both privately owned by him and by the Calcutta Sanskrit College. His "Descriptive Catalogue of the Mackenzie Collection"<sup>4</sup> dealt

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3. We should not like to pass over in silence the earliest references to the Jains. Comp. Windisch in his *Geschichte der indo-arischen Philologie* etc., p. 29; Zachariae *Wzkm* 24, 337-344 (reprinted in his *Kleine Schriften*, p. 41-47) and *Festschrift Winternitz* p. 174-185; Randle *Jras* 1933, p. 147. The Greek glossator Hesychios (5th century A.D.) mentions '*gennoi*' as naked philosophers, a word in which M. Schmidt in his 2nd ed. (1867) of *Hes.* p. 342 surmises the Jains, comp. Gray and Schuyler, *Am. J. of Philol.* 22 (1901), p. 197. Lassen, *Ind. Altertumskunde* 4 (1861) and Lüders *Kz* 38, p. 433 are not against Schmidt's suggestion, whereas Stein in *Megasthenes and Kautilya*, p. 293 f. maintains a cautious attitude.
  4. The Mackenzie Collection. A descriptive Catalogue...By...H.H. Wilson. C. 1828, 2nd ed. Madras 1882.

with 44 South Indian Jain manuscripts that had come to the East India Company in London. But even the earliest essays were partly based upon texts as was Colebrooke's first one in that it concerned Hemacandra's *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* and the *Kalpasūtra* of the Jain Canon. Still he made use of both in a selective manner only and was far from editing or translating them completely, and twenty years had to pass until the first Jain text was published. Again it was Hemacandra's work that was edited by Böhtlingk and Rieu with a German translation in 1847 (St. Petersburg), whereas the *Kalpasūtra*, along with the *Navatattvaprakaraṇa*, appeared in 1848 in Stevenson's English rendering<sup>5</sup>. That this was a rather imperfect performance<sup>6</sup> is easily explained by the fact the Stevenson was the first European scholar to be confronted with the canonical Prakrit<sup>7</sup>. The *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* in 1858 was followed<sup>8</sup> by Weber's edition of Dhaneśvara's *Śatruṃjayamāhātmya*<sup>9</sup> with a detailed preface. So, then, the textual basis was rather narrow for Lassen's sketch of Jainism<sup>10</sup> in his "Indische Altertumskunde" 4, 755-787 (1861).<sup>11</sup>

5. The *Kalpa-Sūtra* and *Nava Tatva*. Two works illustrative of the Jain religion and philosophy. Transl. from the *Magadhi* by J. Stevenson. Lo. 1848.
6. Comp. Jacobi, The *Kalpasūtra* of Bhadrabāhu, pp. 27ff.
7. Pischel, *Grammatik der Prakrit-Sprachen* in § 17 deals with the history of research in the *Ardha-Māgadhi*.
8. Pavie's French analysis of the *Padmāvatīcaritra* in *JAs* 5, T. 7 may also be mentioned.
9. Albrecht Weber, *Über das Śatruṃjaya Māhātmyam*. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Jaina. Leipzig 1858.
10. The word Jainism is an English rendering and etymologically not correct. In German works of Leumann, Winternitz, the Author and others the student will read "Jinismus" and "Jinistisch" derived from Jina, as are, in all languages, "Buddhism etc." from Buddha. "Bauddhism" etc. has never and nowhere been said.
11. Translation by Rehatsek *Ja* 2, 193-200; 258-265.

§2. The mentioned edition had been Weber's first attempt in Jain research, but years later it was actually his great study "Über ein Fragment der Bhagavati etc." that was epoch-making. It appeared in two parts in the *Abhandlungen der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* 1865-66 and in a separate edition (1866-67), that is to say again twenty years after the first Jain text (s.a). Obsolete as it is now, yet it marks in our field the beginning of a philological and creative epoch. As to it, the reader may be referred to Windisch's precise description rendered in the *Grundriss* (*Encyclopedia of Indo-Aryan Research*). But the fundamentals laid down by Weber in self-sacrificing zeal cannot be passed over here : his treatise "Über die heiligen Schriften der Jaina" in *Indische Studien* Vol. 16 and 17 (1883-85) based upon the Jain manuscripts acquired by the Royal Library of Berlin 1873-78, and his "Verzeichnis" of the same (1888-92), the latter<sup>12</sup> represented by two monumental volumes, being a most accurate description which even extends to literature and history. A work of that scope going beyond the usual limits of a catalogue was not out of place at that stage. The Jain manuscripts purchased in later years have been catalogued by the Author not earlier than in 1944<sup>13</sup>.

Some time about those eighties the first prints of canonical texts (1880 ff.) came to Europe adding to foster Jain research work over there. Their inaugurator was Rāy Dhanpati Simha Bāhādur at Azimganj or Murshidabad in Bengal. Those huge volumes served their purpose until they were replaced by more handy ones some thirty years after (s.b.).

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12. "A good deal of my visual faculty has been buried therein", *Verz.* II, 3. p. XVIII.

13. *Die Jaina-Handschriften der Preussischen Staatsbibliothek, Neuerwerbungen seit 1891. Leipzig 1944.* (1127 mss. on 647 pages)

The manuscripts described by Weber had come to Berlin thanks to an agreement between Bühler and the Department of Public Instruction at Bombay which had commissioned him and other scholars in their service with the careful examination of private collections and the purchase of manuscripts at government costs. He was allowed to acquire manuscripts even for foreign libraries, provided they were doubles. The examined and purchased manuscripts were catalogued and listed in the valuable reports of R.S. and S.R. Bhandarkar, Bühler, Kielhorn, Peterson, and others. The manuscripts acquired by the Government have been deposited in the Deccan College, now Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute in Poona. The Jain works among them have been minutely described by H.R. Kapadia in Vol. XVII of the Descriptive Catalogue of the Institute (1935-48). An appendix is devoted to graphic peculiarities (comp. JUB Vol. 5 and 6).<sup>14</sup>

Bühler, through his Reports, has not only become a patron of Jain philology indirectly, but thanks to a number of original works and essays has been a direct promotor in our field, as, in the course of years, Weber, too, had been, and, moreover, they both have inspired younger scholars. Jacobi's critical edition of the "Kalpasūtra of Bhadrabāhu" (AKM 7, 1; 1879) clearly shows traces of Bühler's spirit, while Leumann's "Aupapātika Sūtra" (AKM 8, 2; 1883)—originally a thesis of Leipzig—is influenced by Weber and the Berlin Collection. It may be mentioned here that Weber successfully co-operated with Leumann in his great essay referred to above. The editions

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14. Weber already dealt with this topic (Verz. II 3, p. XII ff.). Leumann discussed the influence of the shape of the leaves upon the text (ZDMG 46, 583f.). Miniatures in manuscripts were treated by Hüttemann, Baessler-Archiv. 4, 2; Brown, Jaina Gazette 28, pp. 77-83 (reviewed by Hirananda Sastri *ibid.*, 113f.); Brown, Kāḷaka (§ 24) with a bibliography. The Bibliography of Indian Archaeology may also be consulted.

of both Jacobi and Leumann are masterpieces of philology, and it was only a predilection for the old Prakrit grammarians that led Pischel in his famous "Grammatik der Prakrit-Sprachen" (§19, footnote 3) to call Hoernle's "Uvāsagadasāo" (1890) the only "critical" one<sup>15</sup>.

§3. Jacobi's introduction to the Kalpasūtra has come to be fundamental for all further research. This research has been described up to the twenties of this century by Windisch and need not be repeated here<sup>16</sup>. Its starting point was, due to Jacobi<sup>17</sup>, the definite removal of any doubt whether the Jains or the Buddhists were of earlier origin<sup>18</sup>, a doubt resulting from some inward and outward similarities between those two world-denying religions. Jain creed had sprung into existence long before Gautama Buddha's time, Vardhamāna Mahāvīra was not its founder, but a reformer of what Pārśva had taught, whom tradition credibly maintains to have lived 250 years before him. It may be added here from a later deduction of Jacobi's that Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa was in 477 B.C. As we know from Pali sources, he was a contemporary of Gautama and is likely to have survived him by seven years<sup>19</sup>.

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15. A reflex of Pischel's remark can be seen in Antagaḍadasāo ed. Barnett, p. X, comp. Leumann, Jras 1907, p. 1080. As to the Uvās., see Leumann's review WZKM 3, 328-350.
  16. For Jain studies in Italy mostly going back to Jacobi see the indological bibliography up to 1911 in Rivista degli Studi Orientali 5, 219-271.
  17. See his introduction to the Kalpasūtra and to SBE 22 and 45.
  18. Colebrooke found it necessary to investigate the precedence of the Veda and of Brahmanism before the said religions (Observations etc., Misc. Essays II 196ff.). Francklin had no doubt that the original religion of India was that of the "Booth" and the "Jeyne" (Researches p. 137).
  19. SPAW 1930, pp. 557ff. (§ 19). Counter-arguments brought forward by Keith Bull. School Or. Studies 6, pp. 859-866.

Pali texts, moreover, give numerous details about thinkers and their schools in the Buddha's time. F.O. Schrader, a pupil of Leumann, made them the subject of his thesis in 1902<sup>20</sup>. The most important of those philosophers was Gośāla Maskariputra, the head of the Ājīvika sect, whose interesting career has been repeatedly treated by Hoernle<sup>21</sup>. That Aśoka knew the Jains under the name of *nigaṇṭha* (Topra edict, 7, 26) was Bühler's statement<sup>22</sup>. Their early history in so far as it is reflected by Hemacandra in his *Parīśiṣṭaparvan* (the *Sthavirāvalī*) and in legends pertaining to it, is due to Jacobi no less than is the right interpretation of what is called the schism that led to the separation of the Śvetāmbara and Digambara communities. They did not, as old time would have it, separate by an act of violence but gradually, until, eventually, both partners became aware of their differences.

§4. It might have been expected that continued Jain research in Europe should have led to the origin of a Jaina Text Society as a counterpart to the well-known Pali Text Society. Pischel expressed his hope in this direction<sup>23</sup>, but things took a different course. The edition of canonical texts—which, of course, was the most important—did not go on methodically, but as circumstances would have it. We are glad to say that the Jains themselves came to help, if, to be true, in their own style. The Āgamodaya-Samiti,

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20. Über den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahāvīra and Buddhas. Strassburg 1902.
  21. *Uvās. II app.*; *Encyclop. of Religion and Ethics* 1, pp. 259ff. Later publications see § 18.—A full account of Schools and Sects in Jaina Literature by Amulyachandra Sen, C. 1931.
  22. ZDMG 46, p. 91; *Ep. Ind.* 2, 274. Acc. to the former place the discovery is due to Lassen.
  23. SPAW 1903, f 11. Pischel lived half a century too early to see the foundation of the Prakrit Text Society on a large scale in 1953. For the first Volume see § 56.

founded at Mhesana in 1915, has published most works of the Śvetāmbara Siddhānta and many more non-canonical texts. These handy prints mark a great progress as compared with the monstrous volumes mentioned above. The classical commentary in Sanskrit has been added. It is wanting in the Jain Sūtra Battisī which was a rather primitive undertaking (Haidarabad 1920), though R̥ṣi (i.e. Sādhu) Āmolak<sup>24</sup> had contributed a Hindi paraphrase. The most recent print<sup>25</sup> is without any commentary whatever. Its name, taken from Ardhamāgadhī, is Suttāgame. Both the Battisī and the Suttāgame are Sthānakvāsī prints and, for that reason, they contain no more than 32 Āgamas out of the traditional 45.

§5. The old texts, in many cases, have been handed down to us in a very curious shape which makes them rather unintelligible for the unprepared reader. The copyists of olden time being confronted with innumerable repetitions have recoured, as can be easily understood, to abbreviations which, however, violated the context. Up to this day, the printed books pass over them as through thick and thin. The reader, indeed, is prepared to forbear as traditional and respectable peculiarities of Jain style a certain monotony of question and answer, dry lists, and long complexes (though not altogether void of euphony) of what has turned out to be metrical passages<sup>26</sup>. But he is longing for a less clumsy wording. This might be easily achieved by a rational method of dissolving those abbreviations and by providing the necessary references,

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24. The same as Amolakh R̥ṣiji, the author of Mukti Sopān (Haidarābād 1915), born in S. 1933, as is evident from the preface.

25. Shri Sutragama Prakashak Samiti, Gurgaon Cantt., E.P.

26. The Vedhametre, discovered by Jacobi Ind. Stud. 17, pp. 389ff.; later treatments by the Author, Worte, p. 3f.; Alsdorf in Asiatica (Festschrift Weller), p. 16.

a method which would result in a readable text where the valuable trend of thought now often concealed would eventually appear in a lucid form. It goes without saying that critical examination and comparison of traditions will remain indispensable. Let it be admitted that the want of controllable oldest manuscripts is often a stumbling stone in the way towards that ideal of a critical edition. Hundreds of Jain works are still preserved in partly subterranean *bhāṇḍārs* where they were deposited centuries ago, and those precious libraries remained inaccessible since the conservatism of the owners could not overcome their disinclination towards their treasures being published. When Bühler was allowed to have a glance into the *barā bhāṇḍār* of Jaisalmer, he was misled as to the mass of what was preserved there. It was not earlier than a few years ago that a scholarly examination of *bhāṇḍār* manuscripts became feasible, and our thanks and respects are due to Munirāj Puṇyavijaya for his working towards that noble aim<sup>27</sup>.

§6. The 'classical' Sanskrit commentary to the Śvetāmbara canon represents the climax of a vast scholastic literature. Its predecessors in Prakrit, the Nijjuttis and Cuṇṇis, were, for a long time, neglected by scholars. We might even say that, in a certain sense, this is still true to-day, for the publications of Cuṇṇis issued in the course of the last decades do not contain even the slightest illustrative or critical addition, though the merits of Muni Jinavijaya Acharya in laying them before the reader are undisputable. It was nearly half a century earlier (1892) that Leumann, on the ground of his own subtle investigations based not upon prints but upon manuscripts, has shown (ZDMG 46, p. 586) the importance of those voluminous products for not only Jain dogmatics but for the history of literature in general. Unfortunately

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27. See Alsdorf in Festschrift Schubring, p. 59f.



the author did not pursue those researches he had characterized as "indispensable for the exploration of the Jain literature of several centuries", pointing out that the Kathās in the old commentaries often appear in non-Jinistic works. Still we possess his "Āvaśyaka-Erzählungen" (AKM 10, 2; 1897) which after the most subtle examination of the best manuscripts give the pure text of those old moral illustrations. It is a point of regret that no more than but four forms of that work should have been printed and that a continuation, though promised, should never have seen the light of the day. It was younger recensions of Jain stories that were translated and explored as to their motives and their importance for comparative history of literature by Hertel and others. In his essay "On the Literature of the Shvetambaras of Gujarat" (1922) we find the following remarkable passage: "During the middle-ages down to our own days the Jains and especially the Śvetāmbaras of Gujrat, were the principal story-tellers of India. Their literature contains, in huge masses, the materials which the students of folklore, who wish to do true scientific work, should thoroughly study in preference to all the other Indian narrative literature." But Hertel did not leave any doubt that in his opinion not even the preliminary condition, i.e. of critical texts and precise translations was fulfilled. As to his intrinsic studies of the Kathānakas for which he succeeded to produce parallels even from non-Indian sources, the reader is referred to Winternitz' History of Indian Literature Vol. 2.

Jain Sanskrit in the Stories, according to Hertel, is a common people's language with its usual carelessness and some borrowings from Prakrit or from the author's provincial tongue; it must not be measured by the standard of classical Bhāratī. This definition serves to weaken a severe judgment pronounced by Bühler (loc. cit. p. 14). At other places in scholarly literature, too, peculiarities of Jain Sanskrit have been noted down. Bloomfield in the

second of four systematical collections<sup>28</sup> has pointed out, (1) the influence of Prakrit and an early stage of New Indian (Gujarati and Marathi) already mentioned, (2) in some cases hyper-sanskritization of words apparently Prakritic, (3) borrowings from dictionaries and grammars, (4) use of words of unknown origin. Apart from Amitagati's *Dharmaparīkṣā* (ed. Mironow) this judgment was based upon Śvetāmbara works. A description of the origin and progress of linguistic studies in the Prakrits (Ardhamāgadhī, Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī, Jaina Śaurasenī) and Apabhraṃśas in Jain literature is beyond the scope of this book.

When stopping further publication of the "Āvaśyaka-Erzählungen" Leumann had consoled the reader with his "Übersicht über die Āvaśyaka-Literature" to come out "in the very next time." Materials from manuscripts and manuscripts only, a long list of which Leumann has given in ZDMG 45 and 46, had been collected for the purpose of laying bare the different layers of an extensive scholastic literature concerning certain indispensable (*āvaśyaka*) formulae of daily devotion. By this great work he was many decades ahead of his time. But, unfortunately, in this case too, printing was stopped when the 14th form (in folio) had been composed. Not until 34 years later this fragment, rich in contents, but difficult to study, was published by the Author who was fortunate enough to find the proofs being preserved<sup>29</sup>.

7. All history of literature, a building, as it were, has for its ground-floor the bio-bibliographical materials. Jain

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28. Life and stories of the Jain Saviour Pārśvanātha (Baltimore 1919); p. 220; Some Aspects of Jaina Sanskrit (Antidöron, Festschrift Wackernagel 1923, pp. 220ff.; The Śālibhadra Carita (JAOS 1923, pp. 290-316); On Diminutive Pronouns in Jaina Sanskrit (Festschrift Lanman 1929, pp. 7ff.).
29. Leumann, Übersicht über die Āvaśyaka-Literatur, aus dem Nachlass hrsg. v. Walther Schubring, Hamburg 1934. Obituary by the same, ZDMG 87, pp. 69-75.

research would have enjoyed the great luck of having them at its disposal, if Klatt's Onomasticon had been completed and printed. Eight volumes from his own hand in alphabetical order contain what was within his reach to collect data concerning Jain authors and works. But he fell severely ill and never recovered. The work was estimated to fill some 1,100 pages in print, but no more than 55 pages have been printed as a specimen thanks to Weber and Leumann<sup>30</sup>. The first to become a bibliographer of Jainism was Guérinot by his "Essai de bibliographie jaina" (1906). A modern standard was not reached until 1944, when Velankar's Jinaratnakoṣa appeared, where the Jain works have been catalogued, while a second volume containing their authors is still waiting for being published. A primitive forerunner had been the "Jaina Granthāvali" published by the Jain Śvetāmbara Conference in 1908.

Another fundament for Jain history are the inscriptions. Guérinot's "Essai" was followed in 1908 by a "Répertoire d'épigraphie jaina." Though not the work of a specialist, yet Luders' "List of Brāhmī Inscriptions from the earliest time till about 400 A.D. with the exception of those of Aśoka" is valuable thanks to innumerable inscribed allusions to the Order of Jain laymen and monks. (EI 10, App. L.C. 1912.)

It seems to be a digression from our subject when we note that Bühler in his academical lecture "*Über die indische Sekte der Jainas*" (1887) was the first to call up the interest of non-scholars for Jainism, legitimated as he was to do so thanks to 17 years of official service in the then Bombay Presidency. Mrs. S. Stevenson, trained in the Christian Mission of Gujarat, wrote her book "The

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30. Specimen of a literary-biographical Onomasticon by Dr. Joh. Klatt Leipzig 1892.—His obituary by Leumann IA, p. 23, 169.

Heart of Jainism" in 1915, thus challenging a strong resentment at least among the Digambaras<sup>31</sup>. It is curious to see that, while this authoress regretted to miss true warmth of heart in the religion she described, Pertold in a public lecture approved of its being excluded from it<sup>32</sup>. Guerinot's book "La religion djaina" (1926) was exposed to criticism as was the book just mentioned<sup>33</sup>. One year before (1925) H.V. Glasenapp's by far more instructive and comprehensive work "Der Jainismus, eine indische Erlösungsreligion" had come into the hands of many grateful readers.

To the same author we owe his contribution to the *Handbuch der Literaturwissenschaft* representing Jain literature and writing according to the different literary species. Winternitz's *History of Indian Literature* Vol. II, pp. 289-356 (1920) which deals with the same subject is too well-known for its merits for being praised here.

§8. Thus far we have registered western working for the public knowledge of Mahāvira's religion. As to the countless pamphlets and journals through which the Jains themselves, for the purpose of propaganda, appeal to the general public, we but mention them here in passing. Of the publications useful for scholars we refer to Vijayadharma Sūri's (s.b.) *Jainatattvajñāna* (in *Festschrift Winternitz*), Jaini's "Outlines of Jainism", P.C. Nahar's "Epitome of Jainism" and Ch. R. Jain's "Jaina Law." Research further receives great help by *compilations* as

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31. Jagmanderlal Jaini : A Review of the H. of J., Ambala 1925. Earlier, Mrs. Stevenson published "Notes on modern Jainism", Oxford 1910.
  32. C. Pertold, The Place and Importance of Jainism in the Comparative Science of Religions (Bh. without year), p. 21 : "I think this sentimental aspect is the least desirable in a modern religion, which must go parallel with the fast development of sciences".
  33. Critically reviewed by Charlotte Krause ZDMG 84, pp. 192-202; comp. also Frauwallner WZKM 36, pp. 336ff.

are catalogues of private libraries, collections of Paṭṭāvalis and of Praśastis, biographies, etc. They all, however, are overshadowed by the "Abhidhānarājendra", a Sanskrit encyclopedia in 7 volumes, whose Prakrit catchwords are taken from the canonical and scholastical literature of the Śvetāmbaras, a monumental work by Vijayarājendra Sūri (1827-1907, Ratlam 1913-25). A glossary of the Canon in three languages is the Illustrated Ardha-Magadhi Dictionary of Muni Ratnacandra in 5 volumes (Indaur 1923-32). Prakrits of all kind including that of the Jains have flown together to mix in the ocean called "Pāia-Sadda-Mahaṇṇavo, a complete Prakrit-Hindi Dictionary" (1928) by Pandit Hargovind Das Sheth. Precise data of places as well as large supplements will increase the value of that great work. Among the *periodicals* we should like to mention the Anekānt, Jain Antiquary, Jain Hitaiṣi where literature and history are being discussed by Jain authors, many of whom, of course, have contributed also to non-Jinist journals. Nearest related to the periodicals are the series (*grantha-mālā*). In many cases they represent a very remarkable file including rare and significant works provided with a scholarly introduction. It is a pity that many Granthamālās should have become known in the West only in fragments, if at all. The Śvetāmbaras can be proud of the volumes, apart from the Siddhānta, published by the Āgamodaya-Samiti, by the Devcand Lālbhāi-J.-Pustakoddhāra, the Ātmānanda-Grantharatnamālā (Bhn, 1911 ff.), the Yaśovijaya-J.-Gr., started in 1904 and apparently the oldest Jain series, and many more literary undertakings which cannot be enumerated here. Our thanks are equally due to the Digambaras. A parallel to the Siddhānta are the classical Digambara authors. They have been printed and translated in the Sacred Books of the Jains (Arrah 1917 ff.; Sanātana-J. Gr. -M. (Ben. 1917ff.); Śrī Rāyacandra-J. Śāstra-M. (Bo. 1916ff.) Māṇikcānd-J. Gr.-M. (Bo. 1915ff.). The most recent series is the Jñānapīṭha-Mūrtidevī-J.-

Gr.-M. (Banaras 1948ff.), a younger counterpart to the Singhī-J.-Gr.-M. (Bo. 1933ff.) of the Śvetāmbaras, edited by Muni Jinavijaya.

§9. These intimations are merely meant to demonstrate the respectable activity within the Jain communities as to their almost inexhaustible stock of literature, an activity radiating as far as to the field of Western research. This state of affairs can be dated from the first two decades of this century. It is true that it was Hoernle who, as early as in 1890, could dedicate the first volume of his *Uvāsagadasāo* to Vijayānanda Sūri (Ānandavijaya=Ātmārāma, 1837-97) in grateful acknowledgment of various suggestions and corrections, though it is equally true that it was Vijayadharma Sūri (1868-1922), never failing to help when being consulted by European scholars<sup>34</sup>, who proved by far more effective. The renaissance just mentioned with the Śvetāmbaras at least is due to his lasting impulse.

For a long time research in Europe and America was known to the Jains but to a certain degree, that is to say, as far as their knowledge of English allowed. Books and articles in German and other Western languages frequently remained beyond their reach. Hence it follows that quite a number of data produced by them are well-known in Western literature. It is evident, therefore, that of all works of Jacobi's (1850-1937)<sup>35</sup> none have come to their knowledge than those written in English. But even this crop harvested on the Jain field by an allround genial indologist was abundant enough for a Jain Conference in

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34. Western acknowledgments and recollections by Winternitz, Guérinot, Belloni-Filippi and others; A.J. Sunawala, V. Dh. S., *His Life and Work*. With a prefatory note by F.W. Thomas, Cambridge 1922, the Same, *Adarsha Sadhu*, an ideal monk, 2nd ed. Cambridge 1934; Vijaya Indra Sūri, *Reminiscences of V. Dh. S.*, Shivpuri 1924.

35. Obituary by H.V. Glasenapp ZDMG 92, pp. 1-14; the Author, *Jain Gazette* 1937.

1914 held on the occasion of Jacobi's second stay in India, to bestow upon him the honorary title of Jaina-darśana-divākara. We are thus justified in this historical sketch in reproducing how to him, in several publications<sup>36</sup>, Jainism presented itself in view of its relation to other creeds and systems.

§10. On the foregoing pages it has been said already that research started from the similarity observed between Mahāvīra's and the Buddha's teaching, those two coeval features which both result in a monk's life, touching each other in many respects and agreeing in considering Right Knowledge to be the means of how to get rid of the endless chain of rebirth. There is, however, a difference (among others) between them in that the Buddha does not share the high opinion of ascetic practices which, in Mahāvīra's belief, are essential for reaching the ultimate goal. Further differences will be found in metaphysics. But here the partner of the comparison<sup>37</sup> is not so much Buddhism as is the Sāṃkhya. In the Sāṃkhya the development of the world starts from matter that is imperishable and infinite as to quality going on in a determined sequel defined by means of Brahman term. The Jains, being far from the Brahman way of thinking, do not acknowledge such a sequel, since, in their eyes, the world is eternal, though they agree with the Sāṃkhya in considering matter as being capable of developing in whatever direction. Moreover, logic compels them, as does the Sāṃkhya, to

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36. On the Metaphysics and Ethics of the Jainas (Transact. 3rd Congr. for the History of Religion 2, pp. 59-66; *Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern* (1923) pp. 21ff.; *Gött. Gelehrte Anz.* 1919, pp. 16ff.; *Encyclop. f. Rel. and Ethics* 7, pp. 465ff.; SPAW 1929, pp. 322ff.; a summary in *Forschungen und Fortschritte* 6, p. 36.

37. Comp. W. Bohn, *Die Religion des Jaina und ihr Verhältnis zum Buddhismus*, *Zeitschr. f. Buddhismus* 3, pp. 113-140; Leumann, *Buddha und Mahāvīra*, *ibid.*, 4 (separate offprint, Munich 1921).

consider as important the transition (*pariṇāma*) from the one status to the next. And third, both are in harmony as to the original conception of the soul. "The Jainas call *jīva* all souls, the Sāṃkhya those that exist in the concrete world. Thus it seems that "soul" has been abstracted from "living being", that is to say, from a popular view." The same idea appears in the conception that the soul is as large as the body, a conception which is apparent with the Jains, while it is at least inferable from the original Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Both Jainism and Sāṃkhya pretend a plurality of bodies. It seems that this conception replaced the primitive idea of a plurality of souls at a time when the doctrine of the One Ātman could not be neglected any longer. This applies to the doctrine of Karman and of reincarnation following from the former and which, by the by, is a primitive idea as well. Both Karman and reincarnation are the fundamentals of the Sāṃkhya system as well as of that of the Jains. The very fact that both these systems, as they now stand, are so very unlike to each other contributes to their common features being extremely significant, and this explains itself by their having embodied elements of common-sense view (*Volksglauben*). The time when this happened can be calculated thanks to non-Jinist testimonials of spiritual development as well as to chronology. Both agree in going back as far as the 8th century B.C.

The Jain system, moreover, exhibits archaic traits not found in other systems. Among them we have the theory of the elementary particles (earth, water, fire, wind) possessing souls, and the names of *dharma* and *adharma* for the media of motion and stop. The former can be rubricated as animism, whereas in the latter there appears the conception of "invisible fluids which by contact cause sin and merit"<sup>38</sup>, a conception coming near to primitive sorcery. In later chapters of this book we are going to point

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38. Jacobi at frequent places.



out some more characteristics of such primitive or popular thinking ("Volks Glaube"). It is very well imaginable that, apart from this basis, Mahāvīra made use of the conceptions of other systems<sup>39</sup>, though his is not dependent on other systems we know of<sup>40</sup>. On the other hand it is probable that the Jains influenced the Yoga as taught by Patanjali, but in subordinate items only. There is no relation to the Vaiśeṣika system assumed by Jacobi, though it shares its atomistic character with that of the Jains. Since the similarity between both of them cannot possibly be ignored, the Jains maintained that a heretic<sup>41</sup> named Chaluya Rohagutta was the inventor of the Vaiśeṣika system. For scholars<sup>42</sup> take the word Chaluya as an illusion to the six (*cha*) categories in the "owl" (*uluya*)-philosophy, i.e. the teaching of the Kāṇādas or "crow-eaters", i.e. "owls." The doctrine imputed to Rohagutta is that he undertook to add a third category (*rāsi*) called *nojīva*, to the natural and traditional ones, viz. *jīva* and *ajīva*. It seems impossible to prove that the Vaiśeṣika took its origin from that rather funny doctrine. Rohagutta was defeated dialectically by 144 items the detailed list of which, being based on the Vaiśeṣika, turns out to be a secondary addition.

§11. It is in this connexion that, last not least, we wish to refer to a subject common to both Jainism and Hinduism, without being entitled to pretend that the latter

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39. "Mahāvīra probably borrowed much more from other sects than we shall ever be able to prove", Jacobi SBE 45, p. XXXII.

40. A conjecture that Umāsvāti in T. 7, 5ff. was influenced by the Yogasūtra was not maintained by Jacobi SPWA 1930, p. 607. Some contact between both of them is stated by him ad. T. 2, 52 and 9, 46.

41. This was the 6th heresy of the 7 known in tradition (§ 17).

42. Jacobi (following Weber) Kalpasūtra p. 119, SBE 45, XXXV ff., ad T. 9. Most important Leumann, Ind. Stud. 17, p. 121ff.

influenced the former. The belief in the force of magic syllables has its roots in the primitive stage of mankind. In Brahman literature it appears ever since the remotest times of antiquity. No wonder, then, that in later centuries we find it even in Jainism where a great many of Stotras resound with those incantations which even an illiterate might master.<sup>43</sup> But the Jains, moreover, have found a way for educated people to bring forward their praise and desire in writing. A *viññā* or magic formula appears in the peculiar manner of each consonant having the virāma and being followed by the respective vowel akṣara (e.g. *t+u* instead of *tu*). In the Canon the Mahānisiha is the only representative<sup>44</sup> and thus goes conform with the Aṅgacūliyā, Āyāravihi, Vihiṃaggappavā and other texts of a decidedly later date. On principle the Stotras are directed to an Arhat, though other persons, among whom there are certain Hindu goddesses, receive veneration all the same. But an Arhat is far beyond the reach of human affairs. Being in the state of pure cognition exclusively and without both sentiment and will, he cannot bestow grace and favour unto those who appeal to him. Hindu influence seems to have been at work in placing at his side two adjutants, one male (*yakṣa*) and one female (*yakṣī*, *yakṣiṇī*), the former presumably being not more than the shadow of the latter<sup>45</sup> and it is these two that take care of a devout supplicant. That, on a large scale, Hindu mythology was adopted by the Jains and brought in accord with their own principles is a fact known too well that it should be treated here in detail. The remarkable process of making out of a Bodhisattva a Roman Catholic Saint<sup>46</sup>

43. Comp. Ch. Krause, Ancient Jaina Hymns, Ujjain 1952; the Author in Festschrift Nobel 1959.

44. The Author, Mahanis. pp. 73 and 74ff. Studien pp. 66, 88, 106.

45. The Author, see footnote 1.

46. E. Kuhn, Barlaam and Josaphat, comp. Winternitz, History 2, p. 416f.

finds its not less remarkable counterpart in the Jain ability of transforming epic heroes and other individuals into venerable persons of their own creed. The difference is that the said process in the West, thanks to translating a wandering subject into many languages, was unconscious, while the Jains with conscious energy satisfied their pious requirements at home.

[Taken from *Die Lehre der Jainas* (1934), translated into English by Wolfgang Beurlen, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1962].

## UNDERSTANDING JAIN RELIGION IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE \*

SATYA RANJAN BANERJEE

I normally study any kind of religion from a historical point of view, because, I believe, if you understand the history of any religion, you would be able to get a better appreciation of any religion whatsoever. So is the case with Jainism. Jainism is a very old religion. There were 24 Tīrthaṅkars in Jainism. The first was known as Ādinātha or Ṛṣabhadeva and the 24th Tīrthaṅkara was Bhagavān Mahāvīra. The period of Mahāvīra is established as the 6th century B.C (599-527B.C). Mahāvīra lived for 72 years. During these 72 years Mahāvīra had brought about some revolutionary changes in the then society of India. This is a very important period in history as it was during this period that Zoroastrianism also developed in Iran. Their original language was called Avestan. This language was not known to a lot of people before the 18th century when the Avestan literature was deciphered and we came to know the contents of the text. Again it was the period of Pythagorus (6th/5th century B.C.) in Greece who started his philosophy of life in Greece around the same period. In China too it was the period when Lao-tse (6th century B.C.) developed Taoism, and Confucius (551-478 B.C.) preached his doctrines of morality known as Confucianism. In India the period saw

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the activities of Lord Mahāvīra and also of Lord Buddha. In a sense the 6th century B.C. was the turning point in the philosophical ideas of human beings in most parts of the world. If Lord Mahāvīra is attributed to the 6th century B.C, surely Ṛṣabhadeva, the 1st Tīrthaṅkara, must have belonged to a much earlier period. It is to be noted that the name Ṛṣabha is found in the *R̥gveda*, which dates back to 1500 B.C. It is, however, much later, around the 8th-10th centuries A.D. that the lives of Tīrthaṅkars were all compiled.

The reason why I give emphasis to dates and history is to make it easy to understand religion by relating the circumstances under which any action would have taken place. It is said that Ṛṣabhadeva taught us many things, but unfortunately all of them were found in books written in some 1000-1500 years later. We do in fact find the life sketch of Ṛṣabha in the *Kalpasūtra*, one of the Agama texts of the Śvetāmbara Jains. So also the life of Pārśvanātha, the 23rd Tīrthaṅkara, is depicted in the *Kalpasūtra*. The date of Pārśvanātha is considered as 817 B.C. There is reference to Ariṣṭanemi in the same text that dates his life to 1000 B.C. In the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, Ariṣṭanemi, among others, is also mentioned. So if we take 1500 B.C. as the starting point of the 1st Tīrthaṅkara and the culmination of the 24th Tīrthaṅkara to 600 B.C., it would be easy to say that that was the period when Jainism started to develop.

Man has been trying his best to understand religion for over 3500 years. The English word religion is equated with the Indian term *dharma*. But the two terms have some differences in meaning and outlook. In fact, the basic meaning of religion (< Latin *religiōn*, substantive of *religiō*, French *religion*, Middle English *religioun*) is piety, care, "the performance of duties to God and man". The word religion is not to be derived from Latin *religāre*, to bind, as it is normally done in common parlance, and states that religion means that which binds you or holds you.

The word is connected with Greek *alegō* I care (< inf. *alegein* "to have a care for, to heed" cf. Greek *algos*, care, from the same root *leg-*). Homer has used the word in this sense in his Iliad (xvi. 388)---*theōn opin ouk alegontes* "not regarding the vengeance of the gods", where the word indicates "fearing the gods". Gradually this meaning was shifted and relegated to the idea of what exists beyond the visible world of which human beings have no control. At a later time, this idea was nurtured through faith, belief, ritual, prayer, spiritual exercises and so on for guiding the everyday conduct of human beings. The religious activities are not guided by reason as is done in philosophy. In course of time, people are strictly adhered to the validity of religious beliefs and practices. The Indian term *dharma* (derived from the root *dhṛ*, to hold, with the suffix *ma*) means the norms for living in a society. The original sense is '*dhāranād dharma ityāhuḥ*, *dharmo dhārayate prajāḥ* i.e. that which holds the *prajā*s or people together are actually the social order. In the Indian context the more emphasis is given on the social order of a place. It is for that reason that we find in the *Manusmṛiti* that the ten inner qualities of man constitute the characteristics of *dharma*. These are—

*dhṛtiḥ kṣamā damo'steyaṁ śaucam indriya-nigrahaḥ/  
dhīr vidyā satyam akrodho daśakam dharma-  
lakṣaṇam//* [6.92]

"Contentment, forgiveness, self-control, non-stealing, purity (of mind), controlling of senses, intellect, knowledge, truth, non-anger (calmness) are the ten features of religion."

And the same Manu in other context states briefly the essence of *dharma* which includes

*ahiṁsā satyam asteyaṁ śaucam indriya-nigrahaḥ/  
evam sāmāsikam dharmam cāturvarṇye' braviṇ  
Manuḥ//* [10.63]

"Non-violence, truth, non-stealing, and purity (of mind), are, in brief, the basis of religion as said by Manu in the context of four castes."

The above mentioned qualities of religion are also propagated by the Jains in the forms of *pañca-mahāvratas* (*ahimsā*, non-injury, *satya*, truth, *acaurya*, non-stealing, *brahmacharya*, celibacy and *aparigraha*, non-accumulation of things), *triguṇtis* (*vag-guṇtis*, control of speech, *kāya-guṇtis*, control of body, and *manoguṇtis*, control of mind), and *pañca-samitis* (*īryā*, care in walking, *bhāṣā*, care in speaking, *eṣaṇā*, care in accepting alms, *ādāna-nikṣepa*, care in taking up and setting down, and *utsarga*, care in excreting). These and many others are the basic things of Jain religion which one must acquire through right vision (or faith), right knowledge, and right conduct.

In the *Mahābhārata* also we often hear the terms like 'this is your *dharma*' and 'that is what you need to do as per your *dharma*' etc.

Every religion has its own beliefs or ways of living and that is what moulds one's life. It is to be noted in this connection that if you follow the doctrines of a particular group, then you belong to that faith. So whatever Mahāvīra and the later Jain teachers have put forth, they all come under the purview of Jainism, and if you believe in this philosophy, you are a Jain. This has been the cases throughout the ages. They were all kings or Kṣatriyas, but during the course of their life they became disenchanted with their life and kingly status, and renounced this material world, crowning their sons as kings, who, in turn, also became Jain saints/monks in their life time.

At the very outset, it is to be noted that some basic Vedic thoughts and ideas which had come down to us from the time of the *Rgveda* (i.e. 15th cent. B.C.) to that of Mahāvīra (i.e. 6th cent. B.C.), were prevalent at the time of Mahāvīra who, by means of his convincing arguments, had tried his best to transform some of these ideas of the

people into the realm of reality. For example, according to the Vedas, God, the Supreme Power, created the world. Mahāvīra did not preach that God created the world. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (I.3.64-68), one of the Āgama granthas of the Śvetāmbaras, says that some people say that Brahmā created the world, but it is false (Bamho is the word used in Prakrit). It says that people do not know that the world was never created by God and it is eternal. This was the first revolutionary idea that was preached by Mahāvīra in the 6th century B.C.

The second revolutionary idea was that the life of all beings are very sacred and naturally they should not be killed, but should be protected. All animals wish to live, and not to be slain; therefore, the Jain monks must relinquish the dangerous killing of animals.

Thirdly, the Vedic concept of *Ātman* (self) is challenged. According to the Vedic Upaniṣads, *Ātman* is permanent, without beginning, change or end. Mahāvīra opposed this view and said—"Reality (*sat*) is not permanent, unchangeable or endless". What is the actual construction of *Ātmā* which we call soul? In general, according to Indian Philosophy, the *Ātmā* of the human beings is ultimately connected to the *Paramātmā*, which is the Supreme Authority or the Supreme Soul. In between there are intermediary stages. But what the Jains call as *Ātmā* and *Paramātmā* is different, because the Jains do not believe in an outside Absolute power, their interpretation of *Ātmā* (i.e. *jīva*), is different.

Fourthly, about the origin of the idea of *Ahiṃsā*. In India, the cult of *ahiṃsā* is very old. It is found in Vedic as well as in Buddhist religions. In the *R̥gveda* we have lots of passages on *Ahiṃsā*- '*mā hiṃṣīḥ*'. Buddhism too deals with *Ahiṃsā*. But since it was only the Jains who philosophized *Ahiṃsā* or made it a part of their philosophy, *Ahiṃsā* becomes a property of Jainism. In most of the Indian literature, whatever be the language — be it Mārāṭhī, Gujarāṭī, Bengali, Hindi, Telugu, Tamil,



Kannada, or Mālayālam, —you will see that they deal with some aspects of *Ahiṃsā* in their writings.

There is a Tamil book, '*Tolkāppiyam*', which is one of the oldest Tamil literary works belonging to about the 3rd century B.C., speaks about *Ahiṃsā*. It is in three parts. The first deals with phonology of *centamiz*, that is, the letters (*ezuttu*) of Tamil. The second deals with words, forms and inflections (*col*) and the third has literature (*porul.*), and 'alaṅkāra' as well. In this literature too there are some passages on *Ahiṃsā*. I have read a translation of the '*Kural*.' belonging to the 3rd or 4th cent. A.D., a very famous Tamil literature, which, some claim, was written by the Jains; and I find that it describes *Ahiṃsā* as one of the great domestic and ascetic virtues.

So when the Jains started establishing the truth in accepting *Ahiṃsā* as fundamental of human life, they started philosophizing it, prepared a logic and ultimately tried their best to establish *Ahiṃsā* as a kind of philosophy. That is why whenever we talk of Jainism, we relate it to *Ahiṃsā*. It is thus described or delineated by almost all types of people.

Finally, another important aspect of Jainism is the '*karma*' theory. Why does any life, be it human or animal, get rebirth? According to Buddhism, it is because we have *taṇhā* (*trṣṇā*) 'desire'. When this desire is not fulfilled in this life we are reborn again to fulfill our desires. In Hinduism many reasons are given for rebirth. One of them is that as the *Cittaśuddhi* has not been done in this life, we are reborn. It is the Jains who say that we are born again and again, because our '*karmakṣaya*' is not yet done completely. It is because you have not completely eradicated the effect of *karma* that you have done in this life, you are bound to take your birth again. So rebirth is common to all philosophies, but the reasons of rebirth are different. It is only the Jains who believe that as long as *karma* is not destroyed, beings are bound to come back again.

When someone starts preaching, even if it be the basic truth, if it is not currently popular, then one meets with lots of resistance. This has happened all over the world. For example, the whole of Greece once thought that Socrates was mad, because the ideas he had put forth were very new to the then existing society. Similarly, Mahāvīra also encountered with lots of oppositions when he started preaching his ideas. The first encounter that Mahāvīra met was Lord Buddha. Buddha and Mahāvīra met each other for many times. They held lots of discussions on soul, life after death, existence of Hell and Heaven and so on. In the Pāyāsi-sutta of the *Dīghanikāya* No. 23, the existence of a soul substance is denied by Pāyāsi as it was done by Buddha himself. In the *Majjhima-nikāya* in the Upāli-sutta (No. 56) there is a dialogue between Buddha and Mahāvīra with regard to the practice of asceticism. In this way, we can see lots of references to the views of Mahāvīra in the Buddhist literature. I have a feeling from the pages of history that perhaps Buddha could not stand the arguments of Mahāvīra, as Buddha's arguments were all refuted, while Mahāvīra's arguments were very poignant and logical. As a result, Buddhism could not stay in India for a long time. And in the 3rd century B.C., at the time of Aśoka (273-236 B.C.), though he was a Buddhist, he sent his missionaries to other parts of India, even to Śrī Lankā. Once Buddhism went out of India, and started spreading outside, it never came back. There are, of course, some followers even today in Magadha, Nalanda and in Chattagong, apart from China, Tibet, South-East Asiatic countries outside India. Another encounter which Mahāvīra had to face was the *Ājīvika sampradāya* which was very famous at that time. Mudgalāyana had an encounter with Mahāvīra, which is described in the 7th chapter of the *Upāsakadasā-sūtra* of the Śvetāmbara canonical literature. Like the *Ājīvikas*, there was another group in the south called 'Yāpanīya' which was also very

famous. Amulyachandra Sen in his book—*Schools and Sects in Jain Literature* (Viśva-Bhāratī, Śāntiniketan, 1931) describes the Jain sects in the canonical literature. This book is not available now, but may be traced in some library.

During the time of Lord Mahāvīra, some of his ardent disciples, later on came to be known as Gaṇadharas (*gaṇa* means 'a group of people' and *dhara* means 'one who holds it together') were perplexed with some of the thoughts and ideas of Mahāvīra which were antagonistic to the then existing Vedic ideas of India. In order to dispel their notions about certain existing ideas, these disciples straightforward asked Mahāvīra certain things which were the burning questions of the day. At the time of Mahāvīra, these ardent disciples, eleven in number, were at a loss to know the real nature of Soul, *Karma*, *Jīva*, basic five elements (*pañca mahābhūtas*), birth in the same form in the next birth, Bondage and Deliverance, Existence of Heaven and Hell, existence of *Pāpa* and *Puṇya*, existence of the other world, and finally *Mokṣa*. These eleven Gaṇadharas had asked Mahāvīra any one of these questions for clarification and understanding. In course of time, these eleven basic questions formed the eleven salient doctrines (*tattvas*) of Jainism. Indrabhūti had the doubt regarding the existence of soul; while Agnibhūti had the doubt regarding *Karma* whose existence could not be visible. Vāyubhūti was poignant in asking Mahāvīra about *Jīva*. His doubt was whether the body itself was the *Jīva* (soul) or whether it was different from the *Jīva*. Vyakta's question was based on the five elements (*pañca mahābhūtas*) of the world. He asked whether the basic five elements (*pañca mahābhūtas*) were real or unreal. Sudharmā asked Mahāvīra whether the *Jīva* would be the same kind or different in the next birth. Maṇḍita had the doubt regarding bondage and deliverance. The doubt of Mauryaputra was whether the deities and Heaven exist at all or not. Akampita had the

doubt regarding the existence of Hell. Acalabhrātā's doubt was regarding the existence of *puṇya* and *pāpa*. Metāryas doubt was regarding the existence of the other world; whereas Prabhāsa's doubt was whether there could be anything like *Mokṣa*.

These questions of the eleven Gaṇadharas are of a crucial nature, and ultimately formed the basic profound philosophical doctrines of Jainism. In course of time, the followers of Mahāvira developed these ideas in different ways by their incisive intellectual analysis. At a much later time, people posed with such questions like-what is *sat*? What is the ultimate goal of a thing? - so on and so forth. It was in the 3rd century A.D., a philosopher called Umāsvāti, in his book *Tattvārthasūtra* or *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*, first defined 'sat', based on the canonical literature of the Śvetambaras. That which is reality is 'sat'—that which exists. It has 'utpāda' (origin), *vyava* (deviation from the original) and *dhrauvya* (permanent). So in Jainism we consider 'sat'—reality as having three points. That is, it has an origin and a deviation, but at the same time it is fixed.

The question that comes to our mind from the above is how can one thing be fixed, is changed? If it is fixed, it cannot be changed, and if it changes, it cannot be fixed. Let me give you an example. Let us take the case of a seed of a plant. When you plant the seed, it sprouts out after a few days and a little later becomes a tree with branches, leaves etc. In course of time, it decays and dies. So it has three stages, but the basic seed is the same, it never dies. Let us take another example of clay—*mṛttikā*. A potter makes a pot out of clay and when the pot is destroyed, it once again turns into earth, so, in fact, the clay is never destroyed. It remains only mud; that which is made out of clay is destroyed. This was the idea put forth by Umāsvāti in the 3rd century A.D.

These ideas over a period of time became their

philosophy too. Originally it was only an idea and then became a philosophy. So what is philosophy in the real sense of the term ? When does a statement turn into a philosophy? Sometimes it is difficult to define exactly what we talk about. When we study certain things systematically, with an objective behind it, giving it a causal relationship between the subject and the effect, then it automatically comes under the purview of philosophy. Every incident in one's own life has a philosophy of its own. When I say that this is how I do something, then that becomes my philosophy. We very often ask, what is your philosophy in life? - May be to earn money, or to be kind to others etc. Throughout the history, the Jains have tried to prove how *Ahimsā* could become a religio-philosophy of life. People will not find fault with philosophy, because it gives a cause and effect relationship. Sometimes it is based on one's own experience.

In establishing *Ahimsā* as a valid philosophy, we will have to depend on Logic. The basic question of Logic is—in what way do we consider something as right or wrong? We have five senses—*cakṣu*, *karṇa*, *jihvā*, *nāsikā* and *tvak*- and whatever we sense through them we believe them. Some philosophies claim that what we see may or may not be true, but these five senses are our basic instruments of cognizance for *pratyakṣa*. Some philosophies claim that our mind can be one of the organs by which we perceive a thing—knowledge. What is knowledge? Knowledge is a word we often use almost everyday. We often talk about the right knowledge, as Jainism does.

Actually, knowledge is a system of ideas corresponding to a system of things and involving a belief in such correspondences. There is basically three systems of ideas. You have an idea, say, of a chair or of a table, but if you have never seen one in your life you cannot have an idea, because you have no knowledge of either a table or a chair.

So you must have some idea corresponding to a system of things, in this case a chair or a table to be able to say, "this is a chair or this is a table". Then you believe, depending on this idea, that this is indeed a chair or a table. These are the definitions that are given in the books of Logic.

In Jainism knowledge has a distinctive role to play and right knowledge is greatly emphasized. Right knowledge helps us examine the matter by right conviction. In every human being (*Jīva*), there is some sort of knowledge latent in him. But as long as that knowledge is not testified with right conviction that knowledge is not a right knowledge. It is considered as false knowledge (*mithyā-jñāna*). Knowledge is a mental process, it is normally accompanied with conviction. For example, if I see a nurse with a boy on the street, I have the right conviction that there are a woman and a boy outside. This conviction is further enhanced with the idea that the woman is a nurse. Uptil now our knowledge is not complete. But if we know the full details about the nurse and the boy, their whereabouts, their locality, their positions and so on, then we can say that we have a right knowledge about them. That is why, in Jainism right knowledge (*samyag jñāna*) is greatly emphasized. This knowledge must be free from doubts.

Knowledge is of five kinds; *Mati-jñāna*, *Śruta-jñāna*, *Avadhi-jñāna*, *Manahparyāya-jñāna* and *Kevala-jñāna*. *Mati-jñāna* is acquired by means of the five senses, or by means of the organ of thinking. *Śruta-jñāna* is based on the interpretation of words and their meanings, writings, signs and gestures, etc. It is related to *mati-jñāna*. *Avadhi-jñāna* is the knowledge of the past; it is the transcendent knowledge of material things; it is obtained with the help of higher perception. It can be acquired by austerities. It is acquired by celestial and infernal souls. *Manahparyāya-jñāna* is the knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of others. Only human beings possess it and they obtain it

by means of higher perfection. *Kevala-jñāna* is the perfect knowledge which is acquired in its pure and undefiled condition by the perfect ones.

But the knowledge of the first three types is considered as bad, as long as it does not come from perfect believe, whereas the last two types of knowledge are perfect only among human beings having proper belief. But knowledge is bad when one understands *sat* and *asat* without any distinction, his knowledge is bad knowledge (*ajñāna*), and bad knowledge leads to *mithyātva*. But for the Jains, falsehood has no place, and cannot be considered as *jñāna* in the real sense of the term. But in Indian philosophy even *mithyātva*, falsehood, is also a type of knowledge. Even Buddhism says that what we see cannot be denied, and this is similar to the Vedantic idea of *Māyā*. For example, you see a rope in the dark and you mistake it for a snake. For that duration of time, the rope becomes the snake. But when we recognize the rope for a rope, the illusion (*māyā*) is over and the illusion becomes *mithyā* (false) and is naturally wrong. So we can see that falsehood is also a form of knowledge though lived for a short while.

As I mentioned earlier Jainism had its origin in Bihar. But later on Jainism spread far and wide from there to different parts of India. In the 4th century B.C. during the period of Chandragupta Maurya (324-300 B.C), there was a famine in Magadha, and it lasted for over 12 years. (There is reference to this famine in the inscriptions of Śravaṇabelagola in Karnataka). During this period the Jains found it very difficult to beg alms from door to door, because of various restrictions and taboos. So a group of Sādhus migrated to the South after travelling through Vindhya and other places and finally settled down in Śravaṇabelagola. These Sādhus then started preaching Jainism there. This is the reason why Jainism spread in the south. So there were many Sādhus and Monks in the south.

Historically the division of the two sects—Śvetāmbara

and Digambara—started when the people who had gone down to the south returned to the north in Magadha, where they perceived the differences between the two sects. This I would say is the basic turning point. Each claimed that theirs was the authentic teachings of Mahāvīra, while the other was mutilating it. But they lived side by side and it was only in the 1st century A.D., that is, the 79 A.D., or may be even the 4th or 3rd century B.C. that they started splitting up and by the 5th century A.D., they became completely different. When the people from the north migrated to the south came back to Magadha, they started looking at the differences between their *ācāras* or *vyavahāras* (conducts). For example, the Digambaras say that Mahāvīra did not wear any clothes, whereas the Śvetāmbaras insist that he did. But if you see the statues of Mahāvīra belonging to the period from 1st century B.C. down to 13th-14th centuries A.D. they are all naked. So this becomes a point in favour of the Digambaras. Another difference is that the Śvetāmbaras believe that women can also get renunciation or *nirvāṇa*, but, according to the Digambaras, women cannot get *nirvāṇa* at all. According to the Śvetāmbaras, Mahāvīra was married and had a daughter before he renounced the world, but, according to the Digambaras, Mahāvīra was not married at all. The canonical literature of the Śvetāmbaras is 45 in number which are not accepted by the Digambaras who have three different texts divided into 45 books. The Digambaras place the date of Mahāvīra between 659 and 587 B.C., whereas the Śvetāmbaras place Mahāvīra between 599 and 527 B.C.

In course of time, there arose many *Saṅghas*, groups of people, in the South. According to the Digambara tradition, the *Mūla-saṅgha* (the original community) was divided into four groups, such as, *Nandi-saṅgha*, *Simha-saṅgha*, *Deva-saṅgha*, and *Sena-saṅgha*, are all groups that propagated the Jaina culture and the names normally took the name of the person who founded the *Saṅghas*.



Again, in contrast to the above four *saṅghas* of the *Mūlasaṅgha* a few more sects came up and they were-*Yāpanīya-saṅgha*, *Drāviḍa-saṅgha*, *Mathurā-saṅgha* and *Kāṣṭhā-saṅgha*. Out of these *saṅghas*, in modern times, the Digambara sects are-*Bispanthīs*, *Terapanthīs*, *Gumānpanthīs* and so on. In the north Jainism flourished from Magadh in Bihar to Rajasthan, Gujarat, Mahārāṣṭra, Bengal, Orissa, Madhya-Pradeśa, Uttara-Pradeśa, Punjab and Kāshmir. Just as in the South we have many *Saṅghas* of the Digambaras, so also in the North, we have many *gacchas* of the Śvetāmbaras, and these are *Kharataragaccha*, *Tapāgaccha*, *Upakeśagaccha*, *Pārśvacandragaccha*, *Āncalagaccha*, *Paurṇanāyagaccha*, *Āgamikagaccha* and so on. Later on, there evolved *Lumpākagaccha*, *Sthānakavāsīs*, *Terāpanthīs*, *Veśadharas* and *Vandhyas*.

For over 2000 years, different philosophers in India have propagated Jainism in different ways. We will, therefore, talk of Jainism with this historical background. What are the books upon which all our arguments will be based ? We will primarily depend upon the canonical literature of the Jains. The Jains were divided into two groups—the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara. In course of time, we found that the two groups had different sets of literature as well. The Śvetāmbara canonical literature is popularly known as *Āgama grantha* or *Siddhānta*. *Āgama* refers to 'that which has come down' to us from Lord Mahāvīra. It is called *Siddhānta* because that is the essence (conclusion) of the speeches of Lord Mahāvīra. But in 1939 the canonical literature of the Digambaras was discovered in *Moodbidri* and the first publication (edited by Hiralal Jain) started from Amaravati. In course of time, the Digambara canonical literature, such as, the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, *Kasāyapāhuḍa*, and *Mahābandha* were all published.

Among the Digambara scholars, some are worth mentioning. It was probably in the early centuries of the

Christian era that we have some Digambara writers who contributed a lot to the cause of Jainism. The first among them was Kundakunda (1st or 3rd century A.D.) who wrote many books, *Pravacanasāra*, *Niyamasāra*, *Samayasāra*, *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, *Prābhṛta-traya* or *Sāra-traya* and so on. These books of Kundakunda were, of course, the earliest, while the other literature followed him. This was the first secular Digambara literature as far as we know. Today, of course, many Digambara literature like *Kaṭṭigeyāṇuvekkhā* and Vaṭṭakera's *Mūlācāra*, Sivārya's *Bhagavati-ārādhanā*, Yativṛṣabhācārya's *Tiloyapannatti* were published from many places and Jainism spread throughout the length and breadth of South India. Starting from Karnaṭaka, it spread to Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Mysore and Kerala as well. The Jain influence had not been very appreciable in Kerala till then.

It is to be noted this connection that enormous literature in different languages had been developed in the south. Starting from the literature in the Prakrit language, we have the Jain literature in Kannaḍa, Telugu and in Tamil. Tamil and Kannaḍa have a lot of literature on Jainism. Most of the Kannaḍa literature till very recently was found on Jainism and also on Jain philosophy. Till about the 10th century A.D. there was no separate Mālāyālam Jain literature, but subsequently we did have some Mālāyālam literature as well. It was after the 8th century that Ādi Śaṅkara introduced many Sanskrit words into Mālāyālam and the languages like Telugu and Kannaḍa started having the influence of '*Maṇipravālanaya*'. Tamil, however, has retained its original identity even till today, though the Sanskrit influences on Tamil can be found even now. It is this background that we need to understand the Jain religion in the South.

At a much later time, three of the Digambara writers became famous, and they were Pūjyapāda Devanandin, Samantabhadra and Akalaṅkadeva.

Pūjyapāda Devanandin (6th cent. A.D.) wrote a commentary on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, known as *Sarvārtha-siddhi*. Samantabhadra (600 A.D. or 8th cent. A.D.) also wrote a commentary on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, the introduction to which is known as *Devāgama-stotra* or *Āptamīmāṃsā* in which the Jainistic philosophy of Syādvāda is explained. His Yuktyanuśāsana is also another philosophical work. Almost at the same time was Akalaṅka (10th cent. A.D.) who also wrote a commentary on the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, known as *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika*. He also wrote a commentary on Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsa*, known as *Aṣṭaśatī*. Akalaṅka is also the author of *Nyāya-viniścaya*, *Laghīyastraya*, *Svarūpa-sambodhana* and *Prāyaścittagrantha*. Akalaṅka's views were opposed by Kumārila, while Vidyānanda Pātrakesarin and Prabhācandra defended Akalaṅka.

In this connection I would like to state the importance of the three eminent Śvetāmbara Jaina writers who contributed a lot to the cause of the spread of Jainism through their writings. These authors are, in a sense, pioneers in the field of Jainism. Their enormous compositions on different subjects have enriched the Jain literature to a great extent. There is a gap of nearly five hundred years from each other. They are Haribhadra, Hemacandra and Yaśovijaya.

Haribhadrāsūri, the most distinguished and prolific Jaina writer of the 8th century (705-775 A.D.), is credited with having written the philosophy of *Anekānta* first. While there were others who also wrote, it was Haribhadrāsūri who wrote *Anekāntajayapatākā* to establish the philosophy of manysidedness for judging a thing. Later, of course, there were many Jain scholars who had written on this philosophy following Haribhadrāsūri. There were some very powerful authors on both sides, but it was the Digambaras who had contributed a lot to the *Anekāntavāda* philosophy. It

explains how an object or an idea can be judged from all possible angles of vision. It is a fact worth noting that according to the Jains a substance has two opposite characters—permanence and change, universality and particularity, similarity and dissimilarity. The Jain authors like Samantabhadra, Akalaṅka, Vidyānātha and Yaśovijaya laid a firm foundation of *Anekāntavāda* and established a grand superstructure of Anekānta doctrine. The *Anekāntajayapatākā* of Haribhadrāsūri is a standard work on the subject and is the most solid contribution to the treasure house of Jain philosophy.

Haribhadra was the first to write commentaries on the Jaina Āgama texts of which again *Āvassaya* and *Dasaveāliya* have come down to us. In Haribhadra's commentaries many interesting tales are found. In his Sanskrit commentaries he retained the narratives in their original Prakrit form. Hemacandra has taken some of his stories in his *Sthavīrāvali-carita*. Haribhadra is also the author of *Upadeśapada* and 32 *Aṣṭakāni*. In his famous book on general philosophy *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*, he mainly deals with Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Jaiminī and Buddhism, and lastly on Jainism in a short section. *Loka-tattva-nirṇaya* is his another philosophical text in Sanskrit verses, where also he has discussed other systems including Jainism. He wrote a commentary on Umāsvāmī's *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*. He also wrote a commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśa* of the Buddhist Dinnāga. His other works are *Yogabindu*, *Yoga-drṣṭi-samuccaya*, *Dharmabindu* etc. All these works deal with the doctrines of Jainism. Jacobi mentions some other works of Haribhadra. They are *Anekānta-jayapatākā* with his own commentary, *Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya*, *Ṣoḍaśa-prakaraṇa*. Haribhadra's *Samarāicca-kaḥā* is a prototype of Taraṅgavatī and is a Prakrit prose romance. Haribhadra also wrote a satire *Dhūrtākhyāna* by name in five *ākhyānas* (stories) during the reign of king Sammattarāya of Citoḍa. (S.R.

Banerjee, *Introducing Jainism*, Calcutta, 2002, pp. 33-34).

Again it was in the 12th century that we had "the Omniscient of the Kali Age" (*Kali-kāla-sarvajña*) Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.) of Gujarat who not only wrote on Jain philosophy but also on grammar, lexicography, poetics and metrics, of the Prakrit and Sanskrit languages. In fact, the growth of Jainism was distinct after the monumental works of Hemacandra. It was because of Hemacandra that Gujarat became a main stronghold of the Śvetāmbara Jains and had remained so for centuries. In fact, the Jain literature flourished to a great extent in the 12th and 13th centuries in Gujarat. Hemacandra wrote several works, such as, *Siddha-hemaśabdānuśāsana*, *Dhātupāṭha*, *Uṇādi-sūtra*, *Liṅgānuśāsana* on grammar; and, *Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi*, *Anekārtha-saṁgraha*, *Nighaṇṭu-śeṣa*, *Ekākṣara-nāmamālā*, *Deśināmamālā* on lexicography; and *Chando'nuśāsana*, *Kāvya'nuśāsana* on metrics and rhetorics; and *Dvyāśraya-kāvya*, *Triṣaṣṭi-śalākā-puruṣa-carita*, *Pariśiṣṭa-parvan* (*Sthavirāvalī*), *Jaina Rāmāyaṇa* on Mahākāvyas; and *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, *Anyā-yoga-vyava-cchedikā* (in 32 verses) and *Yogasāstra* on philosophy. Hemacandra attacked on Brahmanical morality, particularly on Manu, and had shown convincingly that the morality as proclaimed by Manu was incompatible with the command of *Ahiṁsā*.

In the 17th century we also have Yaśovijaya (1624-1688 A.D.) whose contribution to Jainism was a turning point in the Jain history. He was the first who tried to reconcile the differences between the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara conflict. It was he who wanted "to prove that the Kevalin, the completely Enlightened, so long as he leads a physical life, must take nourishment, that women can attain to release, and that the ordinary objects of usage of the monks, garments etc, are not to be counted as "possessions", and that the saintly life does not exclude

life in the world. (Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, p. 593). Though he is not a prolific writer, he seems to be a bulky writer. All his works are full of thoughts and ideas. His *Adhyātma-parikṣā* in Prakrit with a Sanskrit commentary by the author himself, is a treatise on self-realisation. His *Jñāna-bindu-prakaraṇa* (written in 1675) and *Jñānasāra* or *Aṣṭaka-prakaraṇa* relate the essence of knowledge for acquiring the right perception of an object. It is also said that he revised the *Dharma-saṃgraha* written by Mānavijaya in 1681. This is a bulky book which describes the duties of the householder and ascetic. This book is very rich in quotations, and it is seen that nearly 103 works and 26 authors are quoted in this book.

In the history of Jainism certain new ideas (which were once discarded by Mahāvīra) started to appear again. Around the 10th century A.D. differences in certain interpretations of Jainism came in. For example, Mahāvīra did not believe in *Caturāśrama*, that is, *Brahmacarya*, *Grhastha*, *Vānaprastha*, and *Sannyāsa* (Jaina name is *bhikṣu*), but in the 9-10th centuries A.D., these started coming up again in Jainism. It is believed that Jinasena (9th cent. A.D.), a pupil of Virasena, and the friend of King Amoghavarṣa I (815-877 A.D.), and an author of the *Ādipurāṇa*, accepted the *Caturāśrama* system of Hinduism. His follower the famous Digambara *Cāmuṇḍarāya* (10th-11th centuries A.D.) in his work *Cāritra-sāra* has acknowledged this concept of the four *āśramas* of the Hindus. Except one (i.e. *bhikṣu* the name of the fourth stage), the names are also the same.

After a few centuries, Āśādhara (1240 A.D.) in his *Sāgaradharmāmṛta* and Medhāvin (1504 A.D.) in his *Śrāvakācāra* had given threefold classification of the *Śrāvaka*. These are *pākṣika*, *naiṣṭhika*, and *sādhaka*. A *pākṣika-śrāvaka* is a layman who practises the *anuvratas* and the *mūlaguṇas*. He is called a *pākṣika* layman, because he has an inclination (*pakṣa*) towards *ahiṃsā*, while, on

the contrary, the *naiṣṭhika-śrāvaka* (which is, in fact, equivalent to *naiṣṭhika-brahmacārī* and which is again later on called *kṣullaka*) is one who pursues his path upwards for spiritual attainment and practises the tenfold dharmas of the ascetic. As in his culminating point (*niṣṭhā*) he leaves the household life, he is called *naiṣṭhika śrāvaka*. A *Sādhaka* is he who concludes (*sādhayati*) or renounces his human body by carrying out *sallekhanā*. (S.R. Banerjee, *Introducing Jainism*, Calcutta, 2002, pp 34, 36). The inclusion of this idea in the history of Jainism was due to some historical influences of the time . Sometimes these differences might also be due to some other reasons.

Jainism is very severe, very difficult to follow. Particularly the life of the Śvetāmbara Sādhus who roam from place to place is very difficult to follow. They cannot cross the sea or water. As the Jaina Sādhus and Sādhvīs could not cross the sea, Jainism did not spread outside India. But in the last quarter of the twentieth century, some groups of Jains travelled all over the world spreading Jainism. They are not Sādhus and Sādhvīs in the real sense of the term, but they are called *Śramaṇa* and *Śramaṇī*. They are allowed to travel everywhere. This started almost at the end of the 20th century, and the Terapanthī Sādhu community was the pioneers in this respect. The Jaina monks and nuns should not stay in one place for a long time and they must be constantly on the move preaching their religion. They can halt in one place only during the rainy season and resume their journey as soon as the rains are over. Even our present Ācārya Mahāprajñaji has been constantly roaming for over 70 years now. He has perhaps now left Ahmedabad as well. I saw him moving in the years 1958-59 in Calcutta and that is where I met the Ācāryaji for the third time, the first time I met him was in 1957 at Sujangarh in Rajasthan. Wherever they moved, the monks preached the Jaina philosophy and that is how the religion was propagated. People attended these preachings in large

numbers and often became the followers of the religion as well. It is said that in those days both Buddha and Mahāvīra used to go from place to place trying to convince the kings and the queens by their views, because unless the kings accepted it, you could not make the rest of the people (*prajās*) accept their views. Normally when they addressed the king in the assembly, common people were also there, listening. It is also said that there were over 5-6 lakhs followers of Mahāvīra in those days and the preaching basically involved the fundamental truths and also removing from the minds of the followers any kinds of doubts or confusions relating to who he was and what was his role on this earth.

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## APPENDIX

### SOME MAJOR RELIGIONS AND RELIGIOUS IDEAS OF THE WORLD

#### A. MAJOR RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD

1. Christianity
  - a) Roman Catholic
  - b) Orthodox Catholic
  - c) Protestants
  - d) Coptic Christians
2. Judaism
  - a) Jews and Judaism
  - b) Jewish Sects
    - i) Karaism
    - ii) Cabala
    - iii) Hasidism
3. Hinduism (Sanātana/Brahmanism)
4. Jainism (Śvetāmbara and Digambara)
5. Buddhism (Mahāyāna and Hinayāna)
6. Śaivism (Śaktism)
7. Vaiṣṇavism
8. Sikhism (Grantha-sahib)
9. Brāhma-ism (propagated by Raja Ram Mohan Ray)
10. Islam (Muslims/Mohammedanism/Sufism)
11. Taoism
12. Confucianism
13. Shintoism
14. Lamaism
15. Zoroastrianism (Religion of the Parsees)
16. Animism
17. Baha'i Faith
18. Druze
19. Pagan Religion
20. Popular Beliefs

#### B. PRIMITIVE RELIGIONS

- a)
  1. Ancestor worship
  2. Animal worship
  3. Fateshism
  4. Magic
  5. Human Sacrifice

6. Shamanism
7. Totenism
- b) 1. Cargo Cults
2. Ghost Dance
3. Nativistic movements
4. Peyotism
5. Sun-Dance
6. Voodoo

### C. SUBJECTS OF RELIGION

1. Creation of the world (Myths of)
2. God (Existence of God)
3. Heaven and Hell
4. Eschatology (the things after Death)
5. Faith, Prayer and Belief
6. Feast and Festival
7. Priesthood, Ritual and Spiritual exercises
8. Sacrifice/Worship
9. Soul/Ātmā/Paramātmā

### D. IDEAS OF GOD

1. Monotheism → Monism
2. Dualism → Deism
3. Polytheism → Pluralism
4. Theism → Pantheism
5. Agnosticism → Atheism
6. Yahweh/Brahma/Allah
7. Devil and Satan

### E. RELIGIONS OF INDIA AND JAPAN

India	Japan
1. Hinduism/Sanātana/Brahmanism	1. Buddhism
2. Buddhism	2. Shintoism
3. Jainism	3. Confucianism
4. Śaivism (Śāktism)	4. Christianity
5. Vaiṣṇavism	5. Popular Beliefs
6. Sikhism	
7. Brāhma-ism	
8. Islam/Muslim	
9. Christianity	
10. Zoroastrianism	

# SCHOOLS AND SECTS IN JAIN LITERATURE

AMULYA CHANDRA SEN

The canonical literature of the Śvetāmbara Jains contains many references to various philosophical schools and religious sects apparently contemporaneous with itself. Although the canon in the form we have it now is a creation of the Council of Valabhi held in *circa* 454 A.C. under the presidentship of Devardhigaṇin, yet the matter contained in it is much older. This Council reduced the text to writing. The first collection was, however, made by the Council of Pāṭaliputra which, according to Hemacandra, met during the reign of Aśoka Maurya. Additions were made no doubt during the subsequent redactions, but the essentials remained unchanged through the long years of canonical revision which brought with it accretions of extraneous matter. The statements which form the subject matter of discussion in the following pages picture a state of things much earlier than Devardhigaṇin's age and earlier even than the Council of Pāṭaliputra.

The beliefs and practices discussed in the Jaina texts were considered heretical from the point of view of the Jains or the Nirgranthas, as they were called in the earlier days, and as such it was necessary for them to state and criticise the views and practices of many of those schools and sects. An attempt has been made in the following pages to give a comprehensive account of all these sects and schools. Some works outside the Jaina canon have also been sometimes referred to for the purpose of illustrating the matter contained in the canon. References in the later works of Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras to systems of thought adverse to them have

been rejected for the simple reason that they deal with circumstances of later ages influenced by conditions of later times when such works were composed. In many cases parallel references and accounts have been mentioned from the literature of the Buddhists, as they and the Jainas having started their career about the same time the former are likely to furnish reliable evidence on matters referred to by the latter, both being outside the Brahmanical fold and having a strong critical outlook.

That the time the Jaina canon treats of was one bristling with conflicting views and rival schemes may easily be gathered from such statements as "See, there are men who control themselves, whilst others only pretend to be houseless."<sup>1</sup> The *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*, one of the oldest of the canonical texts, says that "To friendly or hostile heretics one should not give alms, drink, dainties and spices...nor do them service. ... Some here are not well instructed as regards the subject of conduct; ... they pronounce opinions. ... Know that all this is without reason."<sup>2</sup> The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga Sūtra*, another of the most authoritative texts, says "These heretics will never be saved. ... some unworthy *śramaṇas* who hold wrong doctrines are afraid of what is free from danger and are not afraid of real danger."<sup>3</sup> "Some who search after truth and pretend to practise the Law, follow the false Law and do not arrive at the right thing ... ignorant of what is right and wrong they do not get out of misery ... they praise their own creed and blame that of their opponents."<sup>4</sup> In a passage of fierce denunciation it has been said that the heretics will never be saved from the sufferings of the world.<sup>5</sup> In the *Sthānāṅga Sūtra* false belief is spoken as

1. *Ācār. S. I. i.2.2; I.i. 3.4.; I.i. 6.3.; with a slight variation in I.i.7.2..*
2. *Ibid. I. vii. 1. 1-3*
3. *Sūt. S. I.i.2.5-10*
4. *Ibid. II.ii. 15-23.*
5. *Ibid. II.ii. 79-81.*

an instrument that causes pain (*micchādaṃsanāsalla*).<sup>6</sup> It has been divided into two classes, *abhiggahiya* and *anabhiggahiya* which Abhayadeva, the commentator, explains as that proceeding from acceptance of wrong doctrine and that proceeding from other causes. In the *Bhagavatī* there are frequent mentions of heretical schools and of heretical ascetics who came to question Mahāvīra. The *Jñātādharmakathā*, *Antaḥkṛtadaśā* and *Praśnavyākaraṇāṅga Sūtras* also contain occasional references to *micchādaṃsanāsalla*.

In the *Upāsakadaśā* praising of heretical teachers and intimacy with them have been regarded as offences against the law of right belief.<sup>7</sup> The animosities of the time are well-illustrated by the remark of the newly converted lay disciple Ānanda made to Mahāvīra : "Truly, Reverend Sir, it does not befit me from this day forward to praise and worship any man of a heretical community, or any of the devas of a heretical community, or any of the objects of reverence to them; or without being first addressed by them, to address them or converse with them; or to give or supply them with food or drink; except it be by the command of the king or the community or any powerful man or deva or one's own elders or by the exigencies of living."<sup>8</sup> Frequently does Mahāvīra refer to the need of refuting heretical doctrines : "Surely, venerable companions," says Mahāvīra to his disciples, "if those servants of the *Śramaṇa* who are householders living among householders, refute the theories of heretics, then much more, venerable companions, must the Nirgrantha ascetics who are students of the sacred collection of the twelve *Angas* be able to refute the theories of heretics by means of these arguments, questions, proofs and explanations."<sup>9</sup>

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6. Sth. i. 48; Bhag. I. 6, 52.

7. Upās. S.i.44.

8. *Ibid.* i. 58.

9. *Ibid.* vi.174

In the *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* bad monks who do not protect themselves from sin, who though having the appearance of monks are the lowest among their worthy brethren, have been likened to heretics : they are despised in this world like poison, they are no bodies in this world or in that beyond.<sup>10</sup> The views and teachings of heretics have been called delusive talk which is untrue and without any meaning.<sup>11</sup> Opinions and manifold doctrines not conforming to the Nirgrantha creed were declared to be contemptible which a monk was advised to abandon, for they were productive of evil everywhere.<sup>12</sup> Faith has been held to be easier to obtain for those who though not versed in the sacred doctrines are not acquainted with other systems and hold no wrong doctrines. Right faith depends on the avoiding of schismatical and heretical tenets.<sup>13</sup> Among the eight principles on which excellence of faith rests, are counted absence of preference for heresies, and non-shaking of right belief at the prosperity of heretical sects.<sup>14</sup>

In the *Nandi Sūtra* Mahāvīra has been eulogised as the moon who ever vanquishes the Rāhu of *Akriyā-vāda*,<sup>15</sup> as the destroyer of the lustre of other schools,<sup>16</sup> and as the destroyer of the pride of false faiths.

It will be seen from the remarks quoted above that the time was full of various opinions, views, beliefs, schools, sects and teachings.<sup>17</sup> They were not at all friendly towards each other as can be easily gathered. It will now

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10. Utta. S. xvii.20.

11. *Ibid.* xviii.26

12. *Ibid.* xviii.26, 30

13. *Ibid.* xvii.26, 28

14. *Ibid.* xvii 31.

15. Nan. S. 9.

16. *Ibid.* 10 & 20.

17. How differences and disputes arose over subjects that would be regarded as beyond the scope of religion in the present day is illustrated in Bhag. S. 11.9.418, in the story

be our task to examine the many references throughout the canon with a view to find out what views each of them upheld and whether any of them can be identified with schools whose doctrines we are familiar with. This will serve a double purpose of showing in the first place what was the historical background of the Nirgrantha doctrine, what views they felt called upon to refute and thereby establish the superiority of the Nirgrantha creed, and secondly of showing though in an indirect manner, the condition of many doctrines of the time by means of the light thrown by the Jainas regarding the philosophical and religious atmosphere of India of that period. It is agreed that a hostile critic's remarks cannot be accepted in full in judging the value or contents of a creed it took upon itself to criticise, yet the opinion of an adverse critic seen through a proper perspective has its own value for historical purposes, indicating as it does the currents of popular opinion. It is to be remembered that this work is not intended to be a history of the philosophies of the time. The principal object is to get as clear an idea as is possible of the tenets, as they appeared to the Nirgranthas, of other schools and sects in those ancient days with a view to create a suitable background for the study of Jainism.

Many of the statements met with in different places are vague, such as the vehement denunciation of those who injure earth-bodies, water-bodies, plants, wind-bodies, animals, etc.<sup>18</sup> for such would apply to many non-Nirgranthas. Jacobi thinks<sup>19</sup> on the authority of Śīlāṅka,

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of Prince Śīva where cosmographic details form the subject of the disputes; and in 11-12.435, where duration of the gods' lives in different heavens is hotly debated. Manifold disputes and their uselessness are also referred to by the Buddhists in *Duṭṭhaṭṭhaka*, *Suddhaṭṭhaka*, *paramaṭṭhaka*, *Pasūra*, *Māgaṇḍiya*, *Cūlavīyūha* and *Mahāṭiyūha Suttas* of the *Aṭṭhakavagga*.

18. Acār. S. I. i.2.2; I.i.3.4; I.i.5.4; I.i.7.2; I.i. 6.4.

19. SBE.xxii.p.4

the commentator, that "others only pretend to be houseless" refers to the Buddhists. It must be pointed out, however, that we know now that there were in those days many kinds of houseless ascetics besides the Buddhists, to whom the remarks of the Jainas would equally apply.<sup>20</sup> We shall deal, however, with only those statements which are particular, precise, and identifiable, and consider them in the order of importance given them in the Jaina texts.

## PART I

### I. THE ĀJĪVIYAS

The doctrines of the Ājīviyas are the best known heresy to the Nirgranthas. Judging from the frequency of their appearance and the vehemence and care with which they are denounced it seems probable that the doctrines of the Ājīviyas played an important part in the life of the times.

The Ājīviyas believed that though it is proved that there are individual souls, they experience pleasure and pain, and on dying lose their state of existence, yet misery and pleasure are not caused by the souls themselves, for how could it be caused, they asked, by other agents as time, etc. ? Pleasure and misery, final beatitude and temporal pleasure, and pain are not caused by the souls themselves nor by others; but the individual souls experience them; it is the fate assigned them by Destiny.<sup>21</sup>

Another account states that there is no such thing as exertion or labour or power or vigour or manly strength, but that all things are caused by destiny which is unalterably fixed.<sup>22</sup> This has been called the doctrine of Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta. From the story of Saddālaputta,

20. See also sūṭ. S. I.i.1.6 & I.ii.1.8; and the long disputes between Nirgranthas and others in Bhag. 8.7.337; 13.2.595–596; 18.7.634; and 18.8.640; Sth. S. 3.2.167; Aup. S. 38

21. Sūṭ. I.i.2.1–3.

22. Upās. 6.166.



the potter of Palāsapura, and an adherent of the Ājiviyas, we get the leading doctrine of Gosāla. The story runs thus:

Saddālaputta once brought out his potter's ware from within his workshop and placed them in the sun. Mahāvīra happened to come upon the scene and asked "Saddālaputta, how is this potter's ware made?"

Saddālaputta : "Reverend Sir, this ware is at first clay, then it is kneaded with water, and then it is mixed well together with ashes and dung; then it is placed on the wheel, and finally many bowls and jars of various sizes are made."

Mahāvīra : "Saddālaputta, is your ware made by dint of exertion and manly strength, or on the other hand, is it made without exertion and manly strength—*kim utṭhāṇeṇam vā kammeṇam vā baleṇam vā virieṇam vā purisakkāra-parakkameṇam kajjanti udāhu anuṭṭhāṇeṇam jāva apurisakkāraparakkameṇam kajjanti?*"

Saddālaputta : "Reverend Sir, it is made without exertion and manly strength, and all things are unalterably fixed."

Mahāvīra : "Saddālaputta, if any one of thy men were to steal thy unbaked or baked ware or scatter it about or make holes in it or let it drop into pieces or place it outside unguarded or if he were to indulge in outrageous familiarities with thy wife Aggimittā, what punishment would thou inflict on that man?"

Saddālaputta : "Reverend Sir, that man I will curse or beat or tie up or frighten or threaten or cuff or fine or bully or even before his time deprive him of his life."

Mahāvīra then pointed out that if all things were unalterably fixed and depended not on exertion then he ought not to take any action against his servant's conduct for the servant was not responsible for it. This convinced Saddālaputta of the falseness of Ājivīya doctrines and he was converted to the creed of Mahāvīra.<sup>23</sup>

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23. Upās. 7.195.200; 6.166

The Parable of the Lotus-pool is an important chapter in which the views of some of the leading schools have been stated.

There was a lotus-pool containing much water and mud, full of white lotuses, delightful and magnificent. In the very middle of this lotus-pool grew one big white lotus. Now there came from each of the four quarters a man proud of his own abilities and attempted to fetch the big white lotus. To each of them as he proceeded the water and mud seemed to extend, so that he could neither reach the white lotus nor return to the bank and was stuck in the mud. Then came a restrained monk who called aloud standing on the bank and the big white lotus flew to him. Mahāvīra narrated this story and asked his disciples if they understood the meaning of the simile and on their answering in the negative explained that the lotus-pool meant the world, the water meant *karman*, the mud meant pleasures, the lotuses meant people in general, the big white lotus meant the king, the four men meant the heretics, the monk meant the Law, the bank meant the Order, and the monk's voice meant the preaching of the Law, and the big lotus flying up meant *nirvāṇa*. Different teachers went to the king to teach him but only the Nirgrantha ascetic succeeded.

One of these four teachers, an Ājīviya, states his doctrines as follows :

There are two kinds of men, one admits and another does not admit action. Both are alike, their case is the same because they are actuated by the same force. An ignorant man thinks of the case as follows : "When I suffer, grieve, blame myself, grow feeble, am afflicted or undergo punishment, I have caused it; or when another man suffers, etc., he has caused it." Thus an ignorant man thinks himself or another to be the cause of what he or the other man experiences. A wise man thinks about the cause as follows : "When I suffer I did not cause it or when another man suffers he did not cause it. By the will of fate

all beings are born, are made to suffer changes of life or to die.<sup>24</sup>

Adda's discussions with various teachers, while renouncing the life of a Prince he was on his way to Mahāvīra, are interesting. In these discussions one man states that if an ascetic living alone uses cold water, eats seeds, accepts things prepared for him or has intercourse with women, he commits no sins thereby.<sup>25</sup> Harṣakula, author of the *Dīpikā* on the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, and *Śīlāṅka* identify this man as Gosāla which is corroborated by the fierce personal attacks he makes on Mahāvīra in course of the discussions. This is natural enough, for the relations between the two were notoriously bitter. The fact, however, appears to be that the Ājīviya doctrines have been put forward through this fictitious person.

The soul of him who is pure will become free from bad *karman* on reaching beatitude, but in that state it will again become defiled through pleasant excitement or hate; and that he who has lived on earth as a restrained monk will become free from *karman*, and as clear water which was free from defilement again becomes defiled, so will be the soul. This doctrine has been attributed to a school. Harṣakula thinks that the Ājīviyas are meant. Śīlāṅka mentions the Trairāśikas besides Ājīviyas. The Trairāśikas are the Jaina followers of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.<sup>26</sup> They are so called because they believed in a third state of existence besides *jīva* and *ajīva*.<sup>27</sup>

In some places the Ājīviyas are mentioned by name but hardly anything is mentioned regarding their views.<sup>28</sup> Once we find them asking the Nirgrantha elders the question whether an article belonging to a young monk belongs to himself or to another, if it is stolen by a thief

24. Sūt.S. II.1.30–33.

25. *Ibid.* II.vi. 7.

26. SBE. xlv. p. 245, n.2.

27. See *infra* the sixth schism led by Rohagupta.

28. Bhag. 1.2.24.

when the young ascetic is observing the *sāmāyikas* and the monk goes after the thief.<sup>29</sup> They are said not to accept Mahāvīra's doctrine of abstention from sin of body, mind and speech in the three-fold divisions of doing it oneself, getting it done by another, or approving of another's doing it.<sup>30</sup>

On the life of Gosāla we have the following details supplied by the Jainas. His father was called Maṅkhali who used to wander about from place to place exhibiting a picture. Maṅkhali once came with his wife Bhaddā to Saravaṇa and took up his lodging in the cow-shed of a wealthy Brahman called Gobahula and Gosāla was born here. He followed his father's calling. At one time Mahāvīra was residing in a weaver's house at Nālandā where Gosāla also happened to come in course of his wanderings. A householder named Vijaya of the city of Rāyagaha entertained Mahāvīra with great honours. Gosāla heard of this from the people and meeting Mahāvīra offered to be his disciple whereupon the latter gave no reply. The same offer was made by Gosāla on two subsequent occasions with the same result. Mahāvīra left Nālandā and Gosāla in his mood of dejection gave away his belongings, shaved his head and went away. He met Mahāvīra again in Paṇiyabhūmi, repeated his offer and it was accepted this time. They lived together in that place for six years.<sup>31</sup>

Once on the road from Siddhatthagāma to Kummaggāma they came across a sesamum shrub in blossom. Gosāla asked if it would die and if so where its seeds would reappear. Mahāvīra replied that the shrub would die but its seeds would appear again in the pods of the same shrub. Gosāla disbelieved this, called Mahāvīra

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29. Bhag. 8.5.328

30. Bhag. 8.5.329

31. According to Kalpa. S.5.122, Mahāvīra lived only a year in Paṇiyabhūmi.

a liar, and going up to the shrub uprooted it but a shower of rain having fallen the shrub took root again and Mahāvīra's prophecy was fulfilled. Now they went on to Kuṇḍaggāma on the outskirts of which they met the ascetic Vessayaṇa practising penances with his arms uplifted, his face turned towards the sun, and his body covered with lice. Gosāla asked the ascetic if he was an ascetic or a lice-heap. This enraged Vessayaṇa who released his fiery forces (*teullese*) to burn Gosāla but Mahāvīra out of pity for Gosāla counteracted the forces by releasing his own forces. Finding himself thwarted Vessayaṇa exclaimed "That will do, Sir, that will do." Gosāla questioned Mahāvīra about the meaning of such exclamation and the latter explained what was about to happen. Then Gosāla enquired how long it took to acquire such forces and how such forces could be acquired. Mahāvīra answered that it could be acquired by dint of penances. Afterwards when they were on their way to Siddhantthagāma they happened to pass the sesamum shrub mentioned before. Gosāla narrated to Mahāvīra his past prophecy and claimed that it had been falsified as the shrub was yet alive. Mahāvīra explained that Gosāla's uprooting it on the previous occasion had fulfilled his prophecy about its death and the coming down of the shower which revived it had caused the seeds to appear in the pods, for all plants were capable of reanimation. Gosāla disbelieved it, went up to the spot and on closely examining the shrub found the seeds. This led him to conclude that not only plants but all living beings were capable of reanimation. Then he left Mahāvīra.

Gosāla then practised the severe penances for acquiring fiery forces and succeeded after six months. Now he proclaimed himself a Jina and founded the Order of the Ājīviyas. The headquarters of the Order was in Śāvatthi in the shop of the potter woman Hālāhalā. In the twenty-fourth year of Gosāla's ascetic life he was visited by six ascetics with whom he discussed their

doctrines and propounded his own theory from the eight Mahānimittas belonging to the Puvvas consisting of the principles of obtainment and non-obtainment, pleasure and pain, life and death. He met a disciple of Mahāvīra and notified to him his intention of destroying Mahāvīra by means of his fiery forces. The threat was conveyed to Mahāvīra who forbade Nirgrantha ascetics to hold any communication with Gosāla. Surrounded by his disciples, Gosāla called on Mahāvīra and angrily ridiculed him for having called Gosāla a disciple of Mahāvīra. "Maṅkhaliputta who was a disciple of Mahāvīra," said Gosāla "was dead and reborn in the heavens as a god. But I whose name was Udayi was born in the body of Ajjuna and entered in the seventh reanimation the the body of Gosāla, which I still hold." He then went on to narrate in detail the processes of reanimation he had undergone in the bodies of different persons in different places and how in his seventh and last reanimation he obtained omniscience in the body of Gosāla in the potter shop of Hālāhalā. Mahāvīra in reply told him that he was like a thief who being chased by villagers attempted to conceal his identity under various disguises and in various places of hiding. Gosāla was enraged at this and hotly abused Mahāvīra. A disciple of the latter intervened but was burnt up by Gosāla's fiery forces. Another disciple also met with the same fate. Mahāvīra himself now rebuked Gosāla who attempted to burn him but was unsuccessful. A scene followed of trial of strength between the two teachers. They parted and Mahāvīra instructed his disciples to go and annoy Gosāla with questions.

After sometime Gosāla was stricken with a fever and being delirious he held a mango in his hand, drank liquors, sang, danced and made improper advances to Hālāhalā, and sprinkled on himself the cool muddy water from the potter's vessels, which acts, Mahāvīra explained to his disciples, led to the Ājīviya doctrines of the eight Finalities (*aṭṭha-carimāṇi*). The first four of the eight Finalities were

the last four acts performed by Gosāla, *viz.*, the last drink, the last song, the last dance and the last improper solicitation. The other four were the last tornado, the last sprinkling elephant, the last fight with big stones and missils,<sup>32</sup> and the last Tīrthaṅkara who is Gosāla himself.

Gosāla's sprinkling himself with the muddy water from the earthen vessels gave rise to the doctrine of the four things that may be used as drinks, and the four things as their substitutes by virtue of the coolingness. Those that may be used as water are the cow's urine, water accidentally collected in potter's vessels, water heated by the sun, and water dripping from a rock. Those that may be used as substitutes are holding in the hand a dish or a bottle or a jar or a pot which is cool or moist; squeezing in the mouth a mango or a hog-plum or a jujube or a *tinduka* fruit when it is unripe or uncooked, but not drinking its juice; squeezing in the mouth *kalāya* or *mugga* or *māsa* or *simbalī* beans when they are unripe or uncooked, but not drinking the juice; and feeling the touch of the moist hands of the gods Puṇṇabhadda and Māṇibhadda when they appear on the last night of six months to one who eats pure food for six months, lies successively for two months each on bare ground, on wooden planks, and on *darba* grass. He who submits to the touch of the two gods furthers the work of venomous snakes but he who does not do so generates in himself a fire which burns his body and he dies and attains liberation.

Ayambula, an Ājīviya came to visit Gosāla at the time and felt ashamed finding Gosāla in a delirium. He was about to go away but Ājīviya elders called him back,

32. The first three of the latter four refer to historical events of the time. The sprinkling elephant was known as Secanaka and belonged to king Śreṇik of Megadha who gave it to his younger son by queen Celleanā. His elder son Kuṇika on becoming king demanded the elephant from his brother which was refused. This gave rise to war in which stone missiles were used.

explained the new doctrines and asked him to put his question to Gosāla after throwing away the mango in his hand. Ayambula did so and asked about the *halla* insect. Gosāla replied "This which you see is not a mango but only the skin of a mango. You ask about the *halla* insect—it is like the root of the bamboo; play the lute, man, play the lute." The Gosāla feeling the end approaching called his disciples and requested them to observe his funeral with all honours and proclaim that he was the last Tirthaṅkara. But afterwards he felt that he was not an omniscient but a false teacher and a humbug but that Mahāvīra was the true Jina. Then he called his disciples and asked them to treat him with dishonour after he was dead and proclaim his misdeeds and the Jinahood of Mahāvīra. Then he died. The Ājīviya *theras* closed the door and pretended to carry out Gosāla's last instructions, and then they opened the doors and gave him a funeral according to his original wishes.<sup>33</sup>

The austerities practised by the Ājīviyas are classified into four kinds, *viz.*, severe austerities, fierce austerities, abstention from ghee and other delicacies, and indifference to pleasant and unpleasant food.<sup>34</sup>

It is said in the system of the Ājīviyas that all the living beings are subject to an ungratified desire to enjoy, and hence their earning of livelihood is by killing, cutting, etc.<sup>35</sup>

The varieties of the Ājīviya ascetics are these : — those who beg in every second house, those who beg in every third house, those who beg in every fourth house, those who beg in every fifth house, those who beg in every sixth house, those who beg in every seventh house, those who accept lotus-stalks only as alms under certain conditions, those who beg in every house, those who do not beg if

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33. Bhag. 15.539-554.

34. Sth. S. 4.2.310

35. Bhag. 8.5.310



there is a flash of lightning, and those who practise penances by entering big earthen vessels.<sup>36</sup>

The names of the twelve adherents of the Ājīviya doctrine are given as Tāla, Tālapalamba, Uvviha, Saṁviha, Udaya, Avaviha, Nānudaya, Namudaya, Anuvālaya, Saṁkhavālaya, Ayambula and Kayaraya. They abstained from eating five kinds of fruits, viz., *umbara*, *vaḍa*, *bora*, *satara* and *pilaṅkhu* and are said to have given up eating roots, bulbous roots, etc.<sup>37</sup>

The Sāmaññaphala Sutta of the Buddhists, which contains an account of the doctrines of the six principal teachers contemporary with Buddha, gives an account of Gosāla's teachings from where we get the same denial of the usefulness of effort or manly vigour. "*N'atthi atthakāre n'atthi parakāre n'atthi purisakāre; n'atthi balam n'atthi viriyam, n'atthi purisathāmo, n'atthi purisaparakkamo*—the attainment of anything does not depend either on one's own acts or on the acts of another or on human effort; there is no such thing as power or energy, or human strength or human vigour."—Digha-nikāya, Vol. II, p. 53. Every thing depends on fate, and salvation depends on a long series of births of different kinds. No change can be effected in this long series of transmigrations by any effort on the part of an individual.

Dr. Barua has reviewed in an exhaustive manner all the matter available on the life and teachings of Gosāla.<sup>38</sup> We do not intend to go here into any detailed examination of Gosāla's teachings, for which one must be referred to Dr. Barua's work. The conclusions reached by him hold up Gosāla and his teachings in a far better light of course. But the fact remains that his teachings were stubbornly

36. Aup. S. 41. for Buddhist evidence cf Mahāvagga 3.12.9 for the last of these classes, and Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta for ascetic practices resembling these.

37. Bhag. 8.5.330.

38. *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, Chap. xxi. for a fuller treatment see Barua, *The Ajivikas*.

opposed by Mahāvīra and Buddha alike. It is essential to remember that Mahāvīra's opposition was due to Gosāla's main doctrines of man's destiny being pre-ordained, that human effort could effect no change in it, and that emancipation was to be obtained only after a long series of transmigrations. These views come out prominently in both the Jaina and Buddhist accounts of Gosāla's teachings.

Jacobi and Dr. Barua are of opinion that contrary to the Jaina account Mahāvīra was a disciple of Gosāla for sometime. The reasons put forward in support of this hypothesis are that Mahāvīra was a mere learner in the first twelve years of his monkhood, that he became a nude ascetic in the second year of his monkhood, that Gosāla predeceased Mahāvīra by twelve years and was therefore his senior, and that Gosāla was recognised as a teacher at least two years before Mahāvīra. Against this hypothesis may be urged certain considerations. Gosāla's being a recognised teacher before Mahāvīra does not prove anything. Accepting the Jaina version Gosāla was not recognised as a teacher so long as he was associated with Mahāvīra, and proclaimed himself as such only after his separation from the latter. Such proclamation may have taken place before Mahāvīra won recognition as a teacher. Again, if Gosāla had ever been Mahāvīra's teacher we would have expected the Buddhists to record something to that effect. We would have expected also that Gosāla would be made to say something regarding his claim when he visited Mahāvīra to upbraid him for the latter's calling Gosāla a disciple.<sup>39</sup> Further, if Mahāvīra borrowed nudity from Gosāla he would not have continued in it when he renounced the discipleship of Gosāla. Although the *Bhagavatī* account of the relation subsisting between the two teachers cannot be accepted in full, it is doubtful whether a reversal of the relation can be accepted as true.

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39. Bhag. 15.550.

The truth very probably was that the two ascetics joined and lived together for sometime during the years of their probation. Difference of opinion on very important matters separated the two as we can infer from the *Bhagavati* account.<sup>40</sup> Their joint life must have been of short duration, one year only,—which was prolonged in later accounts to six years.

## II. THE BRAHMANIC SCHOOLS

About the cult of popular Brahmanism we have many references in Jaina literature. Many Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas support it, they claim to have seen, heard, acknowledged, thoroughly understood in the upper, nether, and side-long directions, and in all ways to have examined it; with such extensive experience and deep wisdom they declare that all sorts of living beings may be slain or tormented or treated with violence or abused or driven away, and there is no wrong in it.<sup>41</sup>

The creation and governance of the world by the gods, as taught by some philosophers, has been regarded as an error.<sup>42</sup> This can be attributed to the Brahmans, for no other contemporary school would regard the gods as creators or governors of the world.

The creation of the universe, according to a “great Ṛṣi” whose name is neither mentioned in the text nor preserved by Śīlāṅka or Haṛṣakula, is by Svayambhū;<sup>43</sup> according to some Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas it is from the primeval egg.<sup>44</sup> Both of these evidently refer to Brahmanical views and this conclusion is corroborated by the allusions to the doctrine of Brahman almost in the same breath with these

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40. Bhag. 15.554.

41. Ācār.S.I.iv.2.3.

42. Sūt. S. I.i.3.5.

43. Sūt.S. I.i.3.7.

44. Sūt.S. I.i.3.8

Brahmanical views, for the doctrine of Brahman, as we know, sprang from followers of Brahmanism.

Owning of possessions and engaging in undertakings is held to be compatible with reaching perfection by some;<sup>45</sup> this suggests the Brahmanical priests who would support a non-ascetic religion of rituals and ceremonies and themselves possess wealth and properties. Buddha's criticism of the Brahmans as owners of property in contrast with the possessionless Brahmā whom they worshipped is significant in this connection.<sup>46</sup>

The gods are declared by some as putting an end to misery.<sup>47</sup> The meaning is that only the gods and not men are capable of attaining *mokṣa*, i.e., in order to obtain *mokṣa* a man must first attain a god's status and then progress onwards to final liberation, for as mere man he cannot obtain liberation. This is probably a piece of casuistry on the part of the Brahmanical priests to tempt *yajamānas* to engage their services for securing by means of sacrifices the status of gods after death.

While arguing with Adda one man says<sup>48</sup> that those who always feed two thousand holy mendicants acquire great merit, become gods and that is the teaching of the Veda. This is clearly a statement put into the mouth of a follower of Brahmanism.

Stories are mentioned of various Brahmanical adherents engaging in disputes with Nirgrantha ascetics. The subject matter of the discussion is not of much importance but the descriptions which precede about the intellectual equipment of the Brahmanical disputant are very interesting. As for instance, in *Sāvatti* dwelt a mendicant *Khandaya* by name of the *Kaccāyana* gotra, a disciple of *Gaddabhāli*. To him went *Piṅgalaya*, a

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45. Sūt.S. I.i.4.3

46. Cf. *Tevijjia Sutta*.

47. Sūt.S. I.xv. 16-17

48. Sūt.S. II.6.43.

Nirgrantha adherent, and asked whether the world was with or without an end, whether the *jīva* was with or without an end, etc. Khandaya was terribly upset, we are told, by these questions, could give no answer, kept quiet, and at last went to Mahāvīra for setting at ease his severe discomfiture. All we can inferentially gather from such accounts is that in the opinion of the authors of these narratives the followers of Brahmanism and other schools concerned could not give a satisfactory solution of such vital problems, but we must beware of reading too much in these statements. Probably to set off Khandaya's indifference to high metaphysical curiosity we are told that he was a teacher of, prevented corruption from entering into, retained in his memory, and was well-versed in the four Vedas Rik, Yajus, Sāman, and Atharvan, to which is added Itihāsa as the fifth, Nighaṇṭu as the sixth, along with the Aṅgas, Upāṅgas, and the Rahasya, knew the six Aṅgas and the philosophy of the sixty categories, arithmetic, phonetics, ceremonial, grammar, prosody, etymology, and astronomy and in many other branches of knowledge suited for Brahmanic mendicants.<sup>49</sup>

There is an interesting account of a Brahman priest named Mahessaradatta who was learned in the Vedas, etc., and who in order to enhance the realm and power of his patron king Jiyasattu caused everyday a Brahman boy, a Kṣatriya boy, a Vaiśya boy and a Śūdra boy to be seized and their hearts extracted alive with which he performed *homa* sacrifices to propitiate the gods on behalf

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49. Bhag.2.1.90; the same enumeration is referred to by a rubric in 15.541 and 18.10.646; repeated in Vip. S.1.5., Aup. 38, and Kalpa S.10., 'The philosophy of the sixty categories' is explained by Abhayadeva as 'the doctrine of Kapila', *saṣṭhitāntra* which means the Sāṃkhya system. The analogous formula of the Buddhists for describing a Brahman, as given in the Ambaṭṭha S., is pretty much the same with a few minor additions.

of the king. On the eighth and fourteenth lunar days he sacrificed two boys from each of the four castes, in the fourth month four boys from each caste, in the sixth month eight boys, and after a year sixteen boys from each caste. Whenever the king was attacked by an enemy, the priest caused eight hundred boys from each caste to be seized and performed *homa* 'sacrifices' with their hearts extracted alive.<sup>50</sup> Although this story is too monstrous to deserve credence it is curious how the underlying idea of offering human sacrifice on the eve of important undertakings, hinted in the order Brahmanic literature, still lingered in the popular mind.<sup>51</sup>

In all the narrative passages in the canonical literature of the Jainas the constantly recurring formula about people performing domestic sacrifices, expiatory ceremonies, etc.,—*ñhāyākayavalikkammā kayakouya-maṅgalapāyachhittā*—is used to describe the daily life of people who are not yet converted by Mahāvīra to the Nirgrantha doctrine or in respect of whom the question of conversion does not arise. All these persons, from princes to peasants, belonged apparently to the Brahmanical fold in the absence of any reference pointing to their adherence to any other creed.

Making a slight departure from the order we are following in our treatment of these various philosophical system, we shall take up at this stage some views which are associated with the Brahmanical fold.

### Samkhya and Yoga

The world was created according to some by Īśvara; according to others this world with living beings and lifeless things with its variety of pleasure and pain was produced from *pahāṇa* (*Pradhāna*).<sup>52</sup> The first of these two

50. Vip.S. 1.5.

51. Cf. Śat. Br. VI.ii.1.5.; XIII.vii.1.8

52. Sat.S. I.i.3.6.

views is to be ascribed to the adherents of a theistic school, and the second to the Sāṃkhya system, or we may take them to refer to the theistic and atheistic followers of the Sāṃkhya philosophy.<sup>53</sup>

The attainment of perfection is possible, it has been maintained by some,<sup>54</sup> only by their method of religious life and not otherwise, and that even before the attainment of salvation they obtain power over others and possess everything to be wished for. Śīlāṅka thinks that the Śaivas and Ekadaṇḍins<sup>55</sup> are meant here. The possession even before emancipation is obtained, of everything to be wished for refers to the *siddhis* or supernatural powers with which we are familiar with in the later Yoga system of Patañjali. Perfection and freedom from disease are the aim of some<sup>56</sup> who are taken to be Śaivas by Śīlāṅka. A sound mind in a sound body seems to be their aim in common with Patañjali.

According to one school, when a man acts or causes another to act it is not his soul which acts or causes to act.<sup>57</sup> Harṣakula and Śīlāṅka ascribe this view to the adherents of the Sāṃkhya philosophy according to whom *prakṛti* acts while the *puruṣa* looks on, and because the *puruṣa* or the soul has no form and it is all-pervading it has no responsibility or agency. The doctrine of Pūraṇa Kassapa, as stated in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* of the Buddhists upholds this view. He taught that when one acts or causes another to act or commits sins no guilt follows. By doing virtuous acts, by generosity or truthfulness no increase of merit follows. There is neither merit nor demerit. Buddhaghosa says that Pūraṇa Kassapa was a naked mendicant, but he is probably

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53. See Jacobi, SBE. XIV, p. 244, n. 4.

54. Sut.S. I.i.3.14

55. They hold that emancipation is obtained by a knowledge of the twenty-five principles, says Śīlāṅka.

56. Sut.S. I.i.3.15

57. Sut.S. I.i.1.13

confusing him with Acelaka Kasspa, a different person. Kasspa's idea is that the soul is passive and not affected by good or bad deeds.<sup>58</sup>

### Śāśvatavādins (Eternalists)

In the opinion of another philosopher<sup>59</sup> the world is boundless and eternal and it exists from eternity and does not perish. Harṣakula and Śilāṅka say that the eternal aspect of the universe means, according to this view, that it has no destruction and that the natural order of things is immutably fixed – one who is a male now will ever be such hereafter, one who is a female will always continue to be such and so on.

### Puranists

Another philosopher says<sup>60</sup> that the world is limited but eternal. This view is ascribed by Harṣakula and Śilāṅka to Vyāsa, for Vyāsa says that the world consists of seven islands.

### The Upanisads

The view is said to be held by some fools that as the earth, though it is but one pile, presents many forms, so the intelligent principle, *viz.*, the *ātman*, appears under various forms as the universe.<sup>61</sup> That the world is created is said to be an error committed by some philosophers.<sup>62</sup>

58. See Barua : *A History of pre-Buddhistic Indian philosophy*, p. 278. The Buddhist version is an exaggerated account of Kasspa's views. Although at first sight it appears like Nāstika-vāda, it is not so as a perusal of Ajita Kesakambali's views would show—Ajita's being true Nāstikavāda.

59. Sūt.S. I.i.4.6.

60. Sūt.S. I.i.4.6.

61. Sūt.S. I.i.1.9.

62. Sūt.S. I.i.3.9. Cf Kaṭha Up. II.v.9.12.



The universe again is said by some Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas to have been produced from the primeval egg and that He (Brahmā) created the things.<sup>63</sup> Some say,<sup>64</sup> that the knowledge of the highest authority is unlimited. Harṣakula and Śilāṅka argue that that which has no limit in time and space is called unlimited by some teachers; but those who possess a knowledge of this unlimited by means of super-sensual vision do not thereby necessarily become omniscient. The meaning appears to be that the Vedāntin's idea of the Absolute is that it transcends knowledge and that one who knows the Absolute becomes, as it were, the Absolute himself, both the ideas being very frequent in the Upaniṣads. The Jainas however, contend that those who possess a knowledge of the Absolute as a transcendental Being do not thereby themselves become entitled to be called omniscient. The text goes on to say that the same philosopher holds that the knowledge is limited in every way. Harṣakula and Śilāṅka regard these two apparently contradictory views to belong to the same philosophers, and solve the difficulty by taking the latter view to allude to Brahmā's sleep for a thousand years alternating with his wakefulness for another thousand years during which he is unconscious and conscious respectively and so the knowledge is both limited and unlimited. The context of the verse is that the Nirgrantha ascetics should know the ordinary views of the common people for some of them say things which are the outcome of a wrong understanding, and as an illustration mentions apparently contradictory views held by Vedāntins and Purāṇists.

In Adda's discussions one man appears and says<sup>65</sup> that he and his predecessor (whom we have already identified as an adherent of Brahmanism) follow very much the same

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63. Sūt.S. I.i.3.8.

64. Sūt.S. I.i.4.7.

65. Sūt.S. II. 6.46-47

law, that they stand firm in it, and shall do so in the time to come; he says that he believes that virtue consists in good conduct and that knowledge is necessary for liberation that with regard to the circle of births there is no difference between them but that they assume an invisible, great, eternal, imperishable, and indestructible Soul who excels all other beings in every respect as the moon excels the stars. This is clearly the opinion of Vedānta, but Śīlāṅka ascribes this view to Ekadaṇḍins, and refers to their *ācārapradhānaṃ. śīlam uktam yamaniyamalakṣaṇam* which suggests Patañjali's system on Yoga. It would appear from this that the Śaivas, Ekadaṇḍins, and Vedāntins held in the early days closely allied views.

In the Parable of the Lotus-pool one of the teachers states his doctrine in the following way.<sup>66</sup> All things have the Self for their cause and their object. They are produced by the Self, manifested by the Self, intimately connected with the Self, and are bound in the Self. As for instance a tumour or a feeling of disposition is generated in, grows with, is no separate from, but is bound up with the body, so all things have the Self for their cause. Just as an ant-hill or a tree or a lotus springs up, grows in, is not separate from but bound up in the earth, or just as a mass of water or a water-bubble is produced in water, grows in water, and is not separate from water, so all things have the Self for their cause.<sup>67</sup>

In the above statements the word which has been put into the mouth of the speaker to mean the Self is *purisa* (*puruṣa*). But the same speaker has been described elsewhere<sup>68</sup> as *īśarakāraṇiya* (*īśvarakāraṇika*), one who holds *Īśvara* the Supreme Soul as the cause of everything.

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66. Sūt.S. II. 1.26.27

67. Cf. Muṇḍaka Up. II.i.9; Tait. Up. vi. III.i. Bṛhad. Up. II.i.20; III.vii.3-28.

68. Sūt.S. II.1.25, 28

We find thus that *Íśvara* and *puruṣa* have been synonymously used in the same way as the Upaniṣads establish the identity of Brahman and the ātman.

### III. ĀTMASASTHA-VĀDA

According to one school there are five elements and the soul is a sixth substance; the soul and the world of five elements are eternal; these six substances do not perish either with or without a cause; the non-existent does not come into existence, and all things are eternal by their very nature.<sup>69</sup> This is known as the "Doctrine of the soul as the sixth substance." Harṣakula includes the Sāṃkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas amongst its adherents, and Śīlāṅka includes the Sāṃkhyas and Śaivādhikārinś who accept the authority of the Vedas.<sup>70</sup> Śīlāṅka quotes many verses of the *Bhagavadgītā* to illustrate the philosophy of the indestructibility of the soul and the non-coming into existence of the non-existent. "If the non-existent came into existence," remarks Śīlāṅka, "it would make the growth of a horn possible to an ass." This doctrine of the eternal existence of the soul and the five elements, *viz.*, earth, water, fire, air, and sky is a criticism of the Buddhist view that things are changing every moment without any cause, and of the Vaiśeṣika view that things are destructible just as a pitcher is destroyed if struck with a staff. The reply of this school is that a thing is not destroyed either with or without a cause, a pitcher smashed with a staff exists, lives and continues in the broken pieces, for out of that lump came its existence.

We have to compare in this connection the doctrine of Pakudha Kaccāyana stated in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (Digha, II, p. 56). Pakudha held that seven things, *viz.*,

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69. Sūt.S. I.i.1i 15-16.

70. In the Sāṃkhya system there are other elements besides these five.

earth, water fire, air, ease, pain and the soul are neither made nor commanded to be made, are not created and are of a permanent existence. There is nothing called slayer or the slain. When one with a sharp sword cleaves a head in twain no one thereby deprives another of life, a sword has only penetrated into the interval between seven elementary substances.

#### IV. TAJJIVATACCHARIRA-VĀDA

The five gross elements are the original causes of things and from them arises another thing, *viz.*, the soul. This is another philosophy well-known to the Jainas. The soul is a product of the elements and has no independent existence of its own. On the dissolution of the body of five elements a living being ceases to exist and nothing is left over.<sup>71</sup> Everybody, fool or sage, has an individual *jīva* 'soul'. These souls exist as long as the body, but after death they are no more, there are no souls which are born again. There is neither virtue nor vice, there is no world beyond, and on the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be.<sup>72</sup>

The Parable of the Lotus-pool explains the theory thus.<sup>73</sup> Upwards from the soles of the feet, downwards from the tips of the hair on the head, within the skin's surface is what is called *jīva* or what is the same, *ātman*. The whole soul lives; when the body is dead it does not live. It lasts as long as the body lasts, it does not outlast the destruction of the body. With the body ends life. Other men carry the corpse away to burn it. When it has been consumed by fire only dove coloured bones remain and the four bearers return to the village with the hearse. Therefore there is and exists no soul different from the

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71. Sut.S.I.i.1.8 Jacobi has linked this verse with the following one. This is not justified, for the latter refers to Vedānta.

72. Sāl.S.I.i.11.13.

73. Sut.S. II.i.15-17,19

body. Those who say that the body is distinct from the soul cannot tell whether the soul is long or small, globular or circular, triangular or square, sexagonal or octagonal, black or blue, red or yellow or white, sweet or bitter, hard or soft, heavy or light, cold or hot. As a man draws a sword from the scabbard and shows the sword and the scabbard separately, as he draws a fibre from the *muñja* grass and shows the stalk and the fibre separately, or as he can take bone and flesh, butter and milk, oil and oil-cake, juice and sugarcane, and fire and *araṇi* wood and show them separately, so no one can show the soul and the body separately and therefore no soul exists. Life ends here, as it naturally follows, and there is nothing beyond.

The discussion between king Payesi and Kesi, a young ascetic lucidly explains the logic on which this philosophy was based,<sup>74</sup> the discussion as compressed is as follows :

Payesi : "Sir, is it your doctrine that the soul and body are two different things and not the same thing?"

Kesi : "O Payesi, it is the doctrine with us, the Nirgrantha ascetic that the soul and the body are two separate things and that they are not the same thing."

Payesi : "If, Sir, that is your doctrine then why does not my grandfather who was a tyrannical ruler and must have been reborn in the hell for many of the sins committed by him, come and warn me, his favourite grandchild, against committing such sins? If he did then I would believe that his soul is still alive and that the soul and the body are separate things."

Kesi replied at length to the effect that if a person offended against his queen and if when Payesi seized the offender in order to punish him the latter wanted to be allowed to come away so that he might warn his relations against committing such acts lest they also be punished as he was, then would Payesi allow him to come away? Similar was the case with those suffering torments in hell,

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74. Rāj. 65-71.

they could not come away howsoever the might long for it.

Payesi : "I had a grandmother who was a very pious lady and must have been born in the heavens after death. If she would come and exhort me to righteousness then I would believe that the soul and the body are different things."

Kesi answered at length pointing out that as Payesi would not respond to another's call to come away while Payesi was entering a temple properly sanctified, through fear lest he be defiled so also his grandmother too would not come.

Payesi : "Once while I was seated in my outer hall of audience surrounded by many chiefs, my Prefect of the Police brought a thief in chains whom I ordered to be put alive in an iron vessel which was hermetically sealed and guards were placed around it. Then after some days I went to the iron vessel, caused it to be unsealed and myself looked for the soul of that thief. If there were holes in the vessel I would have believed that the soul had escaped but as there were none therefore no soul exists apart from the body."

Kesi answered that just as if a man took a trumpet inside a house, closed every opening carefully, and then sounded the trumpet it would be heard outside although there was no apparent outlet, so the soul also could penetrate through earth, stone, etc.

Payesi : "Once I cut into pieces a thief, and put the body inside a closely guarded hermetically sealed iron vessel. Opening it after some time I found countless number of worms. Because these living worms originated out of the dead body — for there was no opening for them to enter — my doctrine is sound that the soul and the body are not different things."

Kesi replied that the king must have had occasion sometime or other to watch the heating of iron and he must have then seen how it became red-hot. There were

no opening in the iron through which the fire could have entered, and in the same manner the soul of the dead man had gone out and the souls of the worms had entered the iron vessel unperceived by the senses.

Payesi then argued that the decay of the body in old age showed there was no permanent underlying *jīva*, to which it was said in reply that the body was merely the material which was liable to decay without effecting any changes or decay in the underlying energy of the *jīva*. He then argued that he once killed a robber weighing him immediately before and after his death and found no difference between the two weights. If the robber had a soul different from the body there would certainly have been some difference in his weight before and after the soul left the body. Again he argued that he cut into many pieces a robber, looked very closely into it for a soul but found it nowhere. Kesi replied that the weight and form of the soul were not perceptible by the ordinary organs of sense.

## V. NĀSTIKA-VĀDA

The philosophy of the Nāstikas or those who deny the existence of the soul was well-known to the Jainas. There is a reference to those who ignore and deny the tenets of the Nirgranthas,<sup>75</sup> which Śilāṅka understands as an allusion to the Buddhists and the followers of Bṛhaspati, the latter being a well-known school of Nāstikas.

A more precise reference speaks of those that profess exclusive belief in the five gross elements, *viz.*, earth, water, fire, air and sky. These five are all that exist and there is nothing in addition to these.<sup>76</sup> This ultramaterialistic view is in line with Cārvāka's famous doctrine of the non-existence of the soul or God or a life

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75. Sūt.S. I.i.1.6

76. Sūt.S. I.i.1.7.

hereafter. Śīlāṅka quotes the notorious statement attributes to Cārvāka wherein the latter holds that there is nothing beyond what is perceived by the senses, the past never returns, there is no *karman* or its effects, the dead never comes back, there is no future life and that the body is but the fortuitous combination of the elements.

The Parable of the Lotus-pool states the doctrine in the following manner :

There are only the five elements through which is explained whether an action is good or bad. The five elements are not created, directly or indirectly, nor made; they are neither effects nor products, they are without beginning and end, they always produce effects, are independent of a directing cause, they are eternal. What is does not perish, from nothing nothing comes. All living beings, all things, the whole world consists of nothing but these five elements. They are the primary cause of the world even down to a blade of the grass. A man buys or causes to buy, kills or causes to kill, cooks and causes to cook, he may even sell and kill a man — and even then he does not do any wrong.<sup>77</sup>

In the Sāmaññaphala Sutta of the Buddhists the doctrines said to belong to Ajita Kesakambali are an echo of Nāstika -vāda. Ajita taught that there is no such thing as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next. After death the elements constituting the body return to the elements. On the dissolution of the body everyone is cut off, annihilated and after death there is nothing.<sup>78</sup>

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77. Sat.S. II.1.21-24

78. Barua : *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p. 293, points out that Ajita's views were not materialistic in the gross sense in which they were understood by Mahāvira and Buddha, but what he really meant was a protest against the view the soul and body were entirely separated.



This doctrine is also called Lokāyata-vāda. Tājivataccharīra-vāda held practically the same view with Nāstika-vāda only with this difference that while the latter deny altogether the existence of the soul the former admit it, but the logical end of both the views would be exactly the same.

## VI. BUDDHISM

A heretic says in connection with the use of water for various purposes that it is justified on the ground of his having permission to drink it or take it for toilet purposes.<sup>79</sup> Śīlāṅka takes these heretics to be Buddhists. This can be accepted without objection for we know that Buddha declared that no sin was committed by drinking water and he permitted bath and washing to his ascetic disciples.<sup>80</sup>

The Nirgranthas looked upon the Ājīviyas as their worst opponents but if facts are considered they suffered most at the hand of the Buddhists in later times. Buddha was a junior contemporary of Mahāvīra, and had therefore greater need and occasion for counteracting and criticising the creed of the latter than Mahāvīra had of fighting with the doctrines of a junior. The rivalry of the two sects grew stronger after Mahāvīra's death. These facts account to some extent for the comparatively scantier mention and criticism of Buddhistic doctrines in the literature of the Jainas than what would normally be expected of the two chief sects of the time.

With regard to the suffering of cold by renouncing clothes and fire some heretical monks, are reported to say that they would put on more clothes and by kindling a fire they would be able to bear the very painful influence of the cold.<sup>81</sup> This may be regarded as applying to me

79. Ācār. S. I.i.3.7.

80. Cf. Mahāvagga 1.25.12 5.13.7

81. Ācār. S. I.vii.2.14.

Buddhists for they were certainly not indifferent to unnecessary suffering. We cannot of course be absolutely certain, for Brahmanical ascetics would also light a fire and take clothings for protection from cold.

The doctrine of five *skandhas* of momentary existence has been ascribed to "some fools." They are said not to admit that the soul is different from, nor identical with the elements, that it is produced from a cause (the elements), nor that it is without a cause, *i.e.*, that it is eternal.<sup>82</sup> This is a clear reference to the Buddhists with their *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *viññāna*, *saṃjñā* and *samskāra skandhas*. The existence of a soul in the popular sense of the term apart from the five *skandhas* was denied by Buddha.

Earth, water, fire, and air, these four *dhātus* are said to combine to form the body according to the *Jāṇakas* (*jñānins*).<sup>83</sup> Harṣakula explains *Jāṇakas* as *pañḍitammanyā Bauddhāḥ*. A variant in the text reads *yāvare* (*ca + apare*) for *Jāṇayā*, and this also has been explained as referring to the Buddhists. Jacobi thinks<sup>84</sup> that the word, *Jāṇaya*, may be derived from *yāna* 'vehicle', which the Buddhists used to designate the two sections of the church, *viz.*, the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. Against this may be pointed out that the Buddhist used the word in respect of themselves only after the great schism arose among them, whereas the present statement appears to be older in age. However all opinion is agreed in understanding this passage to be a reference to the Buddhists.

The Akriyāvādins who deny *karman* and do not admit that the action of the soul is transmitted to the future moments<sup>85</sup> are understood by Śīlāṅka to refer to the

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82. Sūt. S. I.i.1.17.

83. Sūt.S. I.i.1.18.

84. SBE. xlv. p. 238, n.4.

85. Sūt. S. I.xii.4.

Buddhists. The doctrine that everything has but a momentary existence and that there is no continuous identity of existence between a thing as it is now and as it will be in the next moment is one of the Buddhist theories. The Buddhists are included among Akriyāvādins by the Nirgranthas because by not admitting the existence of *jīva* they were considered to deny *karman* as well. Jacobi takes this to refer to Sāṃkhya, because according to it the *puruṣa* does not act.<sup>86</sup> We shall have to treat of Akriyāvāda at greater length later on, but in connection with the present verse it has to be pointed out that although this verse and the one following have been commented upon by Śīlāṅka at great length as applying to the Buddhists, yet we must widen the limits of Akriyāvāda beyond Buddhist doctrine.

In the discussions of Adda one man appears and says<sup>87</sup> that if one pierces a lump of oil-cake with a spit mistaking it for a man, or a gourd mistaking it for a baby, and roasts it one will be guilty of murder according to his views. If a savage puts a man on a spit and roasts him mistaking him for a lump of oil-cake, or a baby mistaking it for a gourd, he will not be guilty of murder. If anybody thrusts a spit through a man or a baby mistaking him or it for a lump of oil-cake, puts him or it on the fire and roasts, that will be a meal fit for the Buddhas to break fast upon.<sup>88</sup> Those who always feed two thousand worthy monks, says this man to Adda, acquire great merit and become powerful gods in Arūpadhātu. This is an account, although exaggerated, of the Buddhist view that motive determines

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86. SBE. xlv., p. 316, n. 3.

87. Sū. S. II.6.26-29.

88. *Buddhāna tam kappati pāraṇāya Harṣakula* explains *buddhānam* as *śākyānām*, while Śīlāṅka says *Buddhānām api bhojanāya योग्यं भवति*, which shows he took it to mean 'for the Buddhas.' 'Buddha' was used by Jains and Buddhists alike to denote their master and in itself is not sufficient to indicate its applicability to the latter.

whether an act is sinful or not. If the state of mind was murderous it was a sin even though the act committed in execution of this intention did not actually result in the loss of life; again, no sin is committed by the accidental killing of life when the act intended was not murder. It has to be taken as an echo of Buddha's statement that the state of mind accompanying an act was more important than the actual of the act.<sup>89</sup> The Arūpadhātu is the highest heaven of the Buddhists. The combination of all this is sufficient to establish its reference to the Buddhists.

Another verse credits some with holding that salvation which was a pleasant thing was produced by enjoying pleasures.<sup>90</sup> Harṣakula and Śilāṅka take it to refer to the Buddhists and quote many passages in support of their identification :

*sarvāṇi sattvāṇi sukhe ratāni, sarvāṇi duḥkhāc ca  
samudvijanti /  
tasmāt sukhārthi sukham eva dadyāt sukhapradātā  
labhate sukhāni //*

All beings seek happiness and turn away from suffering; therefore the seeker of happiness should give happiness, for the giver of happiness obtains happiness.

*maṇuṇṇam bhoyaṇam bhoccā maṇuṇṇam  
sayañāsanam /  
maṇuṇṇamsi agāramsi maṇuṇṇāma jhāyae muṇīa //*

Having enjoyed a pleasant dinner, a pleasant bed and seat, a saint dwells in a pleasant adobe and meditates pleasantly.

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89. Cf. Buddha's conversation with Digha Tapassi a Nirgrantha ascetic and with Upāli, a lay disciple of Mahāvira and Upāli's conversion in *Upāli Sutta*.

90. Sūt.S.I.iii.4.6.

*mṛdvī śayyā prātarutthāya peyā, bhuktam madhye  
pānakam cāparāhṇe /  
drākṣākhaṇḍam śarkarā cārdharitra mokṣascānte  
Śākyaputreṇa drṣṭaḥ //*

A soft bed, drinks in the morning, dinner at midday, drinks in the afternoon, and grapes and sugar at night — these have been laid down by Śākyaputra as leading to salvation.

These are supposed to be drawn from works of the Buddhists themselves explaining their faith or from the writing of others professing to explain it. It is quite clear that as a matter of fact they are taken from the writings of hostile critics and from satires on the teachings of Buddha. Harṣakula thinks that the verse in the text might refer to *svatīrthyas*, some members of the same order as the speaker's, *i.e.*, the Nirgranthas. The events of later days led the commentators, one feels constrained to say, to fasten every possible adverse criticism on to the Buddhists to make up, as it were, for the dearth of anti-Buddhist statements in the texts. The present instance is a very strained attempt to drag in the Buddhists. Both in this verse as well as in another.<sup>91</sup> Harṣakula is undecided about its exact application and names several possible alternatives. The truth probably is that the allusion was to a distinct view which held that like is produced by like and therefore mokṣa being an agreeable thing is obtained by living an agreeable and comfortable life. This is the view held by the Tāntrikas.<sup>92</sup> The Sātavādins also held the same view.<sup>93</sup>

91. Sūt. S. I.iii.4.10

92. See, *Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa* attributed to Āryadeva, JASB, lxvii, 1898, p. 175, and Subhāṣitasamgraha, p. 37. I am indebted to Pandit Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya for these references.

93. This has been discussed later.

The doctrine of Buddha has been included among those false beliefs which are the products of wrong knowledge.<sup>94</sup>

## VII. MINOR SCHOOLS

A school of philosophers thought that a *jīva* performed *sammattakiriyam* (*samyaktvakriyā*) right conduct and *micchattakiriyam* (*mithyātvakriyā*) wrong conduct at the same time, i.e., while it performed right conduct at the same time it performed wrong conduct also, and while it performed wrong conduct it performed also right conduct at the same time.<sup>95</sup> Malayagiri, the commentator, says that it is the doctrine of Caraka. Guṇaratna says that Caraka represented a school of Sāṃkhya.<sup>96</sup>

Another view held by some was to the effect that there was no harm in enjoying the pleasures of the senses for it gave relief to the enjoyer without causing harm to any one else, just as the squeezing of a blister or boil gave relief and has no dangerous consequences. A ram drinks the quiet water which gives it relief. If this harmed the ram we could have said that the act was harmful but as it did not there is surely no harm in it.<sup>97</sup> In the identification of the upholder of this view. Harṣakula has the same doubts which he had with regard to Sātavādins mentioned above.

According to another school it is not only the soul which does not exist but nothing exists. Everything is mere appearance, a mirage, an illusion, a dream or phantasy. There rises no sun nor does it set; there waxes no moon nor does it wane; there are no rivers running nor any wind blowing; the whole world is unreal.<sup>98</sup> The Mādhyamika

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94. Anu. 40; Nandi 42

95. Jivā S. 3. 104.

96. *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, a commentary on *Śaḍḍarsana-samuccaya*, p. 31.

97. Sut.S. I.iii. 4.10-12.

98. Sut.S. I.xii.7.

school of the Buddhists and the popular Māyāvāda which arose as an offshoot of Vedānta owe their origin probably to this school which is met here in the literature of the Jainas for the first time in the history of Indian philosophical thought.

In Sāvattthi there were two rival schools who disputed the point whether knowledge was superior to conduct or conduct was superior to knowledge.<sup>99</sup> Abhayadeva, the commentator, quotes some of their views, e.g.,

*kriyaiva phaladā puṁsām na jñānam phaladam matam /  
yataḥ strībhakṣyabhogajño na jñānāt sukhito bhavet //*

Conduct always bears fruit, not so knowledge — just as one having merely the knowledge of enjoyment of women does not thereby become happy.

*jahā kharo candanabhāravāhī bhārassa bhāgī na hu  
candaṇssa /*

*evaṁ khu nāṇī caraṇeṇa hīṇo nāṇassa bhāgī na hu  
sogaṇe //*

As ass carrying a load of sandalwood carries only a load but does not enjoy the sandalwood, so the man possessing knowledge but devoid of conduct enjoys his knowledge but does not obtain progress.

The supporters of knowledge on the other hand said :  
*viññaptiḥ phaladā puṁsām na kriyā phaladā matā /  
mithyājñānāt pravṛttasya phalāsamvādadarśanāt //*

It is knowledge which bears fruit, not so conduct, for wrong knowledge does not produce the desired result.

*paḍhamam nāṇam tao dayā evaṁ cittaḥai savvasamjajae /  
annāṇī kiṁ kāhī vā nāhī cheyapāvayaṁ. //*

First comes knowledge, then charity — thus are constituted all those who are restrained : one lacking in knowledge knows not what to do or what to know, and whether one is wise or a sinner.

[Taken from *Schools and Sects in Jain Literature*, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan, 1931].

99. Bhag. S. S. 10.354.

# THE FOURTEEN GUṆASTHĀNAS

HELMUTH VON GLASENAPP

Fourteen stages, i.e. the Guṇasthānas, from the condition of complete dependence upon the Karma to the complete detachment from it can be distinguished. They are classified in a *logical* manner, according to the principle of decreasing iniquitousness and of increasing purity, and not in chronological order in which they could pass. For relapses are possible in the case of every soul; they can throw it down from the ascended stages and withdraw completely or partially the development made so far. This can be understood better when it is considered that the stay in many Guṇasthānas lasts for only few minutes so that it is quite possible that someone finds himself in the morning on a high stage, but falls down from it during noon and again climbs to it in the evening. But apart from the possibility of a relapse, it would be impossible to go through all the 14 stages one after the other because a direct transition from the first stage to the second is out of question and the 11th stage is not directly passed before the 12th to the 14th.

I shall give below the individual Guṇasthānas in the usual order and give a brief description of each of them :

1. *Mithyādr̥ṣṭi-guṇasthāna*. This stage is characterized by complete heterodoxy. Many souls, i.e. all those which are not capable of redemption, never come out of this stage. This applies also to those which are born as fully developed, irrational animals having 1 to 5 senses, as long as their existence lasts in this class of beings. Others are elevated from here, and mostly directly up to the fourth Guṇasthāna, but they can descend again to this stage and stay here for a



while which would be minimally a fraction of a Muhūrta and maximally somewhat lesser than 1/2 Pudgala-parāvarta.

2. *Sāsvādāna-samyagdr̥ṣṭi-guṇasthāna*, a stage in which there is a "taste of the right faith". Beings who had the "Aupaśamika-faith" for a fraction of a Muhūrta but had lost it as a result of the eruption of life-long passions, are in this stage lasting only for one Samaya and at the most for 6 Āvalikās. Accordingly, it is a condition lasting only for a short period; it lies between the satge in which heterodoxy was suppressed (like the 4th) and on the lowest when it has full force. The soul returns to the first Guṇasthāna after the expiry of this period. All the rational beings with five senses as also undeveloped animals of every type can be Sāsvādānas.
3. *Samyagmithyādr̥ṣṭi-guṇasthāna*, a stage of "mixed faith." This stage in which the developed rational beings of all types can be found lasts only for a fraction of a Muhūrta; once the period is over, the soul obtains right or false faith as the conditions permit. Jivas falling from the 4th stage normally pass through this Guṇasthāna.
4. *Avirata-samyagdr̥ṣṭi-guṇasthāna*. Beings found in this stage i.e. rational beings of all types having five senses, have right faith but having still no self-discipline. Here a methodical suppression or destruction of the Karma can be begun on one of the two Śreṇis. The duration of this Guṇasthāna is a fraction of a Muhūrta, and at least 33 Sāgaropamas and a little more (i.e. the highest period of life of gods and beings in hell which can be found in this stage) at the most.
5. *Deśavirata-samyagdr̥ṣṭi-guṇasthāna*. In this the right faith and partially the self-discipline is present. This stage, which in contrast to the preceding one is not open to gods and beings from hell, but only to the

fully developed rational animals and human beings, lasts at the most somewhat lesser than a Pūrvakoṭi, and at least a fraction of a Muhūrta. The beings in this stage are either without a Śreṇī or they begin one of the Śreṇīs, respectively are in one of them.

6. *Pramatta-saṁyata-guṇasthāna*. A complete self-discipline is achieved in this stage which is, like the following, accessible only to human beings. But if it has arisen out of flared-up passions, sleep, etc. it is disturbed by negligence (Pramāda). A transcendent knowledge of the thoughts of others can appear from this Guṇasthāna onwards. The duration of the stay in this stage is minimally 1 Samaya, maximally 1 Muhūrta. If someone dies after 1 Samaya, he becomes Avirata (4th stage); if someone dies after a Muhūrta is almost over, he becomes Deśavirata (5th stage). If the Muhūrta is over without any incident, the soul comes into the following, 7th stage in which it says through a fraction of a Muhūrta to return again to the Pramatta-guṇasthāna, after which the process begins anew. This oscillation between the 6th and the 7th Guṇasthāna lasts at the most somewhat less than a Pūrvakoṭi. This concerns ascetics who have not ascended any Śreṇī; if such is ascended or carried further, this sort of oscillation does not take place. It is characteristic of this stage that the body of transference is developed only in it.
7. *Apramatta-saṁyata-guṇasthāna*. Complete self-discipline without negligence is available in this stage. It lasts for 1 Samaya to 1 Muhūrta. The soul in this Guṇasthāna do not have any of the 6 Leśyās, like those of the preceding one, but only one of the three highest.
8. *Apūrva-karaṇa-guṇasthāna*. This stage, like the following one, is accessible only to a soul which is in a Śreṇā; only the white Leśyā occurs now onwards. The process called Apūrva-karaṇa is carried out in

it; the thoughts to which the one who is accomplishing it abandons himself in his meditation, fill him with joys which he had never known before. One who is in an Upāsama-śreṇī stays in this stage at least 1 Samaya and at the most 1 Muhūrta, and the one in the Kṣapaka-śreṇī the whole period of a Muhūrta.

9. *Anivṛtti-bādara-samparāya-guṇasthāna*. Here the soul in the Upāsama-or Kṣapaka-śreṇī accomplishes a process called "Anivṛtti-karaṇa". The former stays here at least for 1 Samaya, and at the most the duration of a Muhūrta, the latter for a period of the duration of a Muhūrta. It is characteristic of this stage that the so-called 6 "non-passions" do not appear any more in this stage, but the 4 flaring-up passions do occur.
10. *Sūkṣma-samparāya-guṇasthāna*. The three passions: anger, pride, deceit do not appear in this stage as also libido, but the flaring-up greed appears to a negligible extent. The stay in this Guṇasthāna is 1 Samaya to 1 Muhūrta in Upāsama and the duration of a Muhūrta in Kṣapaka.
11. *Upāsānta-kaṣāya-vitarāga-chadmastha-guṇasthāna*. This is the highest stage that can be reached in the Upāsamaśreṇī. Here all the passions are suppressed. This lasts at least for 1 Samaya and at the most for the duration of a Muhūrta. The soul falls down from the Upāsamaśreṇī after this and comes to one of the lower Guṇasthānas.
12. *Kṣiṇa-kaṣāya-vitarāga-chadmastha-guṇasthāna*. This stage like all the following ones is attained by only the souls which have destroyed all the passions in the Kṣapaka-śreṇī. When in the last Samaya whatever greed that is left over has been destroyed, the Kṣapaka (who thus jumps the 11th Guṇasthāna!) is in this stage where he remains for the duration of a Muhūrta. He remains bound now an only the momentary Karma. In the last Samaya of his stay

all the Karmas which restricted his knowledge, his seeing and his energy, disappear.

13. *Sayogi-kevali-guṇasthāna*. The saint is a Kevali, an omniscient one, in this stage. If there is an unusual case that he had got the "Tirthaṅkara-karma" in the earlier existences, then this is realized here; he then becomes a Tirthaṅkara, a founder or a restorer of the Jainachurch. The Sayogi-kevali knows everything, sees everything, is capable of everything, yet he has a body and a certain activity which is conditioned by matter, and a number of Karmas obtained earlier are produced in him; but as soon as the Karmas determining the quantum of life (Āyus) are exhausted, he annihilates all these. Accordingly, the Sayogi-condition lasts minimum for a duration of a Muhūrta and maximum somewhat less than a Pūrvakoṭi. The moment the period given to it ends, the saint sinks into deep meditation and then ceases the cruder and finer activity of the mind, speech and body.

14. *Ayogi-kevali-guṇasthāna*. The saint has no activity (Yoga) and Leśyā in this transitory stage comprising only a period of a Muhūrta.

Then he enters the Śaileśi-condition as long as one needs to express 5 short syllables (a, i, u, ri, li). Gone into meditation he destroys then the rest of the Karmas which still exist. He has thus become free from every thing that is material—he is redeemed.

[Extracted from Helmuth von Glasenapp's *Der Jainismus* translated by S.B. Shrotri, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1999].

## RṢABHADEVA

SATYA RANJAN BANERJEE

Ādinātha or Rṣabhadeva occupies a unique position in the annals of Jaina Hagiology. He was the first Tirthaṅkara and possessed perfect knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*). According to the tradition there were no less than 84,000 Prakīrṇakas of each one of the pupils of Rṣabha. The name Rṣabha is found in the *Rgveda* (III. 13, 14, IX. 71). There it is said that Rṣabha is the son of Viśvāmitra (*Rṣabha Vaiśvāmitra-Viśvāmitraputraḥ Rṣabhaḥ ṛṣiḥ*). In another context of the *Rgveda* (X. 166) he is called Vairāja or Śākvara (*Rṣabha vairājo vā Rṣabhaḥ Śākvaraḥ*). We do not know anything more than this about Vedic Rṣabha. Sāyaṇa in the 14th cent. A.D. could not supply us any more information about Rṣabha. However, at a later time in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (Ch. X), the name Rṣabha is mentioned along with Vyāsa, Kaṇāda, Kapila and others.

Rṣabhadeva<sup>1</sup> or Rṣabhanātha, also called Ādinātha, was the son of king Nabhi and queen Marudevī of the Ikṣāku race. He is variously called as Vṛṣabhanātha, Ādiśvara, Yugādiijina, Yugadisā, Nabhaya and Kausalika. He is also called Marudeva as the son of Marudevī. As he is the first in Jaina Hagiology, he is probably called Ādinātha or Ādiśvara; as he has the bull (*vṛṣabha*) as his *cinha* or cognizance, he is called Vṛṣabha. Rṣabhanātha is a variant of Rṣabhadeva. Other names are mostly honorific. He is mostly adorned by the names of Ādinātha and Rṣabhadeva in later literature and Jain temples. He

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1. James Burgess, *The Temples of Śatruñjaya*, Jain Bhawan, Calcutta, 1977, p. 5.

is represented as of golden or yellow complexion and the bull for his cognizance. In Somadeva's *Yaśastilaka* (10th cent. A.D.) "there are representations of most of the dreams of Rṣabha Jina's mother, e.g., the Airāvata elephant, a bull, a lion, the goddess Lakṣmī, the sun and the moon, a lotus pool, the ocean, flames, a heap of jewels, and an aerial car" (*saṃnihitairāvatā.....āśina-saurabheyā.... nilīnopakaṇṭha-kaṇṭhīravā...ramopa-śobhitā...etc.*).<sup>2</sup> According to the commentator of *Kalpa-sūtra*, he was born at Vinītā (i.e. Ayodhyā) in the country of Kosala towards the end of the *dvāpara* age. Some say he was born in Kashmir.<sup>3</sup>

"He was the first king (*prathama rājā*), first anchorite (*prathama bhikṣākara*) and first saint (*prathama jina*) and *prathama tīrthaṅkara*. His stature was 500 poles (*dhanus*)."<sup>4</sup>

He was married to Sumaṅgalā and Sunandā. He had turns by each of his wives. Sunandā gave birth to a son Bāhubali (some say Gommala is another name of Bāhubali) and a daughter Sundarī, and Sumaṅgalā gave birth to a son Bharata and a daughter Brāhmī. From the descendants of Bharata and Bāhubali the Surya and the Candra dynasties originated respectively, and the name of the country became Bhārata. Both Bharata and Bāhubali, though sons of Rṣabha, the first Tīrthaṅkara, were engaged in war<sup>5</sup> for some years, and the incident is described in Vajrasena's *Bharateśvara-Bāhubali-ghora* (1170 A.D.) and Śālibhadra's *Bharateśvara-Bāhubali-rāsa* (1185 A.D.).<sup>6</sup>

2. K.K. Handique, *Yaśastilaka and Indian Culture*, Sholhapur, 1949, p. 121.

3. Burgess, *ibid.*, p. 5.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

5. Winternitz, *ibid.*, p. 585.

6. Majumdar, *The Struggle for Empire*, Vol. V, Bombay, 1957, p. 393f.

Tradition says that Ṛṣabha became a king at the very young age (*pūrva varṣa*). He reigned for many years, then resigned for his sons. Having spent many years, he attained nirvāṇa on a mountain named Aṣṭapada which, Hemacandra says, is the same as Kailāśa. Tradition further says that he was the first who laid the foundation of Jaina religion.

Vācaspati<sup>7</sup> says in his *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭikā* that Buddha and Ṛṣabha are the authors of the Buddhist and Jaina Āgama texts respectively. Hemacandra<sup>8</sup> in his *Laghvartha-niti* says that Ṛṣabha is the creator of *rājanīti*.

According to the Jaina tradition (also corroborated by the non-Jain sources, such as, *Bhāgavata-skanda V*, *Vāyupurāṇa*, *Viṣṇupurāṇa*), it is mentioned that the doctrine of *ahiṃsā* was first preached by Ṛṣabha. According to them, Ṛṣabha's period represents a complete change of world conditions. Prior to this, the country was called Bhogabhūmi ('land of enjoyment') where people were satisfied of all their wants by the mere wish through the help of the traditional *kalpavṛkṣa*. During the time of Ṛṣabha these happy conditions completely disappeared and the people were in perplexity as to the way of life which they were expected to carry on with. Then they all went to Ṛṣabha praying for help. He is said to have consoled them by showing the way of life. And through his people, he established a sort of social organisation by dividing his society into agriculturists, traders and soldiers. After ruling over his kingdom for several years, he abdicated his throne in favour of his son Bharata and went into the forest to perform penance. After the practice of penance for several years he attained *kevala-jñāna* (omniscience). Then he went about from place to place preaching his *ahiṃsā* religion to the people of the land, so

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7. Burgess, *ibid.*, p. 5.

8. K.K. Handique, *ibid.*, p. 227.

9. Majumdar, *ibid.*, p. 270.

that they might have also spiritual relief. The idea of *ahiṃsā* might not have developed fully at that time, as it was at the time of Mahāvīra, or that idea of *ahiṃsā* was perhaps on a par with the Vedic idea of *ahiṃsā*, but the doctrine of *ahiṃsā*, as it is today among the Jains, owes its origin to as far back as that.

Ādinātha or Ṛṣabhadeva is highly adorned by the Jains throughout the ages. The life of Ṛṣabha or Ādinātha has also been written by many Jain writers. In Vimala Sūri's *Paūmacariyam*, composed during 530 years after the demise of Mahāvīra (C XVIII. 103), the history of Ṛṣabha is given (III. 18).<sup>10</sup> In Ravisena's *Padma-purāṇa* written in Sanskrit in 678 A.D. the glorification of the first Tīrthaṅkara is given. In Haribhadra's commentary on the *Āvaśyaka-niryukti*, the story of Ṛṣabha is fully narrated. Dhanapāla, Sobhana's brother, composed *Ṛṣabha-pañcāśikā* in 50 stanzas. This poem is divided into two sections : section one containing the first 20 verses gives allusions to events in the life of Ṛṣabha, while the second section is exclusively devoted to the praise of Ṛṣabha. In the *Ādi-purāṇa* of Jinasena (9th-10th cent. A.D.) the story of Ṛṣabha is told. In the *Śatruñjaya-Māhātmya* of Dhaneśvara (end of 11th cent. or 1100 A.D.), the story of the first Jina Ṛṣabha is given. In the first parvaṇ of Hemacandra's (1088-1172 A.D.) *Triṣaṣṭi-śalākā-puruṣa-carita*, the previous existence of the first Tīrthaṅkara, Ṛṣabhadeva, is narrated. Abhayacandra (11th cent. A.D.) at the request of the minister Padma wrote the *Padmanātha-Mahākāvya* where the author intended to give the lives of all 23 Jinas. But he actually describes only the life of Ṛṣabha, the first Tīrthaṅkara, in 19 cantos. Vardhamāna wrote his *Ādinātha-carita* in 1103 A.D. to describe the life of Ṛṣabha. It has 1000 gāthās. Merutuṅga (1306 A.D.) in his *Mahāpuruṣa-carita* has also

10. See Winternitz, *ibid.*, p. 490, 494, 481, 498, 553f, 503, 506, 517, 548.



given the life story of Rṣabha. At a festival in a temple of Rṣabha (which was erected by two contemporaries of the Cāhamāna prince Samarasimha in about 1185 A.D.), the drama *Prabuddha-Rauhiṇeya* by Rāmabhadra Muni (prob. 12th cent. A.D.) was performed. It is generally seen that the life-story of Rṣabha is told in the introductory section of the Rāma Epics.

Rṣabhadeva has also been worshipped through the ages. A temple of Rṣabhanātha was erected at Anahilavāḍa by a merchant prince Ninnaya by name sometime in the 8th-9th centuries A.D. In the tenth century A.D. there were many Jaina temples at Khajuraho. In Cunningham's list at No. 26, there is an ancient temple called Setnāth which is most probably from the original name of Ādinātha, 14 feet in height, at No. 27 in his list. There is yet another small ancient Jaina temple now dedicated to Ādinātha. Sometime in the 11th cent. A.D. the Jaina Vimala Sāha was appointed Governor of Ābu under Bhima I of Gujarat. In 1031 A.D. Vimala Sāha built a marble temple of Ādinātha at Delwara on Mount Abu. At the village of Sandhārā, near Bhanpurā, two Jain temples were dedicated to Ādinātha and belonged to the Digambara community. Regular worship is carried on these two temples.<sup>11</sup>

Some pieces of information on Ādinātha temple pertaining to Bengal are mentioned below :

### *Temples / mandirs*

1. Deuli-Ādinātha temple, almost dilapidated.
2. Arsha (Boran Police St.) in Purulia-Rṣabha.

### *Status*

3. Jhalda (10th cent. A.D.) with inscription. The term Śrāvaka is used.

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11. Majumdar, *ibid.*, p. 535f.

4. *Purulia Dt.*

- i) Sufaran
- ii) Suisā
- iii) Haraktore
- iv) Pakbirla (Rṣabha)
- v) Telkupi in Cheliāmā
- vi) Lālgarḥ near Cheliāmā

5. *Bankura*

- i) Deul Bhiḷā (Indpur = Īdpur)
- ii) Dharapāt.
- iii) Gobindanagar, P.S. Jaypur.

6. *Malda Dist.*

- i) Ādinātha Statue near Pandua (9th - 10th cent. A.D.) with inscription pub. by Asoke Bhattacharya in the Asiatic Society's Journal, Vol. No. 52/53.

7. *West Dinajpur*

- i) Surāhār-Ādinātha temple

8. *Sundarban area*

- i) Rṣabhanātha statue.

# ANEKĀNTAVĀDA AND LANGUAGE\*

SATYA RANJAN BANERJEE

## 1. Anekānta

The Jaina theory of *anekāntavāda* is a distinctive contribution to Indian philosophical thought. It examines the manysidedness of Reality or manifoldness of Truth. It is virtually connected with the examination of Reality. Reality, according to the Jains, is permanent in the midst of changes. As *anekānta* basically determines the nature of Reality, let us define first what Reality is. Reality, according to Umāsvāti, is described as—

*utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktam sat* (TS. V. 30)

"Existence is characterised by origination, disappearance (destruction) and permanence" (S.A. Jain).

It is a permanent reality in the midst of change of appearance and disappearance. This conception of Reality is peculiar to Jainism. As existing reality in order to maintain its permanent and continued process must necessarily undergo change in the form of appearance and disappearance, it seems to us a paradox at the beginning. But a closer analysis and minute observation will help us to appreciate the significance of this description of Reality. For example, let us look at the seed of a plant. When the seed is planted in the soil it must necessarily break the shell and sprout out. This is the first step in its attempt to grow. Then the sprouting seed further undergoes change and some portion of it comes out seeking the sunlight and another goes down into the soil, will undergo

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enormous changes into the root system. Similarly, the portion that sprouts up into the air and sunlight will also undergo enormous changes of sprouting out in tendrils and leaves finally resulting in branches and stem of the plant all engaged in the task of procuring nourishment with the help of sunlight. At every stage thus we find change, the old leaves being shed off and the new sprouts coming in. This seems to be the general law of Nature. The life of the seed does never *die*, it lives even though it is being constantly changed and this is what is *sat*.

What is true of a plant, is also true with regard to the basic or fundamental things of Nature. The Jain conception of Reality is different from the other Indian philosophers. Some philosophers would only emphasize change alone as the characteristic of Reality. The one-sided emphasis either on permanency or change is rejected by Jain thinkers. They consider this system as *anekānta*, a system which clings to a partial aspect of Reality. So the Jains call their own system as *anekāntavāda*, i.e., a system of philosophy which maintains that Reality has multifarious aspects and that a complete comprehension of such a nature must necessarily take into consideration all the different aspects through which Reality manifests itself. Hence the Jaina *Darśana* is also called *anekāntavāda* often translated as "Indefiniteness of Being". It tells us that any material thing continues forever to exist as matter, and this may assume any shape and quality. Thus *mṛttikā* (clay) as a substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay (*ghaṭa-paṭādi*) or its colour, may come into existence and perish.

That a substance may assume different forms is illustrated by two verses from the *Āptamīmāṃsā* (also quoted by Malliṣeṇa in his *Syādvādamāñjari*). The verse relates the story of a certain king who had a son and a daughter. Out of gold, the daughter got a jar made of gold, whereas the prince got a crown also made of gold. This act of the king displeased the daughter, whereas the prince

was pleased; but the king was neutral being the possessor of so much gold whether in the form of a jar or of a crown. The verse in question runs thus:

*ghaṭa - maulī - suvarṇārthī nāśotpāda - sthitiṣvayam/  
śoka - pramoda - mādhyasthyam jano yāti sahetukam//*  
[Apt. Mī. 59]

Similary, to illustrate *utpāda*, *vināśa* and *dhrauvya*, there is another story which says-

*payovrato na dadhyatti na payo' tti dadhivrataḥ/  
agorasavrato nobhe tasmād vastu trayātmakam//*  
[Apt. Mī. 60]

The verse says that "he who has vowed to live on milk does not take curds; he who has vowed to live on curds does not take milk; he who has vowed to live on food other than those supplied by a cow takes neither milk nor curds" - so a substance has three qualities.

So *Anekāntavāda* describes the nature of a substance (*dravya*). *Anta* means *pakṣa*, or *koṭi* or *dharma*, another side of a substance. In analysing a substance, it is observed that it has, at least, two aspects. In one sense a permanent substance is an *anta* (one side) and *anīyatva* is also an *anta* (another side). Nāgārjuna in his *Mādhyamika-kārikā* says-

*astiti nāstīti, ubhe'pi antā śuddhī aśuddhīti ime'pi  
antā/  
tasmād ubhe ante vivarjayitvā madhye' pi sthānam  
prakaroti paṇḍitaḥ//*

In his opinion, existence and non-existence, purity and impurity all are distinctive features of a substance. And this is *anta* or *dharma*.

From the above it can be said that in an *anekāntavāda*, the nature of contradictory features of a substance is described. If there is no mutual contradictory features, then it is not described by *anta*. In the Upaniṣad, a substance is considered as only permanent, the Buddhists consider the existence of a substance as transitory. But only the Jains think that a substance (*dravya*) is both

permanent and transitory. When it is *nitya* (permanent), it is a *dravya* (substance), and when it is *anitya* (transitory), it is called *pariyāya*. The description of a substance in the form of *dravya* and *pariyāya* is the basic tenet of *anekāntavāda*. Umāsvāti defines *dravya* thus:

*guṇa-pariyāya-vad dravyam* (TS. V 38)

"A substance is that which has qualities and modes."

On the basis of the commentary *Sarvārthasiddhi* this definition can be explained thus. The basic idea is that in a substance the qualities and modes exist. The qualities of a substance are always associated with the substance (*dravya*). But the modes are not always associated with the substance (*dravya*). The Pūjyapāda says- "That which makes distinction between one substance and another is called a quality, and the modification of a substance is called a mode. A substance is associated with these two. Further, it is of inseparable connection and permanent. The qualities are the distinguishing features of a substance and the lack of qualities would lead to intermixture confusion of a substance<sup>1</sup>."

When this definition is applied to soul and matter, the distinguishing features are clear to understand. Soul has the quality of consciousness, while matter has not got it. So, "souls are distinguished from matter by the presence of qualities, such as, knowledge, while matter is distinguished from souls by the presence of form (colour) etc. Without such distinguishing characteristics, there can be no distinction between souls and matter". So knowledge and consciousness are the qualities always associated with souls, while forms, i.e. colour etc. are associated with matter.

### *The Relativity of Knowledge:*

The *Anekānta* teaches us the principle of the relativity of knowledge which is an important contribution to the domain of truth. An example of this partial truth is found

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1. S.A. Jain, Reality, p. 162.

in the *Udānasūtra* of the Pali canon as well as in philosophical treatises of the Jains. This is the story of the 'Parable of the Blind Men and the Elephant' (popularly known as *andha-gaja-nyāya*). There were certain blind men who experienced an elephant, and when they were asked to describe the elephant, each of them described the elephant in accordance with the experience he had with regard to the limbs of the elephant which he happened to have felt. Each one is right with regard to his experiences of the elephant, but each one's experiences are not the whole truth. The *Udānasūtra* says-

*imesu kira sajjamīti eke samana-brāhmaṇā/  
viggaḥa naṃ vivadaṃti janā ekāṅga-dassino//*

Here the *ekāṅgadassino* indicates those blind men who see only a single limb of the elephant.

This simple story indicates that the truth or the pathways of Reality can be investigated from different angles of vision. This simple story also indicates the manysidedness of Truth, the multiple nature of Reality.

Though the Jains are the pioneers in their theory of relativity, the Buddhists as well as the Sanskrit writers are not completely devoid of this principle and the consistency of contradictories. The *andha-gaja-nyāya* found in almost all the systems of Indian philosophy shows that the possibility of a partial truth of apparent contradictories is acknowledged by all the systems of philosophy. But the Jains say that their philosophy only visualises the whole truth (*sakalādeśa*), while the other systems only possess the broken truth (*vikalādeśa*). These two contradictories are the essence of *anekāntavāda*. It is a fact worth noting that though the two sects, i.e., Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras, differ in many respects, but with regard to the theory of relativity they do not. For the origin of the concept of *anekānta*, the Śvetāmbara canons can help very little, though one or two references are found.

As far as the development of *anekāntavāda* is

concerned, it can be said that it is not very old. Though there are some glimpses here and there in the Jain canonical literature, the real development did not start from the 5th century A.D. when the Śvetāmbara Jain canonical literature was codified finally. In the *Bhagavatisūtra* the process of *anekāntavāda* is hinted at in the form of *syādvāda*. The author of "Nayacakra" says-

*sarva-nayānām jina-pravacanasyaiva nibandhanatvāt kim asya nibandhanam iti ced ucyate. nibandhanam cāsyā. "āyā bhante nāṇe aṇṇāṇe (=ātmā jñānam ajñānam) iti svāmī Gautama svāminā prṣṭo vyākaroti Godamā nāṇe niyamā ato jñānam niyamād ātmani jñānasyānya-vyatirekeṇa vṛttadarśanāt "āyāpuṇa siya nāṇe siya aṇṇāṇe."*

"All the sermons of the Jina is the source of *nyāya* (logic), then what is the necessity of this? The necessity of this doctrine rests on the knowledge and ignorance of Self is the answer when asked by Gautamasvāmī. So, Gautama, the rule is knowledge. This one is for both knowledge and ignorance.<sup>2</sup>

In the passage of the *Bhagavatisūtra* mentioned above, there is a germ of *syādvāda*. The passage further says-

*Goyamā appaṇo ādiṭṭhe āyā, parassa ādiṭṭhe no āyā tad ubhayassa ādiṭṭhe avvattavvaṃ ātā ti ya ṇo ātā ti ya iti.*

If you ask, Gautama, then soul is, in other sense, the soul does not exist; but if both are asked, it is inexpressible- soul can be explained in both ways.<sup>3</sup>

As far as we know this is the earliest reference to *syādvāda*, but in this conception there are only three propositions which can be rendered as *asti* (affirmation), *nāsti* (negation) and *avaktavya* (indescribability).<sup>4</sup>

2. Dhruva, p. lxxvii.

3. Op. cit.

4. Op. cit.



Gradually, in course of time, these three original propositions came to be known as *mūlabhaṅga*, particularly when the *syādvāda* developed into sevenfold propositions in the *Pravacana-sāra* and *Pañcāstikāya* of Kundakunda belonging to the 1st or 2nd century A.D.

In his commentary also Devanandī has only mentioned three propositions which are *sat* (affirmation), *asat* (denial) and *avaktavya* (indescribability) and not the sevenfold propositions as described by late logicians.

Among the other Jaina Āgama texts, in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga Nirukti*, the reference to the *Syādvāda* is found.

After the period of canonical speculation, came the age of systematization in the 1st or 2nd century A.D. This is the age of Umāsvāti and Kundakunda. Umāsvāti (1st or 3rd century A.D.) makes no mention of the *Syādvāda*, not to speak of its seven propositions. In his *Tattvārthasūtra* (V.32), he, for the first time, refers to the principle of Relativity or *Anekānta* in his sūtra,

*arpitānarpita-siddheḥ* (TS. V. 32)

which means—"the contradictory views are established (*arpita*) from different points of view." Pūjyapāda Devanandī or Jinendrabuddhi (bet. 5th and 7th centuries A.D.) in his commentary *Sarvārthasiddhi* on the *Tattvārthasūtra* comments on this sūtra thus (translated by S.A. Jain, see pp. 157-158) :

"Substances are characterised by an infinite number of attributes. For the sake of use or need, prominence is given to certain characteristics of a substance from one point of view. And prominence is not given to other characteristics, as these are of no use or need at that time. Thus even the existing attributes are not expressed, as these are of secondary importance (*anarpita*). There is no contradiction in what is established by these two points of view. For instance, there is no contradiction in the same person Devadatta being a father, a son, a brother, a nephew and so on. For the points of view are different.

From the point of view of his son he is a father, and from the point of view of his father he is a son. Similarly, with regard to his other designations. In the same manner substance is permanent from the point of view of general properties. From the point of view of its specific modes it is not permanent. Hence there is no contradiction. These two, the general and the particular, somehow, are different as well as identical. Thus these form the cause of wordly intercourse.

"A question is raised. That which exists is governed by the doctrine of manifold points of view (*relative pluralism*). Therefore, it is proper that molecules are formed from matter by division and union. But there is this doubt. Are molecules of two atoms and so on formed by mere union, or is there any peculiarity? The reply is this. When there is union of actions, these atoms are transformed by combination in one object, which is a molecule. If it is so, what is it that certain atoms combine and certain others do not, though all of them are of the nature of matter? Though the atoms are not different as far as their nature as matter is concerned, combination is established on the basis of capacity derived from the effect of mutual differences among infinite modes".

But in the *Pravacana-sāra* and in the *Pañcāstikāya* of *Kundakunda* (2nd A.D.), the sevenfold propositions came into existence.

In the Golden age of Jain philosophy (bet. 6th and 10th centuries A.D.), we have two outstanding pioneers on Jain philosophy, Siddhasena Divākara (a Śvetāmbara) and Samantabhadra (a Digambara), both belonging to 6th and 7th centuries A.D. Siddhasena Divākara's two works, namely, *Nyāyāvatāra* and *Sammatti-tarka* commented on by Siddharṣi (10th century A.D.) and Abhayadevasūri (10th century A.D.) respectively, are famous Jain logical texts. Samantabhadra (also belonging to the same period) wrote *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* in which the Jainistic philosophy of *Syādvāda* was explained.

In this age belonged Haribhadra Sūri (705-775 A.D.) whose *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* is a famous book where brief discussions of the different systems of Indian philosophy are described. In fact, as far as I know, Haribhadra Sūri's *Anekāntajayapatākā* edited by H.R. Kapadia (Baroda 1947) is perhaps the first book where the problem of *anekānta* philosophy is explained.

In the same period (i.e. in the later part of the 8th century) also belonged Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka or Akalaṅkadeva who wrote the *Tattvārtharājavārttika* on the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* of Umāsvāti, and *Aṣṭaśati*, a commentary on Samantabhadra's *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, *Nyāyaviniścaya*, *Tattvārtha-vārttika-vyākhyānālaṅkāra* and numerous others.

Two other famous authors also belonged to this golden age. And they are—Vidyānandī (belonging to the early part of the 9th century A.D.) and Māṇikyanandī (also belonging to the 9th century A.D.). Vidyānandī (a Digambara) wrote a commentary entitled *Aṣṭasahasrī* on the *Aṣṭaśati* of Akalaṅkadeva and *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika*, whereas Māṇikyanandī (another Digambara of the 9th cent. A.D.), wrote his famous *Parikṣāmukha* on Jain Logic.

In the last period of Jain philosophy (bet. 11th and 15th centuries A.D.), there developed the Jain philosophy on the *syādvāda*. Two contemporary authors—Devasūri (1086-1169 A.D.) and Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.)—are the pioneers on the idea of *syādvāda*. Devasūri wrote *pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra* and its commentary *Syādvādaratnākara*. The prolific writer Hemacandra has two famous works called *Anyā-yoga-vyavacchedikā-dvātriṃśikā* and *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* which are the landmarks on Jain philosophical texts.

So also Ratnaprabhasūri and Malliṣeṇa. Ratnaprabhasūri (1181 A.D.) wrote *Syādvāda-ratnākara-vārttika* which was a shorter commentary on the *Syādvāda-ratnākara*.

Malliṣeṇa (1292 A.D.) is the author of the *Syādvādamāñjarī* which is a commentary on *Anya-yoga-vyavacchedika-dvātriṃsika* of Hemacandra.

In the decadent period of this age we have Maladhārī Rājaśekhara (1348 A.D.), Jñānacandra (1358 A.D.) and Guṇaratna (1409. A.D.)

Akalaṅkadeva (8th century A.D.) in his *Nyāyaviniścaya* defines *anekānta* thus :

*upayogau śrutasya dvau syādvāda-naya-samjñitau/  
syādvādaḥ sakalādeśo nayo vikala-saṅkayā//*

*anatātmakārtha-kathanam syādvādaḥ. yathā jivaḥ  
puḍgalaḥ dharmo'dharma ākāśaḥ kāla iti. tatra jīvo  
jñāna-darśana-vīrya sukhair asādhāraṇaiḥ  
amūrttatvā-saṅkhyāta-pradeśatva-sukṣmatvaiḥ  
sādhāraṇa- sādharāṇaiḥ sādharāṇa sattva-prameyatvā'  
guru- laghutva-dharmatva-guṇitvādibhiḥ sādharāṇaiḥ  
anekāntaḥ. tasya jīvasyādeśāt pramāṇam syādvādaḥ.<sup>5</sup>*

In a very modern book entitled *Jaina-siddhānta-dipikā* of Gaṇādhipati Tulsi, *anekānta* is defined in a lucid way as—

*sāmānya-viśeṣa-sad-asan-nityānitya-vācyāvācyā-  
dyanekāntātmakam* ( X. 29)

i.e., "(The cognizable object is) universal-cum-particular, existent-cum-nonexistent, eternal-cum-noneternal, expressible-cum-nonexpressible and is thus indeterminate (in terms of formal contradiction)."

Satkari Mukherji and Nathmal Tania in their notes (pp. 188-189) have explained the sūtra thus.

"*Anekānta* means not *ekānta*. *Anta* literally means end or extreme. Thus 'being' is one extreme and 'non-being' is the other extreme of predication. This also holds good of eternal and non-eternal, and so on, which are given in

5. Mahendra Kumar Shastri, *Akalaṅka-grantha-trayam*, 1939, p. 21.

formal logic as contradictories. According to pure logic, these oppositions are exclusive of one another and they cannot be combined in any one substratum. The opposition is absolute and unconditional. This may be called the absolutistic logic. The Jaina is a non-absolutistic, and so also all philosophers like the Sāṃkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsist and the non-monistic schools of Vedānta are non-absolutistics inasmuch as they do not believe in the absolute opposition of the logical extremes e.g., being and non-being, eternal and non-eternal, and so on. According to the Jainas, opposition is understandable only in the light of experience. We know that light and darkness are opposed, because we do not see them together. No *a priori* knowledge of such opposition is possible. Accordingly the non-absolutist contends that if being and non-being are found together, and this finding is not contradicted by subsequent experience. We must conclude that there is no opposition between them. In other words, one is not exclusive of the other. We have seen a jar existing in its place and not existing in another. Existence and non-existence are thus both predicable of the jar. The concept of change or becoming involves that a thing continues and maintains its identity in spite of its diversity of qualities. The unbaked jar is black, becomes red when baked and yet continues as the jar. The Jaina thus maintains in strict conformity with the dictates of experience, that all reals are possessed of a nature which is not determinable in the light of formal logic. Everything is eternal as substance, but perishable *qua modes*. The Jaina does not consider the Naiyāyika to be sound logically when he makes substance and modes different entities which however are somehow brought together by a relation called *samavāya* (inherence). But inherence as an independent relation is only a logical makeshift which will not work."

In the end we can thus sum up the entire discussion about *anekānta* in the succinct language of Ācārya

Mahāprajña who in his book *Anekānta* in Hindi (translated into English by Mrs Sudhamahi Regunathan by the name of *Anekānta*, the third Eye) has said that our life is based on opposing pairs. The English translation says—

"Anekanta has one rule : co-existence of opposites. Not only is existence in pairs, they have to be opposing pairs. In the entire world of nature, in the entire universe of existence, opposing pairs exist. If there is wisdom there is ignorance. If there is vision, there is lack of it. If there is happiness then there is sadness too. If there is loss of consciousness, there is awakening. If there is death, there is life. There is the auspicious and the inauspicious. High and low. The disturbed and the undisturbed. There is gaining of strength and the loss of it." (pp. 4-5)

## II Language

Having thus described the fundamental basic conception of *anekānta* which really emphasises the manysidedness of truth, or to put it in a different way, looking at a substance (*dravya*) from its positive and negative aspects, I now pass on to apply the doctrine of *Anekānta* to the epistemological problem of language which consists of sentences and their meanings.

Various schools of Indian philosophy, the Sanskrit grammarians and rhetoricians have devoted much time to the linguistic problem of meaning. In order to ascertain the meaning of word(s) in a sentence, they have speculated various semantic aspects of language. The rhetoricians have defined a sentence thus:-

*vākyam syād yogyatā' kāṅkṣā' satti-yuktaḥ padoccayaḥ*  
(SD. II. I)

"A sentence is a collection of words (*padoccayaḥ*) possessing (*yuktaḥ*) compatibility (*yogyatā*), expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) and juxta-position or proximity (*āsatti*)".

"Compatibility (*yogyatā*) means the absence of absurdity in the mutual relation of the things denoted by

the words. A sentence like *payasā siñcati* has compatibility because water has the fitness, owing to its liquidity which is necessary for sprinkling. But a sentence like *vahninā siñcati* has no compatibility, since fire lacks liquidity which only can make a thing an instrument in the act of sprinkling. If it were held that a mere collocation of words can make a sentence even in the absence of compatibility then such a collection of words as *vahninā siñcati* would be a sentence; but no one would say that the above is a proper sentence, even though grammatically there is no defect in the sentence.

Expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) is another condition of a sentence. Absence of the completion of the sense will not make a sentence. Mere saying *gauḥ*, *aśvaḥ*, *puruṣaḥ* etc. will not make a sentence, because those words will create curiosity in the listener's mind to complete the sense. But if we say that *aśvaḥ dhāvati*, the curiosity of the listener will go away. If there is any desire (*jijñāsā*) in the mind of a listener to know something about the sentence, then that sentence is not a sentence. So the examples given above will not constitute a sentence, because they lack one of the requisites of a sentence which is expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*).

"Juxtaposition (*āsatti*) is the absence of a break in the apprehension of what is said; i.e., the presentation of things without the intervention of time or other unconnected things" (Kane, SD. p 35).

In the *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, *āsatti* is defined as *avyavadhānena padajanya-padārthopasthitiḥ* i.e., the knowledge of the meaning of words resulting from the words being heard without any long pause (between the several words).

To conclude, it can be said that "a sentence is made up by the combination of several notions and it is therefore necessary that the impression made by each word should remain fresh until this combination is effected. If we utter the two words *gām* and *ānaya* at the interval of some

hours, no sense will be apprehended. It is not absolutely necessary that the words must be *uttered* together. In a printed book we have no utterance and yet we apprehend the sense because the words occur in Juxtaposition." (Kane, SD. p 35). So these three i.e., *yogyatā*, *ākāṅkṣā*, *āsatti* or *saṁnidhi* are said to be the causes of the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence (*vākyārtha jñāna*).

At a later stage, *Tātparya* is also added to the conception of a sentence. In the *Parama-laghu-mañjūṣā* of Nāgésabhaṭṭa (17th century A.D.), *tātparya* is also included in the definition of a sentence.

*śābdabodha-sahakāri-kāraṇāni ākāṅkṣā-yogyotā'satti-  
tātparyāni.*

*Tātparya* is another element which is the cause in helping the meaning of a word.

The rhetorician Viśvanātha says that in considering compatibility and expectancy, the words *ātmā* and *artha* are to be construed as *ākāṅkṣā* and *yogyatā* respectively.

*tatrākāṅkṣā-yogyatayor ātmārtha-dharmatve'pi padoccaya dharmatvam upacārāt* (*Vṛtti* under SD. II.I).

Although expectancy is a property of the soul and compatibility is an attribute of things, both of them are spoken of in the text as the properties of a collection of words in a secondary sense. (Kane, SD. p. 35)

*Ākāṅkṣā* literally means "a desire to know" . Desire does not inhabit in the words, nor in the sense. Desire is the property of the listener. So *ākāṅkṣā* is *ātmadharmā*, *yogyatā* really subsists in the thing as signified by the words. Words and things are closely connected. *Āsatti* is an attribute of words---- when one utters the words in juxtaposition, the meaning is conveyed.

Having defined a sentence which is a collection of words, it is now time to define a word.

*varṇāḥ padaṁ prayogārthān anvitaikārtha-bodhakāḥ*  
"A word means letters so combined as to be suited for




use, not in logical connection, conveying a meaning and only one meaning."

The use of the word *prayogārḥā* "suited for use" means that the crude form of a word (*prātipadika*) is not regarded as a word. Unless the words are inflected, they are not considered word to be used in a sentence.

The words 'not in logical connection' means that the combination of letters are not logically connected though the combination of letters gives the meaning of words logically.

Having defined a word as "combination of words conveying a sense", it is now necessary to know the nature of meaning of a word. As far as the semantics of a word is concerned, the meaning of a word can be basically divided into three categories. They are:



The picture gives us the idea of the basic meanings of a word. *Abhidhā* is the expressed or conventional meaning of a word, i.e. the meaning as conveyed by the direct signification of a word; it is, in fact, the dictionary meaning of a word. Mukulabhaṭṭa (last quarter of the 9th cent. A.D.) in his work *Abhidhā-vṛtti-māṭṛkā* calls *abhidhā* as *mukhyārtha*. When the principal meaning of a word is indicated, Mukulabhaṭṭa terms it *mukhya*. The grammarians call it *śakyārtha* and *adhidheyārtha*, because the first meaning of words is given in the dictionary; it is

*śakya*, because it gives that meaning which the word conveys (*śakya*); and because the meaning is given in the dictionary (*abhidhāna*), it is called *abhidheyārtha*.

This *abhidhā* is of three kinds---*yaugika*, *rūḍha* and *yogarūḍha*. When a word gets its meaning from its derivation (i.e. root + suffixed meaning), the word is termed as *yaugika* word; e.g. *kartā* doer. When a word receives its meaning other than what is expressed by its derivative meaning, it is called *rūḍhi* word, e.g. *kuśala* meaning 'expert' and not "one who collects grass." The derivative meaning (= *kuśam lāti dadāti vā iti kuśalaḥ*) is not prominent here, particularly when we say *karmaṇi kuśalaḥ* 'expert in work.' The *yogarūḍha* word is a combination of *yaugika* and *rūḍha*, and therefore, it has the significance of both, but the meaning refers to a third one, e.g. *pañkaja*.

*Lakṣaṇā* indicates the figurative meaning of a word (*lakṣyārtha*). By *lakṣaṇā* a new meaning of a word is indicated along with the principal or current meaning of a word. How the meaning of *lakṣaṇā* is acquired, is very well-explained by Amareshwar Thakur in his Introduction (at p. 28) to the *Kāvya-prakāśa* of *Mamṣa* (bet. 1050 and 1100 A.D.):

"When the current meaning is barred by incompatibility and another meaning connected with the current meaning (*vāc्यārtha*) comes to be attached to the word either through usage (*rūḍhi*=*prasiddhi* or *prayogavāha*) or for a special purpose (*prayojana*) then the function (*vr̥tti*) by which this new meaning is presented is called *lakṣaṇā*."

Two examples are given for *lakṣaṇā*: one is *karmaṇi kuśalaḥ* 'expert in work' and the other is *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* 'a ghoṣa resides in the Ganges.' Here in *karmaṇi kuśalaḥ* the primary meaning of *kuśala* 'a collector of *kuśa* grass' (*kuśam lāti iti*) is barred by its figurative meaning 'expert' which meaning has come from the primary meaning as a gatherer of *kuśa* grass, because the gathering of *kuśa*

requires discrimination, and as a result, secondary meaning 'expert' is sanctioned by usage. In the second example, *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, the primary meaning river is barred, because a *ghoṣa* (a village of cowherds) cannot reside in the river. Naturally, the meaning of the Gaṅgā will be *gaṅgātaṭa* the bank of the Ganges."

*Vyañjanā* directly means the 'power of suggestion.' *Vyaṅgārtha*, therefore, means 'a suggested or implied meaning of a word.'

The implied meaning of a word is that meaning which gives rise to another meaning to be understood by persons inundated with the qualities of a genius. This *vyaṅgārtha* meaning depends upon (i) the speaker, (ii) the person spoken to, (iii) intonation of a language, i.e. the change of voice indicating emotions, (iv) the sentence, (v) the expressed meaning, (vi) the presence of another person, (vii) context, (viii) place and (ix) time. All the suggested meanings which give rise to another meaning is conveyed by the words and so words constitute a contributing factor for the suggestion of the meaning.

Even though these three are the powers of a word, the inner power of a word is *ṁṛtti* (function) or *śakti* (power) or *saṅketa* (convention). It should be noted that each word in every language has a power to convey a particular sense. That power of a word is to be grasped from the convention. "When a man ascertains that a particular word has a convention in respect of a particular sense, then only does he recognise the power of the word to express that particular sense" (Kane, S D. p. 39).

How can we acquire the meaning of a word? Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana (17th-century A.D.) has given an indication to that effect in the *Bhāṣā-pariccheda* thus:

*śaktigrahaṁ vyākaraṇopamāna-koṣṭha-vyākhyāḍ  
vyavahārataśca/  
vākyasya śeṣād vivṛter vadanti sānnidhyataḥ siddha-  
padasya vṛddhāḥ//*

This verse tells us the conception of verbal testimony in the following cases.

1. *Vyākaraṇa* : We learn from grammar the meanings of roots and suffices and relation of words in a sentence;
2. *Upamāna* : In some cases the meaning of a word can be ascertained by means of similarity of comparison;
3. *Koṣa* : We know the meaning of a word, both synonyms and antonyms, from a dictionary;
4. *Āptavākya* : We often get the meaning of a word from the usage of a higher authority;
5. *Vyavahāra* : We get the meaning of a word from the practical use of a word;
6. *Vākyaśeṣa* : Literally, *vākyaśeṣa* means 'the end or rest of the passage' i.e. it means the context. From the context the meaning of word comes out, e.g., in the Vedic passage *aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti*, the exact meaning of *aktāḥ* is *ghṛta* which is understood from the context (*tejo vai ghṛtam*). In the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* (I. 4 2a) this idea is expressed by *sandigdheṣu vākyaśeṣāt*.
7. *Vivṛta* : From explanation sometimes we can get the meaning of a word; e.g., *rasāla* means *āmra*, 'mango.'
8. *Siddhapadasya vṛddhāḥ* : Sometimes the meaning of a word may be gathered from the utterances of well-known people.

Although we have different ways by which we acquire the meaning of a word, the problem is still shrouded in obscurity. P.V. Kane in his SD. has explained this phenomenon in the following manner :

"When a child begins to learn a language, he first understands the meaning of words in a lump and not of each word separately. When he hears the direction 'bring a cow' addressed by one old man to another, and sees a cow brought by the man, he understands that the direction

meant the bringing of a body with a dewlap etc. He then has no distinct idea of the meaning of the two words *gām* and *ānaya*. Afterwards he hears two sentences 'tie the cow' and 'bring the horse' and sees the cow fastened and the horse brought. He finds that in the former of the sentences, a portion, namely *gām*, is common to the sentence *gām ānaya*, but another portion (*ānaya*) is omitted and something else inserted (*badhāna*). As in the case of both the sentences (*gām ānaya* and *gām badhāna*) the same body was dealt with, he naturally associates the portion *gām* with the body (cow). Thus he ascertains that the word *go* has a convention in respect of cow. The ascertainment of the convention leads him to understand that the primary meaning of the word *go* is cow." (pp. 39-40).

*Tātparya* says that every sentence must have a meaning which is intended to be conveyed by a sentence. If the hearer understands that intended meaning, the purpose is served. But in the following verse speaker's intention and normal significance are different. The verse says.

*kim gavi gotvaṃ kim agavi ca gotvaṃ.  
yadi gavi gotvaṃ mayi na hi tat tvam/  
yadi agavi ca gotvaṃ yadi vadasi tvam.  
bhavati bhavān eva samam eva gotvaṃ//*

"Does cowness reside in cow only, or can cowness reside in non-cow? If cowness resides in cow only, then it does not reside in me; but if you say that cowness lies in non-cow also, then cowness may be equal in you and in me as well."

Here the intention of the speaker is to say that cowness resides in cow only; and so to say that you behave like a cow is contradictory. It can be taken as an example of *gaunī lakṣaṇā*. The qualities residing in a bull, such as *jāḍya* (senselessness) and *māndya* (dullness), are transferred to a man. The word *go* primarily means the *jāti gotra*, and as the qualities senselessness and dullness

are associated with the bull, the transference of these qualities is indicated in man. The many-sidedness of the meaning of *go* can be looked upon on the basis of *anekānta*.

In a similar way, in the following example the contradictory position of words makes the sentence *double entendre*;

*mā yāhityapamaṅgalam vraja sakhe snehena śūnyam  
vacas  
tiṣṭheti prabhutā yathāruci kuruṣvaisā pyudāsīnatā/  
no jīvāmi vinā tvayeti vacanam sambhāvya vā na vā  
tan mām śikṣaya nātha yat samucitam vaktum tvayi  
prasthite//*

"(If I say) don't proceed it will be inauspicious; wander, my friend, my word will sound empty without any affection; stay (on) looks like commanding; do as you wish, will also mean indifferent; if I say I shall not be able to live without you, may or may not be liked by you; therefore, my lord, teach me what is to be told at the time of your departure".

The verbal forms like *yāhi*, *vraja*, *tiṣṭha*, *kuruṣva* have a special suggested meaning other than the lexicographical sense. The root *yā* does not simply mean 'go', it has a special sense 'proceed' 'set out' for a journey. The imperative indicates the idea of prohibition strengthened by the particle *mā*. Similarly, *vraja* does not mean mere going or proceeding, it gives the idea of wandering. Lexicographically, "wander implies the absence of a fixed course or more or less indifference to a course that has been fixed or otherwise indicated" (Webster's *Dictionary of Synonyms*, 1942). The imperative gives the idea of wishes. *tiṣṭha* 'stay (on)' "stresses continuance in a place" and so it implies the non-movement of a person. The imperative also implies 'command'. Finally, at the end of the series of actions comes the verb *kuruṣva* which normally means "do whatever you like". This verb is used in a general notion.

The positive aspects of all these verbs have a negative

side also. The implied sense of this passage, in the eye of *anekānta*, reflects the dilemma of the situation which will debar the husband from taking any decision for going. This is the implied sense of the passage.

The combination of sounds (or letters *varṇāḥ*) will give us infinite number of meanings. In the following verse the one letter *n* in combination with the same letter *n* gives us a good sense. The verse in question is not really meant for alliteration, but is meant for showing the infinite power of sound combination. The verse says—

*na nonanunno nunnono nānā nānananā nanu/  
nunno'nunnanno nanunneno nānenā nunnanunнанut //*  
(Kī XV. 14)

"No man is he who is wounded by a low man; no man is the man who wounds a low man, O ye of divine aspect; the wounded is not wounded if his master is unwounded; nor guiltless is he who wounds one sore wounded." [translated by A. B. Keith, *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, Oxford, 1920, p 114.]


*Deep Structure, Surface Structure and Transformation.*

*Tātparya* can be equated with the deep structure, surface structure and transformation of the modern linguistic theory.

It is normally said that sentences of all languages must have a deep structure and a surface structure. The deep structure gives the meaning of a sentence, while the surface structure gives the form of a sentence as it is used in communication. The basic idea of deep and surface structures can only be understood when a person listens to someone else speaking a language. What is most important is to find out a meaning in sounds of a language. The deep and surface structures are based on finding out a meaning in sounds. In fact, what we say is tantamount to saying that the form of a sentence is given outwardly by its surface structure, while the meaning of a sentence

is conveyed by its deep structure. Take a sentence like—a new idea is often valuable.

The main function of the deep structure is to elucidate the explicit meaning of a sentence which is not provided by a surface structure outwardly.



In the above sentence, the deep structure meaning of "the idea is new" is not explicitly conveyed by the surface structure "a new idea". It should be borne in mind that "deep structure of a sentence gives its meaning because the deep structure contains all of the information required to determine the meaning of a sentence."

The surface structure is the sentence which is actually produced, which is actually written or spoken. The deep structure implies the inner intended meaning of a sentence which the native speaker of the language takes into account. The surface structure shows the sentence in communication, whereas the deep structure of a sentence tells us the significance of the sentence so spoken. In fact, the deep structure ultimately expresses the semantic aspect of a sentence which can be elicited from the sentence.

The next point which arises in this context is to state the relationship between the deep and surface structures of a sentence, or *vice versa*. The answer to this question is simple. The relationship between the deep and surface structures is transformation which functions as a link between the two. In other words, a deep structure becomes



a surface structure via transformation. As deep structure is mainly based on the meaning of a sentence and its syntax, it is regarded as an "abstract" object, while surface structure, because of its written or spoken form, is closer to physical reality.

The part played by transformation to both these structures, is to change or transfer one constituent element into another. The transformation is the process which changes the word-order of the deep structure, so as to generate the surface structure.

"Transformation is the process which converts deep structures into intermediate or surface structures". For example.

- i) a declarative sentence into an interrogative one.
- ii) an active sentence into a passive one.

For example - the active sentence

- a) Daisy puzzled Winterbourne is transformed into a passive as
- b) Winterbourne was puzzled by Daisy.

Any language makes use of their elementary transformational processes: adjunction, substitution, and deletion.

For example, the English sentence—I have decided on the train can mean many aspects. It may mean that

- i) something I have decided when I was travelling on the train; or it may mean
- ii) out of many conveyances, I have decided that I shall go by train; or it may mean
- iii) my ideas come to my mind when I normally travel by train, and so on.

In this connection it should be noted that the Jains are not lacking in unfurling the deep and surface structures of a sentence. In the *Bhagavati-sūtra* (Book ten, chapter III), in course of conversation with Mahāvīra, Goyama (Gautama) asks Mahāvīra some questions on language. The text in question runs as follows:

*aha bhante! āsaissāmo saissāmo ciṭṭhissāmo*

*ṇisiissāmo tuyatṭhissāmo āmaṇṭaṇi āṇavaṇi jāyaṇi taha pucchaṇi ya paṇṇavaṇi paccakkhāṇi bāsā bhāsā icchāṇulomā ya aṇabhiggahiyā bhāsā bhāsā ya abhiggahammi boddhuvā saṁsayakaraṇi voyaḍamavoyadā ceva paṇṇavaṇi ṇaṁ esā bhāsā ṇa esā bhāsā mosā.*

"Oh venerable one (*bhante*)! [when one says] we shall reside (*āsaissāmo*), we shall lie (down) (*saissāmo*), we shall stand (up) (*citṭhissāmo*), we shall sit (down) (*ṇisiissāmo*), we shall stretch (*tuyatṭhissāmo*), the forms of language (*paṇṇavaṇi bhāsā*) [i.e. one of the twelve kinds of expressions] (*bhāsā*) such as, [1] addressing (*āmaṇṭaṇi*) [2] ordering (*āṇavaṇi*), [3] prayer (*jāyaṇi*) as well as, [4] questioning (*pucchaṇi*), [5] advice (*paṇṇavaṇi*), [6] refusing (*paccakkhāṇi*), [7] consenting (*icchāṇulomā*), [8] irrelevant (*aṇabhiggahiyā*). [9] relevant (*abhiggahammi boddhuvā*), [10] doubtful (*saṁsayakaraṇi*), [11] explicit (*voyaḍā*) or [12] indefinite (*avvoyaḍā*) — do these forms conform to the type of understanding (i.e. *paṇṇavaṇi* advice) or are they never false (*ṇa esā bhāsā mosā*)? Mahāvira's reply was—

*ṇa esā bhāsā mosā*

"They are not false."

In fact, these questions of Goyama to Mahāvira is related to sentences of a language. In a language, the utterances of human beings can be expressed in manifold ways of which some twelve forms are mentioned by Goyama. Our unit of speech is the sentence and the sentence is the expression of our thoughts and ideas in the form of judgment which either affirms or negates our statement. Whatever things come to the mind of a speaker, he tries to convey his opinion to the hearer. It is said earlier that in communicating one's idea in a sentence, the idea must possess compatibility, expectancy and juxtaposition, and this will lead a sentence to logical judgment. If a sentence mirrors a judgment, it must conform to the logical law.

When we analyse the utterances of human beings, we see that the sentences may be of various forms. They could be---

(i) Assertory (*āmantaṇī*), (ii) Interrogative (*pucchaṇī*) (iii) Petitionary (*icchā'ṇulomā*), (iv) Exclamatory (combination of i and iii). Apart from these, the sentences may be affirmative or negative, hypothetical or universal, personal or impersonal. Besides, the sentences may be incomplete in the form of Aposiopesis, Anakoluthon, Ellipsis and Interrogation. These are the patterns by which our expressions or utterances are made.

Besides these sententious patterns of expressing our thoughts and ideas, our sentences, irrespective of any form, may be pedantic, ironical, autobiographical, apostrophic, eulogical, logical, melodious, elliptical, and so on. This is not all. All these stylistic patterns of our expressions depend on how our thoughts and ideas are communicated to a person; on how a person utters his speeches, following any stylistic patterns. His utterances may be balanced and symmetrical, analogical and diffused, verbose and condensed. Sometimes the style may be humourous, rhythmic and emotional, interlocutory and rhetorical; their expressions may be serio-comic, antithetical, and picturesque. Even then our modes of expressions are not limited to these patterns. They are innumerable, multi-phased; they are *anekānta*. And all these modes of expressions are correct and are recognised in our ordinary speech. This idea is expressed by Mahāvīra in the language-----*ṇa esā bhāsā mosā*, "This language is not false."

In explaining certain grammatical niceties, the Jains raised some fundamental questions on the meaning of *calamāṇe calie*. Almost at the very beginning of the *Bhagavati-sūtra* (Book 1, ch-1), Goyama, while Mahāvīra was at Guṇasīlaka *caitya* in Rājagṛha, asks Mahāvīra the very fundamental linguistic problem of *calamāṇe calie*. The text runs as follows:

*calamāṇe calie. udirijjamāṇe udirie. vedijjamāṇe vedie.  
pahijjamāṇe pahīṇe. chijjamāṇe chinṇe, bhijjamāṇe  
bhinṇe, dajjhamāṇe dadḍhe, mijjamāṇe mae,  
nijjarijjamāṇe jijjīṇṇe.*

.....  
*ee naṃ cattāri padā egatṭhā nāṇāghosā nāṇā-vamjaṇā  
uppaṇṇa-pakkhassa.*

.....  
*ee naṃ paṃcā padā nāṇatṭhā nāṇā-vamjaṇā vigaya-  
pakkhassa.* [Bh. Sū. I. I. 11-13].

"[Is it proper to call] moving as moved, fructifying as fructified, feeling as felt, separating as separated, cutting as cut, piercing as pierced, burning as burnt, dying as dead, and exhausting as exhausted."

"These [first] four words are of the same import, though of different sounds and different suggestions.

"These five are of different imports, different sounds and different suggestions"

Apart from its philosophical implication on *Karma*-theory, this passage has a linguistic implication as well. The expressions *calamāṇe calie* have two tenses in one breath. Grammatically *calamāṇe* (moving) is a present participle tense implying the sense of continuous action; and hence it can be a present continuous tense. The implied underlying meaning is that the action has started but still continuing, and so the action is incomplete. But *calie* ('has moved') is a present perfect tense which means that the action has started and has continued for some time and now the action is complete and the result is there, and hence it is completive. So the use of two tenses is not congruous in the same expression. Mahāvīra's contention on this sort of expression is that when an action continues for some time, it can easily be said that some portions of that continuous action have been completed and the remaining portion is still continuing, when the continuity of action is over, the action is finished, and so

the action is said to be complete, and so the expression *calie* is used to indicate that sense.

In Book II chapter 6, it is said that language is the vehicle of expression (*ohāriṇī bhāṣā*). This expression has a reference to the *Paṇṇavaṇā-sūtra* (chapter eleven on language pp. 168-178 of Jain Vishva Bharati edition 1989). The basic points of this chapter are succinctly summed up by K.C. Lalwani thus:

"Language may be *satya*, *asatya*, *satya-mṛṣā* and *asatya-amṛṣā*. The main source of language is the soul. It arises in a physical body, gross, assimilative and caloric. Its shape is like that of a thunder. The matter let loose by language goes to the other extreme of the sphere. Matter-clusters with innumerable space units are included in it; matter with innumerable vacuum units are included in it; matter with a life-span of one, two, till ten time-units, countable time-units, uncountable time-units are included in it; matter with colour, smell, substance and touch are included in it. As a rule, matter from six directions are included, and they may be included without break or with break. The minimum life-span of language is one time-unit, and the maximum less than 48 minutes. Matter constituting language is acquired by the activities of the physical body, and is thrown out in the form of words or speech. *Asatya* and *satya-mṛṣā* languages are spoken with the decline of *karma* enshrouding knowledge and vision, but with the rise of *karma* causing delusion, while *satya* and *asatya-amṛṣā* are spoken with the decline of *karma* enshrouding knowledge and vision. Smallest in number are those who speak *satya*: innumerable times more are those who speak *asatya-mṛṣā*; innumerable times more than the second are those who speak *asatya*; innumerable times more than the third are those speaking *asatya-amṛṣā*; but infinite times more are those who speak not. Included in the last category are inadequate (undeveloped) organisms, the liberated souls, the rock-like steadfast (would-be-liberated) beings, and all one-organ being."

In conclusion, we can say that the application of *anekānta* in language is manifold. It is primarily found in the levels of meaning and in the context of syntax, apart from other grammatical niceties. From the discussion above it is seen that a word or a sentence may possess multi-levels of meaning. The verbal expression may be manifold, indeterminate and relative as the reality is also manifold, indeterminate and relative. As far as meaning is concerned it is inexhaustive as reality itself. The meaning that we fix of a particular word or a sentence depends upon the context and the intention of the speaker and it is all meant for our practical purposes. Syntactically that a sentence may be construed as active or passive or otherwise—is all due to multi-structural pattern of a sentence. The manifold grammatical categories are infinite as the expressions of human beings are. Directly or indirectly, the principle of *anekānta* is inherent in the manifold aspects of language.

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# JAINISM AND NON-VIOLENCE\*

SATYA RANJAN BANERJEE

## Preamble

India is the cradle of *ahiṃsā* (non-violence). From the hoary antiquity down to the present day, India has always been emphasizing on the importance of *ahiṃsā*. There are some passages in Vedic literature, in Classical Sanskrit, in Buddhist and Jain literature which tell us every now and then the eulogy of *ahiṃsā*. The impact of the doctrine of *ahiṃsā* is so much that even in the literary documents of modern Indian languages, this idea of non-violence is greatly reflected. In the present context, I am only concerned with the contributions of the Jains to the field of non-violence *vis-à-vis* the other Indian literature like Sanskrit and Buddhist.

## Words for Violence

At the very beginning, I believe, it will not be out of place here, if I mention that there are some words which are used in connection with “violence” or “non-violence”, and these words are *daṇḍa*, *-atipāta*, *ghan* and *whims*—along with their compound forms.

The root meaning of *daṇḍa* is “to blow with an instrument”, “to hurt”, “to strike” and the like<sup>1</sup>. In the *Ācārāṅga-sūtra* (Book II) Mahāvīra was teased with—

*haya-puvvo tattha daṇḍeṇaṃ adu vā muṭṭhiṇā adu phaleṇaṃ adu leluṇā kavāleṇaṃ*

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\* A lecture delivered at the Asiatic Society on the 4th of September 2003 at the Humayun Kabir Hall.

1. For all these ideas, see Colette Chaillat—*Words for Violence in the “Seniors” of the Jaina Canon*, pp. 207-236, in *Jain Studies in Honour of Jozef Deleu 1993* ed. by Rudy Smet and Kenji Watanabe, Hon-no-Tomosha, Tokyo.



“he (Mahāvīra) was struck with a stick, the fist, a fruit, a clod, a potsherd”

In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra* (2.2.6), *daṇḍa* implies grave moral injury, such as, *se hantā, chettā bhattā lumpaittā vilumpaittā uddavaittā*—“he knocks down, cuts, pierces, breaks, plunders, puts to death.”

We have five *daṇḍa-samāyānas*, like *aṭṭhā-daṇḍa*, *anaṭṭhā-daṇḍa*, *himsā-daṇḍa*, *akamhā-daṇḍa*, *diṭṭhi-vipariyāsiya-daṇḍa*. However, violence by *daṇḍa* is treated severely in the Jain canonical texts.

Another word—*atipāta* (Pkt. *aivāya*) meaning “destroying”, “killing” is normally used in compound in connection with (*ṣaṭ*) *jīva-nikāyas*, such as *pāṇāivāya* etc.

In the *Ācārāṅga-sūtra* it is said —

*paccakkhāmi savvaṃ pāṇāivāyaṃ, neva sayam  
pāṇāivāyaṃ karejjā.*

“I renounce all injury against life. I shall not injure any life”.

In the *Daśavaikālika-sūtra*, almost the same is repeated in a better way—

*savvaṃ bhante pāṇāivāyaṃ paccakkhāmi. neva  
sayam pāṇe aivāejjā, neva annehiṃ pāṇe  
aivāyāvejjā, pāṇe aivāyante vi anne na  
samañujāṇejjā, jāvajjivāe tivihaṃ tiviheṇaṃ*

“O my master, I renounce all injury against any being. I [shall myself] not injure any living being, nor cause it to be injured by others, nor allow others who injure it, to do so.”

This type of expression is found in the Jain canonical texts to indicate the injury of life.

The frequent use of the root *han* “to kill” in the Āgama texts shows that the “injury” with this root is emphatic. Numerous forms of this root, such as, *haṇati* (thematic base), *hammai* (act. 3ps), *haṇa*, *haṇaha* (imp. 2 pl), *haṇe*, *haṇejjā* (optative) are constantly used. Its derivative forms like *ghātae*, *ghātayejja* are also used. In most of the cases, when the different forms of this root are used, they are

used in stock-phrases like *na ghātae*, *na ghātejjā*, *na hammai*, *na haṇati* and so on, and in almost all the cases the passages are connected with life (*pāṇā*).

The root *hiṃs* is often interchanged with *han*. But the root *hiṃs* is also used, such as, *na hiṃsejjā pāṇiṇaṃ pāṇe*—‘do not injure to a living beings’, *hiṃsimsu me*—“they have injured me”, *na hiṃsai kiṃca*—“do not kill anybody”, etc. From this root the negative idea of *hiṃsā*. i.e., *ahiṃsā* is formed :

The etymological meaning of *ahiṃsā* is simply non-violence. The derivation of *ahiṃsā* is *na hiṃsā a-hiṃsā* where *a-* is a negative particle which means “devoid of injury”. The *hiṃsā* is derived from the root *hiṃs* meaning “to strike, beat, wound, kill, destroy” and so on with the suffix *ac* and the formation will be *hiṃsā* by the sūtra *gurośca halaḥ* (3/3/103) which means the suffix *a(c)* is added to a consonantal root which has a *guru* (heavy) vowel which automatically takes the feminine suffix *ā* by the sūtra *a pratyayāt* (3/3/102). In fact, the root *hiṃs* is again derived from the desiderative of the root *han* meaning to kill, injure, harm etc. This root *han* is cognated with Gk *θείνω*, *θάνατος*, *φόνος*, *πέφαται*, Lat. *de-fendere*, *of-fendere*, Lith *genu*, *geti*, Slav. *gūnati*. Lexicographically, *hiṃsā*, may be of three types : 1. mental as ‘bearing malice’, 2. verbal as ‘abusive language’, and 3. personal as ‘acts of violence.’

The reason why I raise this etymological meaning of the word *hiṃsā* is to show that the word is very primitive and the concept of the word is from the very beginning of human civilization. That is why, the major Indo-European languages like Greek, Latin, Lithuanian and Slavic possess these words with their primitive meanings like mental, verbal and personal. Therefore, in all schools of Indian thoughts whenever there was a question of non-violence, it was connected with *kāyena*, *manasā* and *vācā*—“by body, by mind and by speech”. At a later stage, the Jain *sādhus* (monks) gave emphasis on the question of

non-violence always with reference to *kāyena*, *manasā* and *vācā*— this idea ultimately leads to *triguṇti* which consists of *vag-guṇti* (control of speech), *kāyagūṇti* (control of activity of body) and *monogūṇti* (control of mind) and to *bhāṣā-samiti* (care in speaking) of Jain philosophy.<sup>1</sup>

Having said this, let me now pass on to the topic to see how the Jains have developed this idea of non-violence in their literature.

### Tolerance as a kind of non-violence

Here in this context it will not be out of place to talk something about tolerance which is tagged as a part of non-violence. There is a class of people who labour under the idea that “tolerance is not a traditional Jain virtue.” This is far from truth. It is true that there is no direct word for tolerance in Sanskrit or in Pali and Prakrit. But the Sanskrit words—*sahana*, *sahiṣṇutā*, *sahana-kṣamatā*, *sahana-śīlatā* and the like are used to indicate the idea of tolerance. There is another Sanskrit word *sahitram* which is also used in the sense of tolerance, forbearance, patience and so on.

There is no common Indo-European term for tolerance, unless we presume that IE *\*bherō* which has Greek φέρω, φορέω, Sanskrit *bharā-mi* (*bībharmi*), Latin *ferō*, Gothic *baítra* all meaning “I bear”, has the significance of tolerance; otherwise, the idea of tolerance is expressed differently in different IE languages. The Sanskrit words are formed from the root *sah-*, the Greek has the roots ἀνασχεώ (ἀνασχετός), ἀνέκτω (ἀνεκτός, adv. ἀνεκτῶς), ἐπιτρέω (Plato’s οὐκ ἐπιτρέπτεον, “it cannot be tolerated), εὐφώρητος and so on, and Latin has *toleratus*, *tolerantia* from the Latin root *tolerare*. Though all these words developed differently in different IE languages, the idea of tolerance is as old as IE.

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1. For this see my book, *Introducing Jainism*, Calcutta, 2002, pp. 57-64.

The English word tolerance was incorporated in Middle English from the Latin word *tolerantia* which again has come from Latin *tolerat(us)* which is a present participle form from the Latin *tolerare* which originally means "to bear." Lexicographically, tolerance means "a fair and objective attitude towards opinions and practices which differ from one's own". In English history, John Locke (1632-1704) was, perhaps, the first who used the term tolerance applying it to the study of ancient religion in his book *Letters concerning Toleration* published in 1689 (subsequently reprinted in 1690, 1692 and so on). Locke was greatly influenced by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), the most important English philosopher between Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and John Locke. In a recently published text—*Tolerance and Intolerance in Early Judaism and Christianity* edited by Guy G. Stroumsa and Grahan N. Stanton, Stroumsa in his Postscript : The Future of Intolerance has made a remark that "tolerance was not a virtue in the ancient world." John E. Cort is of opinion that Stroumsa's observation may equally be applicable to the Jains.

The word *upagraha* is often used in Jain literature for indicating the idea of "mutual existence". It was as early as in the first or fifth century A.D. Umāsvāmī (or Umāsvāti) used the term in this sense in his *Tattvārthasūtra* (V. 21) in the line *parasparopagraho jīvānām* "(The function) of souls is to help one another."

The oldest commentary of this text is the *Śarvārthasiddhi* by Śrī Pūjyapāda belonging to the sixth or seventh century A.D. He has explained the line as follows :

"The word *paraspara* means reciprocity of action *parasparasya upagrahaḥ* means rendering help to another. That is, the help rendered by the living to one another. What is it ? It is mutual help between the master and the servant, the teacher and the taught. The master renders help to the servants by giving them money. And they serve

their master by doing him good and protecting him from evil. The preceptor teaches what is good here and in the next world (birth) and makes his disciples follow his teachings. And the disciples benefit their preceptor by their devoted service." (S.A. Jain, p.147).

In fact, Tolerance is one of the most fundamental principles in Jain religion.<sup>1</sup> Tolerance is expressed in different contexts in different ways. Though Jainism started in the very hoary antiquity, Mahāvīra, the 24th Tīrthaṅkara, was the main propagator of Jain religion and philosophy. Through his whole life, dedicated for the cause of Jainism, Mahāvīra showed the people the way of tolerance for becoming a perfect man in different aspects of Jainism. At the age of 30, he left his home and started doing severe penance for the salvation of his soul. While doing penance and preaching his doctrines in different parts of eastern India, Magadha being the primary centre for his propagation, he suffered quite a lot from the hands of the people. In the second part of the *Ācārāṅgasūtra* a brief life sketch of Mahāvīra is given and there it is said that when Mahāvīra was at Rāḍha, the people of Rāḍha had mocked him, had sneered at him and threw stones at him. Even dogs and ferocious animals used to attack him for biting. Mahāvīra withstood all these sufferings calmly and quietly. This is one of the greatest instances of his tolerance.

Apart from this incident, Mahāvīra showed his tolerance with his rival groups, such as, the Ājīvikas, Gosāla Maṅkhaliputra and so on. His life-stories also tell us how he showed his tolerance towards his playmates.

The basic ideas of tolerance can be gleaned from Jainism through the *Pañcamahāvratas*, *Triguṇī* and *Pañcasamiti*. I need not expatiate all these ideas here.

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1. For writing this portion, I have freely incorporated some passages from my book, *Introducing Jainism*, in my present dissertation without keeping them within the inverted commas, even though lots of new materials are added to it.

The greatest example of tolerance is the *Paryuṣaṇa parva* of the Jains which is one of the finest festivals which leads people to the goal of tolerance and thereby maintains a friendship between men and men, and even between men and animals. *Paryuṣaṇa parva* is normally held between the end of August and beginning of September of every year. At the end of the *paryuṣaṇa parva* the *kṣamā-yācanā* ceremony starts, and in that ceremony everybody craves indulgence of others to forgive. Everybody says to everybody the following verse.

*khamemi savva-jīve savve jīvā khamantu me /  
metti me savva-bhūesu veraṃ majjhaṃ na kenāvi //*

"I pardon all the animals and let all the animals pardon me; I have friendship with all animals and I have no enmity with any body."

Some of the Jain kings, Vastupāla, for example, in Gujarāt, in the 13th century A.D., practised tolerance to all sorts of religious beliefs. What is secularism today, was also practised by Vastupāla at that time. One verse found in the *Purātana-prabandha-saṃgraha* shows how Vastupāla was honoured by all sorts of religious people :

*bauddhair bauddho vaiṣṇavair viṣṇubhaktah,  
śaivaiḥ śaivo yogibhir yoga-raṅgaḥ /  
jainais tāvaj jaina eveti kṛtvā,  
sattvādhāraḥ stuyate Vastupālaḥ //*

"Vastupāla, the depositor of strength, is praised in this way by the Buddhists as Buddha, by the Vaiṣṇavas as Viṣṇu, by the Śaivas as Śiva and by the Yogin as a devotee of yoga and also by the Jains as a Jina.

A similar type of verse says that the lord of the three worlds (*Triloka-nātha*) is considered as the same by different religious people: The verse says—

*yaṃ śaivāḥ samupāsate śiva iti Brahmeti vedāntino  
bauddhā buddha iti pramāṇa-paṭavaḥ karteti  
naiyāyikāḥ*

*arhan nityatha jaina-śāsana-ratāḥ karmeti*  
*mīmāṃsakāḥ*  
*so'yaṃ vo vidadhātu vāñchita-phalaṃ*  
*trailokyanātho Hariḥ !*

“Whom the Śaivas worship as Śiva, and the Vedāntins as Brahma, the Buddhists, expert in logic, as Buddha and the Naiyāyikas the creator and the Jainas, adherent to the teachings of Jina, as *arhan* (i.e. Jina) and the Mīmāṃsakas consider as the *karma* (actions) that Hari, the Lord of the three worlds, gives us the fruit desired by us.”

These above mentioned two passages will show how a sort of secularism in the modern sense of the term was prevalent in the middle history of India which shows a sense of tolerance among the kings where all sorts of religious faiths could live together without any enmity.

### **Ahiṃsā at the time of Mahāvīra as reflected in Jainism**

The contribution of the Jains to *ahiṃsā* can be ransacked from their literature only. In the Jaina Hagiology, there were twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras—Ādinātha or Ṛṣabhadeva was the first and Vardhamāna Mahāvīra was the last. In the sixth century B.C., Vardhamāna Mahāvīra (599 B.C. - 527 B.C.) flourished. In course of his wonderings from place to place, Mahāvīra preached his doctrines and sermons. Among his doctrinal tenets *ahiṃsā* got its prominence. Actually, what Mahāvīra talked about *ahiṃsā* cannot be known authentically, because most of his teachings and doctrines have come down to us through his disciples and their descendants who have kept the sayings of Mahāvīra in their memory for nearly a thousand years after his *nirvaṇa* in 527 B.C. till the second council of Valabhī in the 5th century A.D. which codified the doctrines of Mahāvīra in the present form of the Āgamas of both the sects.

## Mahāvira on Ahimsā

In the Āgama texts<sup>1</sup> of both the sects—Śvetāmbara and Digambara—the nature of *ahimsā* is straightforward. Nothing in particular was generally emphasized in a particular text. Here and there in course of his conversation with the people, he stressed on the importance of *ahimsā*. The passages which are recorded in the canonical literature of the Śvetāmbara Jains are the glorification of *ahimsā* which, at a much later time, was again turned into a philosophy. For example, non-killing, *ahimsā*, is regarded as one of the best and excellent *dharma*s in the *Daśavaikālika-sūtra* along with *saṃyama* (controlling of mind) and *tapa* (penance) in the following verse :

*dhmmo maṅgalam ukkiṭṭham ahimsā saṃyamo*  
*tavo /*  
*deva vi taṃ namaṃssanti jassa dhamme sayā*  
*mano // (I. 1.1.)*

“Non-violence, controlling of mind and penance are regarded as the best and excellent *dhamma* and even the gods bow down their heads to those who have a mind in them.”

This passage has a parallel in the *Dhammapada* (19.6):  
*yam hi saccaṃ ca dhmmo ca ahimsā saṃyamo*  
*damo /*

*sa ve vantamalo dhīro so thero ti pavuccati //*

In the same text, it is further said that life of all beings is dear to them, and so they should not be destroyed by human beings. So in a verse life is greatly extolled :

*jāvanti loe pāṇā tasā adu vā thāvarā /*  
*te jāṇam ajāṇam vā na haṇe no vi ghātae // (I. VI. 9)*

“In this world as many lives of both *trasa* and *sthāvara* animals are there, one should not kill them or cause to be killed with or without knowing.”

The reason Mahāvira offers for saying this is given in the next verse :



*savve jīvā vi icchanti jīviuṃ na marijjīuṃ /  
tamhā paṇivahaṃ ghoram niggaṃthā vajjayanti  
ṇaṃ // (I. VI. 10)*

In the same *Daśavaikālika-sūtra*, Mahāvīra has stressed on the point of restraint by saying that one should not hurt any life in mind, body and speech :

*tesiṃ acchaṇa-joṇa niccam hoyavvayaṃ siyā /  
maṇasā kāya-vakkeṇa evaṃ havai saṃjāe //*  
(I. VIII. 3)

“Towards all these animals one must always constantly be non-injurious even in mind, body and speech, then he is called a restrained person.”

The basic idea that has actuated Mahāvīra to extol life of all sorts of creatures is emanated from the fact that says —

*savve pānā piyāuyā (Ācārāṅga I. 2.3)*  
“All lives are dear to animals”,  
and  
*nāivāijja kiṃcana (Ibid., I. 2.4)*  
“And nobody is to be hurt”.

Almost the same idea in a little elaborated form is echoed in the *Uttarādhyaṇa-sūtra* in the following manner :

*jaganissiehiṃ bhūehiṃ tasanāmehiṃ thāwarehiṃ ca /  
no tesiṃ ārabhe daṃḍaṃ maṇasā vayasā kāyasā  
ceva // (VIII. 10)*

“In thoughts, words, and acts he should do nothing injurious to beings who peopled the world, whether they move or not.”

*na hu paṇavahaṃ aṇṇjāṇe muccejja kayai savva-  
dukkhāṇaṃ /  
evāriehiṃ akkhāyaṃ jehiṃ imo sāhudhammo  
panassatto // (VIII. 8)*

“One should not permit the killing of living beings; then he will perhaps be delivered from all misery; thus have spoken the preceptors who have proclaimed the Law of ascetics.”

The feelings of Mahāvīra towards all kinds of animals are acute and severe. He is confident enough to assert the fact that all lives have the feelings of pleasure and pain and so they should be saved from injury. Manu once said that

*antaḥ saṃjñā bhavantye sukha-duḥkha*

*samanvitāḥ* (Ch I.)

The same idea is also reflected in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* in a very emphatic tone :

*savvāhiṃ aṇujuttihiṃ matimaṃ paḍilehiyā /*

*savve akkanta-dukkhā ya ao savvee na hiṃsayā //*

(I. 11.9)

“A wise man should study them with all means of philosophical research. All beings hate pain; therefore one should not kill them.”

*eyaṃ khu nāṇiṇo sāraṃ jaṃ na-hiṃsai kīṃcaṇa /*

*ahiṃsā samayaṃ ceva eyāvantam vijāṇīyā //*

(I. 11.10)

“This is the quintessence of wisdom : not to kill anything. Know this to be the legitimate conclusion from the principle of reciprocity with regard to non-killing.”

From all these passages of *ahiṃsā* quoted above what Mahāvīra wants to emphasize is the fact that “we must not be goaded by the passions and impulses of *hiṃsā*. But, to all intents and purposes, we must control our mind to allow us to grow stronger mentally, so that our life can become severe, pure and holy. This does not mean that we should not enjoy life to its fullest extent, but that enjoyment should not be of a beastly type, but of a divine nature. It must not transgress the purity and serenity of life and of *dharma*. It should be noted that the basic idea of *ahiṃsā* is not to control the outward events of one’s life, but to control the inward temper in which he faces these events. So the practice of *ahiṃsā* will teach us how to preserve a purely inward integrity and balance of mind, and how to conquer the world from a world both hostile

## Ahimsā in Buddhism

## Ahimsā in the Hindu scriptures

*dr̥te d̥mha mā mitrasya mā cakṣuṣā sarvāṇi  
bhūtāni samikṣantām /  
mitrasyāhaṃ cakṣuṣā sarvāṇi bhūtāni samikṣe /  
mitrasya cakṣuṣa samikṣāmahe // (ŚYV. 36/18)*

**“Even though the body is emaciated, let me be firm. Let you show me all animals with the eyes of a friend. I also (want to) see all the animals with the eyes of my**

friend. Let us see each other devoid of malice with the eyes of my friend."

The same idea is echoed once by the Romans as the Latin sentence says —

*homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum pecto.*

"I am a man, there is nothing about man whom I keep away far from me."

The Atharvaveda says—let us not get any fear from any quarter of the globe :

*abhayaṃ mitrād, abhayaṃ amitrad  
abhayaṃ jñātād, abhayaṃ parokṣāt /  
abhayaṃ naktam, abhayaṃ divā  
naḥ sarvā āśā mama mitraṃ bhavantu //*

[AV. 19.15.6]

"Let there be no fear from my friend, no fear from my enemy, no fear from my relatives, no fear from the unknown (quarters); there is no fear from night, no fear from day. Let all our hopes be friendly".

In the post-Vedic stage, the same tone and tune of Vedic *ahiṃsā* was followed, but in a modified form. By that time (i.e. say 600 B.C.) the Vedic sacrifice had gained ground in the society; Out of many sacrifices, the animal sacrifice (*paśuyāga*) was also prevalent. By the time Manu wrote his book *Manusmṛhitā* where he has said that *hiṃsā* in connection with animal sacrifice is not *hiṃsā* at all, it is to be treated as *ahiṃsā*, and the mandate of Manu is often quoted for that :

*yajñārthaṃ paśavaḥ sṛṣṭāḥ svayam eva  
svayambhūvā /  
yajñasya bhūtyāi sarvasya tasmād yajñe  
vodho'vadhah // [V. 39]*

"Svayambhū (the Self-existence) himself created animals for the sake of sacrifice. Sacrifices (have been instituted) for the good of this whole (world); hence the slaughtering (of beasts) for sacrifices is not slaughtering (in the ordinary sense of the word)."

Despite the fact that for sacrificial purposes the killing of animals is not despised, Manu in general has described the excellence of *ahiṃsā* in the same *Manu-saṃhitā*. In fact, according to Manu, non-killing is a virtue which is to be inculcated by all :

*indriyānāṃ nirodhena rāga-dveṣa-kṣayena ca /*  
*ahiṃsayā ca bhūtānāṃ amṛtatvāya kalpate //*

[VI. 60]

“By the restraint of his senses, by the destruction of attachment and hatred, and by the abstention from injury to the creatures, he becomes fit for immortality.”

### Ahiṃsā in the Mahābhārata

Coming to the time of the *Mahābhārata* (dated between 4th cent. B.C. to 4th cent. A.D.) we can see that the eulogy of *ahiṃsā* was not diminished, rather it was highly extolled. It seems paradox at the outset when the *Mahābhārata* is a book on war, how could there *ahiṃsā* play a part ? But we shall be surprised to note that in the various parts of the *Mahābhārata*, *ahiṃsā* is greatly eulogised. In the Vanaparva (III) a long conversation between Draupadī, Yudhiṣṭhira and Bhīma was made on ethical questions in which Draupadī praises the doctrine of *ahiṃsā*, i.e., the forbearance towards living beings (chapters 206-208). It is noteworthy that in many places of the *Mahābhārata* “the ascetic morality of *ahiṃsā* and of love towards all creatures” is depicted. In the Śāntiparva, the greatness of *ahiṃsā* is firmly established, the argument being—

*jīvitum yaḥ svayaṃ cecchet katham so'nyam*  
*ghātayet /*  
*yad yad ātmani ceccheta tat parasyāpi cintayet //*

[12, 254.22]

“He who himself wants to live, how he can kill the other; what one wants for himself, that is to be thought of others.”

In order to establish this statement the story of Jājali-Tulādhāra is given in which Tulādhāra has proved the excellence of *ahiṃsā* as a superior religion to anything else. Tulādhāra is the pedlar and Jājali is the Brahmanical ascetic. In this conversation Tulādhāra appears as a teacher. The Brahmin Jājali well-versed in the Śāstras has asked Tulādhāra about the essence of religion. Tulādhāra says —

*adrohenaiva bhūtānām alpadroheṇa vā punaḥ /  
yā vṛttiḥ sa paro dharmas tena jivāmi Jājale //*

“Oh Jājali, without injuring the animals or doing less injury (to animals), if one lives, that is a great religion. I want to live by that religion.”

*sarveṣāṃ yaḥ suhr̥ṇ nityaṃ sarveṣāṃ ca hite rataḥ /  
karmaṇā manasā vācā ca dharmam veda Jājale //*

“Oh Jājali, he who becomes a friend to all people or who is engaged in doing good to others by means of action, mind and speech, he knows religion.”

*yadā cāyaṃ na bibhēti yadā cāsmān na bibhyati /  
yadā necchati na dveṣṭi brahma sampadyate tadā //*

“When one does not fear others, and when others do not fear one and when one does not wish to do anything, or when one does not want to hurt others, he attains the feet of Brahma.”

*yadā na kurute bhāvam sarvabhūteṣu pāpakam /  
karmaṇā manasā vācā brahma sampadyate tadā //*

“When a man does not do any harm to animals by action, mind and speech, he can attain the feet of Brahma.”

*yasmān nodvijate bhūtaṃ jātu kiñcit kathañcana /  
abhayaṃ sarvabhūtebhyaḥ sa prāpnoti sadā mune //*

“When an animal is never agitated by any means from anybody, that world does never feel any agitation from any animal.”

*loke yaḥ sarvabhūtebhyaḥ dadātyabhaya-dakṣiṇām /  
sa sarva-yajñāi iḥjanāḥ prāpnotyabhaya-dakṣiṇām /  
na bhūtānām ahiṃsāyā jyāyān dharmo'sti kaścana //*

“He who gives fearless (atmosphere) to all animals of the world, he attains no fear (from anybody) even by performing sacrifice. There is no great religion of men like *ahiṃsā* (non-injury) in the world.”

Tulādhāra goes on saying that “there is no higher law than forbearance towards all living beings. Therefore the breeding of cattle is cruel, because it involves the torturing and killing of animals. Cruel, too, is the keeping of slaves, and traffic in living creatures. Even agriculture is full of sin, for the plough wounds the earth and kills many innocent animals” (Winternitz, *Hist. Ind. Lit.* pp. 416-17). To this Jājali replies —

*kr̥ṣṇā hyannaṃ prabhavati tatas tvam asi jīvasī /  
paśubhiś coṣadhibhiśca martyā jīvanti vanija //  
tato yajñāḥ prabhavanti nāstikyam api jalpasi /  
na hi varted ayaṃ loko vārtām utsṛjya kevalān //*

“Food is produced by agriculture, and you, too, are living on it; people live on cattle-breeding and agriculture; from that sacrifice is performed, you are talking like an atheist, people could not live alone by giving up the business of his livelihood.”

Thereupon Tulādhāra replied with a long discourse upon the true sacrifice, which should be offered without the desire for reward, without priestly deception, and without the killing of living beings. Finally Tulādhāra calls on the birds which had nested in the hair of Jājali’s head as witnesses for his doctrine, and they, too, confirm that the true religion consists in forbearance towards all human beings” (Winternitz, *Hist. Ind. Lit.* pp. 417-18).

*ahiṃsā paramo dharmas tathāhiṃsā paro damaḥ /  
ahiṃsā paramaṃ dānam ahiṃsā paramaṃ tapaḥ //*

“*Ahiṃsā* (non-violence) is the highest religion, in the same way *ahiṃsā* is the highest restraint; *ahiṃsā* is the highest gift, and *ahiṃsā* is the highest penance.”

*ahiṃsā paramo yajñas tathāhiṃsā paramaṃ*  
*phalam /*  
*ahiṃsā paramaṃ mitram ahiṃsā paramaṃ*  
*sukham /*

*ahiṃsā paramaṃ satyam ahiṃsā paramaṃ śrutam //*

“*Ahiṃsā* is the highest sacrifice, and in the same way *ahiṃsā* is the highest fruit; *ahiṃsā* is the highest friend, *ahiṃsā* is the highest happiness; *ahiṃsā* is the highest truth, *ahiṃsā* is the highest knowledge.”

*sarva-yajñeṣu vā dānaṃ sarva-tīrtheṣu vā plutam /*  
*sarva-dāna-phalaṃ vāpi naitat tulyan ahiṃsayā //*

“Or *ahiṃsā* is the best gift in all sacrifices, it is a raft (boat) in all *tīrthas*; or even is the result of all gifts, nothing can be compared with *ahiṃsā*.”

Even though Kṛṣṇa is forcing Arjuna to lodge a war against his relatives and kinsmen, there are passages in the *Gītā* (X. 5; XII. 13, XIII. 7; XVI. 2. VII. 14) where lots of encomiums are showered on *ahiṃsā* which prove beyond doubt that it has a significant place in Hindu religion as well.

Whether this portion of the *Mahābhārata* is greatly influenced by Jainism or not, is a matter of speculation now.

### Ahiṃsā in the Purāṇas

We have lots of quotations from the Purāṇas where in many places *ahiṃsā* is eulogised to a great extent. In the Padma, Viṣṇu, Mārkaṇḍeya, Śiva, and in many others, non-injury is greatly extolled. It is not possible to cite all these quotations here. Only one or two examples are sufficient to understand the spirit of non-violence. In the *Padmapurāṇa*, it is said —

*andhe tamasi mājjāmaḥ paśubhir ye yajāmahe /*  
*hiṃsā nāma bhaved dharmo na bhūto na bhaviṣyati //*

“Those who do sacrifice with animals they are plunged in blind darkness, that sort of religion is *hiṃsā* (killing).”



*yūpaṃ khittvā paśūn hatvā kṛtvā ridhira*  
*kardamam /*  
*yadyevaṃ gamyate svargaṃ narake kena gamyate //*

“By digging a *yūpa*, killing animals, and making muddy with blood, if anybody goes to heaven by this method, then who will go to hell”?

In the Uttarakhaṇḍa of the *Padmapurāṇa* we come across a passage where the goddess Durgā praises the doctrine of *ahiṃsā*.

But in the other Purāṇa texts, *ahiṃsā* is also praised as one of the best ways of social behaviour. For example, in the *Bhāgavata* the killing of animal even in the sacrifice is vilified to a great extent as the following verse shows :

*ye tvanevaṃwido' santaḥ stabdhāḥ sadabhimāninaḥ /*  
*paśūn druhyanti visrabdhāḥ pretya khādanti te ca*  
*tān //* [11. 5. 14]

“Those who are ignorant of this real Dharma and, though wicked and haughty, account themselves virtuous, kill animals without any feeling of remorse or fear of punishment, and are devoured by those very animals in their next birth.”

### Ahiṃsā in the Tantrik texts

Even in the Tantrik texts some praises of *ahiṃsā* are found. For example, in the *Kulārṇava-tantra* the drinking of wine (*surā*) is extolled in the most extravagant manner, and the eating of meat is permissible only in the *Kulapūjā*, even though the non-killing (*ahiṃsā*) is honoured elsewhere. This shows an exception to the rule of *ahiṃsā*.

### Śaṅkarācārya on Ahiṃsā

In the eighth century A.D. Śaṅkarācārya in his *Sarva-vedānta-siddhānta-sāra* praised *ahiṃsā* as a noble virtue. He says—

*ahiṃsā vāñ-mana-kāyaiḥ prāṇi-mātra-prapīḍanam /  
svātmavat sarvabhūteṣu kāyena manasā girā //*

“Ahiṃsā means that not a single animal is to be hurt by speech, mind and body, and to behave all animals like ones own self with mind, body and speech is non-violence (*ahiṃsā*).”

### Ahiṃsā in the Mediaeval Jainism

In the mediaeval period (roughly started from the 10th cent. A.D.), the doctrine of *ahiṃsā* turned into a different direction. It was no longer a mere eulogy of *ahiṃsā*, nor was it regarded as a sort of moral ethics, as it was at the time of Mahāvīra. In the Hindu sources it was mainly argumentative as it was evidenced by the *Mahābhārata*-tradition. But it was the Jains who turned *ahiṃsā* into a system of philosophy. And as a result, there were lots of changes in their philosophical ideas and *ahiṃsā* was described from various points of view.

The first philosophical text is the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* by Umāsvāti or Umāsvāmī belonging to the first or fifth cent. A.D. The text describes the nature of *ahiṃsā* as was current in his time. Umāsvāti defines *hiṃsā* from the philosophical point view:

*pramatta-yogāt prāṇa-vyaparopaṇam hiṃsā //*

(VII. 13)

“Injury is the severance of vitalities out of passion.”

When a person is actuated by passion he is called *pramatta*. *Pramattayoga* therefore means the activity of such a person. Therefore, the severance of the vitalities that are present is called injury.

It is said by Umāsvāti that *hiṃsā* does not depend on acts alone. *Hiṃsā* may be *bhāva-hiṃsā* and *dravya-hiṃsā*. *Bhāva-hiṃsā* means the “intention to hurt”, whereas *dravya-hiṃsā* means the “actual physical hurt.” *Bhāva-hiṃsā* arises under the influence of anger and other passions as described by Umāsvāti in his book as—

*krodha-lobha-bhīrutva-hāsyā-pratyākhyānāny-*

*anuvīci-bhāṣaṇaṃ pañca* (TS. VII. 5).

i.e., anger, greed, cowardice, jest and speaking blameless speech are five which cause *bhāva-hiṃsā*.

On this point, Amṛtacandra (11th cent. A.D.) thinks *rāga* and *dveṣa* can constitute *hiṃsā* even though no creature perishes. His argument is that once a person is full of anger, he destroys himself, even though he does not destroy any creature.

In the mediaeval period, Somadeva (959 A.D.), one of the outstanding authors, in his *Upāsakādhyayana* i.e., the sixth, seventh, and eighth books of his *Yāśastilaka* which constitute an excursus on the *Śrāvakācāra*, has emphasized the positive aspect of *ahiṃsā* which, in his opinion, is *maitrī*, *pramoda*, *kāruṇya*, and *mādhyasthya*. *Maitrī* is the friendship with the animals by practising non-infliction towards the creatures, *pramoda* is the affection coupled with the respect for all beings, *kāruṇya* is charity to help the needy, and *mādhyasthya* is a state of equanimity.

Later on, Amitagati (993 A.D.) and Amṛtacandra (11th cent. A.D.) in their respective treatises *Śrāvakācāra* (VI. 33-44) and *Puruṣārtha-siddhyupāya* (verses 79-89) advocated absolute *ahiṃsā* (non-violence) (*Introducing Jainism*, pp. 71-72).

Another author Devagupta (1016 A.D.) by name in his *Nava-pada-prakarāṇa* (verse 22) described the various facets of *hiṃsā*. He says that *hiṃsā* may be *ārambhaja* or *anārambhaja*. *Ārambhaja hiṃsā* is inherent in the occupation, whereas *anārambhaja* is not related to the occupation. There is another *hiṃsā* called *saṅkalpaja* which is intentional. Crimes done by *hiṃsā* may be either *sārthaka* or *nirarthaka*. *Sārthaka hiṃsā* may be committed with care and attention (*sāpekṣa*), while, if it is committed carelessly, it is *nirapekṣa*. This idea of *hiṃsā* corroborates with the conception of Umāsvāti described above.

In the mediaeval period, Hemacandra (1088-1172

A.D.) was the greatest exponent of Jainism. He attacked Manu seriously and called his *Mānava-saṃhitā* as *Himsā-śāstra*. Manu has depicted the excellence of *ahiṃsā* in so many words, but only has said that in the case of sacrifice the killing of animals is not an offence (*tasmād yajñe vadho' vadhah*). Hemacandra protests against the statement of Manu in his *Yogaśāstra* (II. 33-49). Hemacandra says that it is a distortion of reality to think that the animals have come to this world to be offered to gods for the prosperity and betterment of the world. It is not true to say that the *Jivas* living in this world will be reborn as divine beings. Hemacandra calls these people hypocrits who preach the religion of cruelty. Hemacandra goes on to say further that if the animals are sacrificed for an abode in heaven, then why should one not kill one's parents in the sacrifice for getting an abode in heaven? His argument rests on the famous verse which he quotes from the *Daśavaikālikasūtra* :

*savve jīvā vi icchanti jīviuṃ ṇa marijjīuṃ /*  
*taṃhā pañivahaṃ ghoram nigganthā vajjayanti*

*naṃ //*

(I. 6.10)

"All animals wish to live, and not to be slain; therefore the Jain monks must relinquish the dangerous killing of animals."

Hemacandra then concludes by comparing *ahiṃsā* with the beneficent mother :

*māteva sarva-bhūtānām ahiṃsā hitakāriṇī /*  
*ahiṃsāiva hi saṃsāram arāvamṛta-sāraṇīḥ //* 2.50  
*ahiṃsā duḥkha-dāvāgni-prāvṛṣṇya-ghanāvali /*  
*bhava-bhrami-rugārtānām ahiṃsā paramauśadhī //*  
 2.51

"*Ahiṃsā* is like a beneficent mother of all creatures, in the desert of *Saṃsāra* (mundane life) *ahiṃsā* works like a stream of nectar to the forest-fire, *ahiṃsā* is the course of rain-clouds, for the beings tormented by the

diseases, (*ahimsā*) is the best healing herb; and *ahimsā* is called the perpetual return of existence."

Hemacandra thinks that the protection to all animal beings (*abhaya-dāna* or *karuṇā-dāna*) is the positive side of *ahimsā* which everyone should follow.

### Ahimsā in History

The above citations are textual, but there are some historical references as well. In the history of Gujarat, Kumārapāla occupies a unique position. After Jayasīṃha (1094-1142 A.D.), Kumārapāla (1142-1173 A.D.) became the king of Gujarāt and was initiated into Jainism in 1159 A.D. by Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.). After that he made the Jaina religion a state religion in his country. The king himself abandoned hunting, and prohibited the killing of animals, eating meat, drinking, gambling and animal combat. Such types of instances can be ransacked from the pages of history.

It is a fact worth noting here in this connection that in the reign of great Akbar (1556-1605 A.D.) "whose spirit of tolerance and eclecticism led him to form the idea of embracing all the Indian creeds in his new *Ilahi Din* or "Religion of God"—the Jainas obtained a warrant prohibiting the slaughter of animals, etc. wherever their faith was practised". Bholanath Chunder in his *Travels of a Hindoo* (1869), Vol. I, notes :

"It is a remarkable *sanad* or document bearing the bonafide seal of Akbar, which has recently come to light, the name under which Pareshnath was known in that emperor's age appears to have been Samet Sikhar. This whole hill together with others in Bihar and Gujarat, was granted to, and bestowed upon Hira Vijaya Suri Acharya, the then pontiff of the Śvetāmbara Jaina sect, by Akbar. They were given in perpetuity and there is an especial clause prohibiting the killing of animals either on, below, or about the hills." (pp. 210-11).

John Tod in his *Travels in Western India* referring to

this act of the Great Akbar remarks : "It was this scrupulous regard for the religious opinions of all the varied sects within his mighty realm, that procured this monarch the inevitable designation of Jagat Guru, 'the guardian of mankind', and which caused him to be regarded by the Vaisnavas as an incarnation of Kanhaiya." (pp. 290-91)

This beneficial act of Akbar granted in 1589, was recorded in one of the inscriptions at Satruñjaya.

Similarly, in the reign of Shah Jahan another grant was made under the seal of his second son Murad Bakhsh, the Governor of Gujarat, by which the hill and surrounding district was given in perpetual *inām* to Satidas Javheri, a Sravaka and jeweller to the Court".

### The Intellectual Ahimsā<sup>1</sup>

The intellectual *ahimsā* is not considered as *himsā* (violence) by the Jains, even though the Jains have *vāk gupti* (practices of restrained of speech) and *bhāṣā-samiti* (self-regulation of speech). We can infer this from the study of Jain literature. Whenever the Jains have got a chance, they have criticised the views of the Buddhists and the Hindus. Here I give a few examples to show how the process of intellectual *himsā* (violence) was carried out without being realised that the Jains are transgressing their rules *vāk gupti* and *bhāṣā-samiti*.

In the *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga* (1. 3. 64-68), one of the Āgama texts of the Śvetāmbara Jains, the final deduction of which was completed by 454 A.D., the Vedic conception of the ultimate Reality or Divinity as an outside creator-God was severely criticised :

*iṇam aṇṇa tu aṇṇānaṃ ihaṃ egesim āhiyaṃ /  
deva-utte ayaṃ loe baṃbha-utte tu avare // 64 //*

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1. The Violence of Non-violence : A Study of some Jain Responses to Non-Jain Religious Practices, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 15 : 1-43, 1992.

“We hear also of another error of some (philosophers) : some say that the world has been created (or is governed) by the gods, others, by Brahman.”

*īsareṇa kaḍe loe pahāṇāi tahāvare /*

*jivājīva-samāutte suha-dukkha-samaṇṇie //65//*

“Some say that it has been created by the Īśvara, others that it was produced from chaos, etc., this world with living beings and lifeless things, with its variety of pleasure and pain.”

*sayambhūṇā kaḍa loe iti vuttam mahesiṇā /*

*māreṇa samthuyā māyā teṇa loe asāsaye // 66 //*

“The great Ṛṣi said, that the world has been created by Svayambhū; Māra originated Māyā, therefore, the world (appears to be) uneternal.”

*māhaṇā samaṇā eye āha aṇḍakaḍe jage /*

*aso tattam akāsī ya ayāṇamṭā musam vae // 67 //*

“Some Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas say that the universe was produced from the (primeval) egg, and He (Brahman) created the things. These ignorant men speak untruth.”

*saeḥim pariyāehim logam būyā kaḍe tti ya /*

*tattam te ṇa viyāṇamṭi ṇāyam ṇāsī kayāi vi // 68 //*

“Those who on arguments of their own maintain that the world has been created, do not know the truth. Nor will (the world) ever perish.”

V.M. Kulkarni in his book, *The Story of Rāma in Jain Literature*, (Saraswati Pustak Bhandar, Ahmedabad, 1990, p. 77) has informed us that Vimala Sūri (1st/2nd cent. A.D.) in his *Paūmacariyam* has said that “the Rāmāyaṇa stories are most certainly lies”, and “the poets who composed Rāmāyaṇa were lairs.” Vimala Sūri says—

*aliyam pi savvam eyam uvavatti-viruddha-paccaya-  
guṇehim /*

*na ya saddaḥamṭi purisā, havaṇṭi je paṇḍiyā loe //*

*Paūma. II. 117.*

In a fifth-century text the *Śrāvaka-prajñāpti* by an anonymous author, and its commentator Haribhadra

belonging to the eighth century A.D. "were at great pains", says Phyllis Granoff, "to criticize both the Buddhists and the little-known *samsāra-mocakas* for not adhering to an absolute prohibition of all forms of violence."

In the *Āvaśyakacūrṇi* by Jinadāsa-gaṇi Mahattara (7th-8th cent. A.D.), a story of Śiva Maheśvara was ridiculed by Jinadāsa. While the Hindus think that Śiva was a god, Jinadāsa says that he was "the son of a nun who had been magically impregnated by a wizard seeking a suitable repository for his powers and subsequently came into possession of a spell which caused a hole in his forehead, the third eye of Shaiva mythology. As a result of his violent and lascivious behaviour, he was killed by a prostitute named Umā, one of the names of Shiva's wife Pārvatī." (Paul Dundas, *The Jains*, 1992, Routledge, London, pp. 201-202).

Haribhadra Sūri (705-775 A.D.), an author of the eighth century A.D., criticised Hindu Mythological text in his *Dhūrtākhyāna*. Phyllis Granoff observes that Haribhadra's *Dhūrtākhyāna* "is a spoof of Brahmanical mythology.... calculated to offend by the nature of the examples he has chosen to illustrate the improbability of Puranic religion."

The same Haribhadra Sūri in his *Samarāiccakahā* similarly criticized "Brahmanical rites".

In the twelfth century A.D., Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.) severely criticised Hindu deities on theological grounds. In his *Yogaśāstra* Hemacandra criticises some aspects of Hindu deities which, he thinks, are not fit for liberation. He says—

"Those gods who are tainted by passion, etc., as seen by their women, weapons, necklaces, etc. and who show disfavour or favour to others, are not liberated."

"Since they are confused and disturbed by dancing, loud laughter, and singing, how can they lead to the peaceful state?" (*Yogaśāstra*, II. 6-7).

The same Hemacandra in the same *Yogaśāstra* text



criticised the *Mānava-dharma-śāstra* as *Hiṃsā-śāstra*, "a scripture of violence."

Padmanābha Jaini has informed us that Vādicandra Bhaṭṭāraka (15/16th A.D.) criticised the *Śiva Purāṇa* for presenting a false genealogy of the Pāṇḍavas. (*Mahābhārata Motifs in the Jaina Pāṇḍa-Purāṇa*, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 1984, Vol. 47, pp. 108-115).

### Ahiṃsā as a Philosophy

Though the Hindus, the Buddhists and the Jains have accepted the question of *Ahiṃsā*, it is the Jains who have turned it into a system of philosophical order. The quintessence of *ahiṃsā* has made Mahāvīra an outstanding exponent of social equality and justice.

The effect of *ahiṃsā* (non-killing, non-hurting, non-injury) can be seen on (1) food, (2) drink, (3) trades and industries, (4) social behaviour, and (5) civil and criminal wrongs.

### Conclusion

I conclude this chapter by the remarks which I have already made in my book, *Introducing Jainism*, at pp. 73-74.

"It seems somewhat paradoxical to think of any religion in this advanced age of science and technology. It may seem outlandish too to think of a religion at the present day which speaks of non-violence, when the spectacular contributions of science erode the foundations on which our beliefs and values of life have rested for centuries. But in spite of all these achievements one thing is still sure : Are men really happy ? Has science been able to bring mental peace and tranquillity? Is it not true that one violence has brought back another violence? Has one war stopped another war ? Material world does not and cannot bring happiness to mankind. It did not happen in the past and it will not happen in future either. People

have realised now that spiritual and ethical teachings and practices may restore happiness in our life. And in this respect Mahāvīra's doctrines have profound significance in the present society as it had in the past. To be precise, if Jain philosophy is properly understood, one is inclined to believe that it will contribute much to the development of human personality and will make life worth living. A proper understanding of Mahāvīra's teachings will lessen the misery and dishonesty, corruption and fear, malice and hatred under whose pressure the present world is helplessly groaning.

"Mahāvīra's intellectual empire as reflected in his principles of non-violence is imperishable, and the heart of a great number of people burst with a boundless admiration has been greatly moulded from thousands of years over the whole terrain of Indian life. A section of people still believes that Mahāvīra's doctrines should be preached and practised in this world—a world which is full of toil and turmoil, a world which is full of violence and conflicts, a world where the values of human lives are jeopardised at the altar of human power, a world where beastly propensities of human beings are increasing rapidly, where the human finer qualities are sacrificed for the cause of material expansion and prosperity, and where lives of all sorts are butchered as fodder for guns. It is also believed that if Mahāvīra's basic tenets are imparted to the present generation as a part of their education, a new world may be ushered in in course of time, where there will be no violence, but a permanent bliss will pervade all over the world. To conclude, his teachings will deepen our ideas and thoughts, broaden our visions, heighten our mental horizon, strengthen our mind with a new vigour, and enlighten our future generations for the betterment of our life".

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For further studies of the subject, the following Bibliography will help one to understand and deal with the problem of Non-violence.

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# POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHTS IN HEMACANDRA (1088 - 1172 A.D.)

SATYA RANJAN BANERJEE

## I. Political Thoughts of Hemacandra

Ācārya Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.) belonged to the twelfth century A.D. and the period of Ācārya Hemacandra covering eighty years was the most crucial age in the mediaeval history of India. The crucial age was reckoned between 998 and 1292 A.D. In 998, Mahmūd, the Turkish conqueror, captured Ghazni; and this period ended in 1292, when Jalāl-ud-din, the Khalji chief, proclaimed himself the Sultan of Delhi. From the historical point of view, the entire period can be conveniently divided into two: the first period ended in 1193 A.D. (that is the period when Hemacandra actually flourished), and the second ended in 1299 A.D. The first period ended with the defeat of Pr̥thvirāja Chahamāna of Ajmer by Muizz-ud-din Ghūri in the battle of Tarain and opened the gates of Madhya Pradesh to the foreign invaders.

It should be kept in mind that the political and social history of India at the time when Hemacandra flourished was the history of mediaeval India which ended with the defeat of Pr̥thvirāja Chahamāna of Ajmer. So to talk about the political and social history of India at the time of Hemacandra is a difficult task. It is difficult, because we do not have any direct evidence to rely upon; because the literary works of Hemacandra do not give us sufficient material to reconstruct the socio-political picture of India in the twelfth century. In a sense, the primary sources are to be verified by the contemporary literary and other

documents. And at the same time, the secondary sources are also consulted for checking the primary documents.

Hemacandra was born in 1088 A.D. at Dhandahukā, a town in the neighbourhood of Ahmedabad, as the son of a merchant. He was born in the atmosphere of a pious Jaina family and from his childhood, it was observed that he was destined to be monk. As a Jaina teacher he spent most of his life in the capital of Gujarāt which was Aṇahillavāḍa Paṭṭaṇa (modern Patan). At that time, Siddharāja Jayasimha (1094-1143 A.D.) was the ruler of Gujarāt. Hemacandra's literary activities started at the inspiration of Siddharāja Jayasimha, who after his war with Mālvā, became jealous of the literary glory of Ujjayinī, and asked Hemacandra to write a grammar and some literary works. Hemacandra wrote a book on grammar and dedicated it to the king, and hence the name was Siddha-Hemacandra<sup>1</sup>. He also wrote a Mahākāvya, called *Kumārapālacarita*, also called *Dvyāśrayakāvya*, where he celebrated the glory of his two patrons—Siddharāja (1094-1143 A.D.) and Kumārapāla (1143-1174 A.D.), in Sanskrit and Prakrit. Somaprabhācārya (2nd half of 12th century A.D.), a junior contemporary with Hemacandra, has nicely described the literary achievements of Hemacandra in the following verse :

*klptaṁ vyākaraṇaṁ navam  
viracitaṁ chando navam,  
dvyāśrayālaṅkārau prathitau navau  
prakaṭitaṁ śrīyogaśāstraṁ navam/  
tarkaḥ sañjanito navo  
jinavarādīnāṁ caritraṁ navam baddhaṁ  
yena na kena kena vidhinā mohañ kṛto dūrataḥ<sup>2</sup>.*

"He composed a new grammar (i.e. the Siddha-Hemacandra), a new science of metrics (the Chandonuśāsana), the Dvyāśraya-kāvya and the Alāṅkāra-śāstra (i.e. the Kāvyañuśāsana), a new Yogaśāstra,

1. B.J. Sandesara, Literary Circle etc. p.11.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

a new logic (i.e. the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*), and a new biography of the Jinas (i.e. the *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣa-caritra* and the *Pariśiṣṭaparvan*). In what way has he not removed our ignorance ?”

Hemacandra also wrote several other works, such as, *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi*, *Anekārthasaṃgraha* and others.

Before we enter into the problem, it will be our prime duty to enumerate the available works of Hemacandra upon which this edifice of socio-political history of India is based. Hemacandra was one of the most versatile and prolific writers who worked in most of the secular branches of learning. These branches include grammar, lexicography, poetry, poetics, metres, philosophy, logic and many others. Below is given the list of the available works of Hemachandra :

I. On grammar :

1. Śabdānuśāsana, also called Siddha-Hemacandra, or Haima-śabdānuśāsana,
2. Dhātupāṭha : Dhātupārāyaṇa, Dhātumālā,
3. Uṇādisūtra-vṛtti,
4. Liṅgānuśāsana

II. On Lexicography :

5. Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi : Nāmamālā, Nāmamālāśeṣa,
6. Anekārtha-saṃgraha : Anekārtha-śeṣa
7. Nighaṇṭu-śeṣa : śeṣasaṃgraha, śeṣa-saṃgraha-sāroddhāra,
8. Deśināmamālā / Deśīśabda-saṃgraha
9. Ekākṣara-nāmamālā

III. On Metre :

10. Chando'nuśāsana

IV. On Poetics :

11. Kāvya'nuśāsana with Alamkāra-cūḍāmaṇi

V. On Philosophy / Logic :

12. Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā
13. Bālābala-sūtra-br̥had-vṛtti,

## VI. On Yoga :

14. Yogaśāstra

## VII. On Mahākāvya :

15. Kumārapālacarita, also called Dvyāśraya-kāvya

## VIII. On the lives of Great Men :

16. Tri-ṣaṣṭi-śalākā-puṣuṣa-carita

17. Pariśiṣṭaparva or Sthavirāvali-carita

## IX. On Miscellaneous topics :

18. Vibhrama-sūtra (?)

19. Jaina Rāmāyaṇa

20. Vitarāga-stotra (on Mahāvira)

21. Anya-yoga-vyavaccheda-dvātrimśikā

22. Laghvarhan-nitiśāstra (?)

“The above mentioned works of Hemacandra may not be distinguished by any great originality, but they display a truly encyclopaedic erudition and an enormous amount of reading, besides a practical sense which makes them very useful.”<sup>3</sup> Hemacandra has not written any book on historical events, except the *Kumārapālacarita* which describes the history of the Chaulukya of Aṇhilvāḍ with particular reference to Kumārapāla, his great patron. It is proved by C.R. Jain (the Jaina Gazette, January, 1935, pp. 9ff) on the authority of the Puran Chand Nahar, that the Arhannīti is a work of the 19th century, and not by Hemacandra himself. It will, therefore, be difficult to elicit the socio-political thoughts of Hemacandra from this work. But while describing the kings and the country, some of the epithets of kings and some of the words used for describing the country give us clue to frame our ideas about the socio-political thoughts of Hemacandra.

It is generally assumed that the historical gleanings which Hemacandra has recorded in his works, mainly in the *Kumārapālacarita*, otherwise known as *Dvyāśraya-kāvya*, is the mediaeval history of Gujarāt. From the

3. Winternitz, Foreword to Bühler's Life of Hemacandra, p. xv.



description of the capital, Anahillapura (=Paṭṭana, modern Patan) found in the *Kumārapālacarita*, it can be assumed that the time when Hemacandra flourished in Gujarāt, the economic condition was fairly reliable. The soil of Gujarāt was fertile; its people were adventurous, hard-working and well-behaved. People had to live on agriculture which yielded bountiful harvests. There is no denying the fact that industries flourished in a successful manner; internal trade and maritime commerce were brisk and profitable. The life of the people of Gujarāt was simple and straightforward; they regulated their sustenance from a rich soil. The upper classes lived in plenty and pomp; the middle classes also lived in comfort. The people of Gujarāt were gay and cheerful.

During the time of Hemacandra, i.e. in the twelfth century, the political theory of India was, primarily guided by the commentators of *Smṛti-śāstras* as well as of *Nīti-śāstras*. The commentators of Yājñavalkya and Manu were the persons whose interpretations on political theory were generally followed. The famous commentaries of Vijñāneśvara (11th cent. A.D.) and Aparārka (12th cent. A.D.) on Yājñavalkya and of Kulluka (11th/12th cent. A.D.) on Manu were very much operative. Hemacandra's *Laghvarhan-nīti-śāstra* was also composed in this climate; and to this period could also be included the *Śukra-nīti-sāra* of Śukrācārya. The *Rājadharmā*, section (xi) of the *Kṛtya-kalpa-taru* of Lakṣmīdhara was a Digest which was composed during this time to bridge the link between the above two commentators. Gopala's *Kāmadhenu* is another Digest belonging to this period.

To start with the conception of 'king', Vijñāneśvara, following Medhātithi, writes under Yājñavalkya :

*jñātvā-parādharmā deśaṇca kālāṁ balam athāpi vā /  
vayaḥ karma ca vittaṇca daṇḍam daṇḍeṣu pātayet//*  
(I. 318)

"Though this aggregate of kingly duties has been laid down with reference to the king, this duty should be

understood to apply to one to another caste also who is engaged in the task of protecting the province, the district, and so forth."

Vijñāneśvara then emphasises the duty of the king. As the king has a system of taxation (*kara*), and as the people pay taxes to the king, it is the duty of the king to protect the people and to look after the welfare of the people of his kingdom. Aparārka also in the commentary of the same verse of Yājñavalkya justifies the same interpretation. In his opinion, all the duties as have been prescribed for a kṣatriya ruler are also applicable to a non-kṣatriya ruler. This idea is generated by the maxim (*nyāya*) which is applicable to the *Rajadharma*. Aparārka in the twelfth century was very sceptical about the kṣatriya-origin of kingship. U.N. Ghosal, on this point, comments in his *History of the Hindu Revenue System*, Calcutta, 1929 :

"Everyone who contributes wealth expects a benefit accruing to himself, while paying taxes has no other object than self-preservation and therefore one taking the taxes is bound to protect the people. In other words, taxation and protection are the two sides of a bargain between the ruler and his subjects. Thence follows the corollary that kingship is independent of kṣatriya-birth". (p 270). Gopāla in his *Kāmadhenu* also reiterated the same view.

Lakṣmīdhara in his *Kṛtya-kalpa-taru* focuses the idea of the origin and nature of kingship based on Manu and Nārada. While believing in the divine origin of the king, he also upholds that the penal authority of the king is the sign of securing of the social and political order of the country.

Hemacandra in his *Laghvarhan-nīti* has stated an interesting theory of the origin of *rājanīti*. In his opinion, the creation of Rājanīti goes back as far as to the prophet king Ṛṣabha. Hemacandra makes the science as of Jain origin.

## Administrative Organisations

After the rise and fall of the Imperial Pratihāras of Kanauj (750-850 A.D.), there arose new powers in different parts of North and South India. In the North, Chaulukyas of Gujarāt, the Chandellas of Jejākabhukti, the Pāramāras of Mālvā, and the Kalachuris of Chedi became very powerful rulers. In the South, in a similar way, the Chaulukyas of Kalyāṇa, the Cholas, the Yādavas, the Hoysalas, and the Pāṇḍyas became the powerful rulers.

In course of time, many kings have some titles which show the status of the kings. For example, the famous kings of the Kalachuris of Chedi had the epithets like *gajapati* (king of elephants), *aśvapati* (king of horses), *narapati* (king of men), and *rājatrāyādhipati* (lord of the three grades of kings). All these epithets indicate the status of the kings.

Next in the royal line was *mahārāja-putra* (crown prince) — the sons of the kings.

Next in rank were the officers bearing the titles of the Chief ministers popularly known by the terms *amātya-mukhya*, *mantripradhāna*, or *pradhānāmātya*. A minister who was in charge of religious endowments was known by the term *dharma-karmādhikārī*. The Kalachuris recorded the names of other dignitaries, such as, *mahāmātya*, *dharmapradhāna*, *daśamūlika*, *sandhi-vigrahika*, *pratihāras*, *duṣṭasādhya* and so on. These titles were used in order to administer a particular locality of a village or of an area.

Incidentally, it can be mentioned that in the 13th century, the Chandellas of Jejākabhukti used the titles for the office bearers of state for a *mantri* (minister) as *mahāmattaraka* and *māṇḍalika*. The minister of foreign affairs was known as *sandhi-vigrahika*, and a *śreṣṭhī* was a banker. For adjudicating upon the disputes of merchants a body was formed in the name of *pañcakula* and *dharmādhikaraṇa* (court of justice). In an inscription dated

1205 A.D., a reference is given to look after the families of deceased soldiers.

The administration of the Paramāra kingdom adopted the same imperial titles with a new one like *daṇḍādhiśa* (Commander-in-Chief) and the like. The villages were grouped under *pratijāgaraṇaka*, *viśaya* or *bhoga* or *pathaka* and *maṇḍala*. Every village was under the care of a headman known as *paṭṭakila*.

The Gāhaḍavāla dynasty who ruled for more than a century (1090-1193), almost the same period when Hemacandra lived, adopted the same usual imperial titles like *narapati*, *gajapati* etc., as mentioned before. Like the kings, the queens also adopted some titles, such as, *paṭṭamahādevī* and *mahārājñī*. The crown prince was often consecrated *Yuvarāja*. In this period, the royal titles like *senāpati*, *bhāṇḍārika*, *akṣapatalika* and *dūta* were introduced.

From the *Kumārapālacarita* (= Ku) we can gather that the king was regarded as a divine person as the word *sva-rāt* (Ku. 1. 119) indicates. The king is considered as an embodiment of a divine being. Manu (VII.8) once said that—

*bālo'pi nāvamantavyo manuṣya iti bhūmipah /  
mahatī devatā hyeṣā nara-rupeṇa tiṣṭhati //*

“Even a king—be he a boy—should not be dishonoured as a man, as he (i.e. king) is an embodiment of a great god in the form of man”.

The word *sahasra-rājñī* (Ku. IV. 40) shows that the king is often surrounded by other subordinate kings or other administrative officers. The *rājasabhā* (court) of Mūlarāja is called *sahasra-rājñī* as his court was surrounded by thousands of kings.

In the court of Kumārapāla there were two *sāmantas* named Vijaya and Kṛṣṇaka (Ku XIX. 98). He had Māṇḍalikas and Mahājanikas also (Ku. VI. 26 and VI.

34). The Māṇḍalikas were the governors of some places known as Maṇḍalas or Deśas. The Mahājanikas were, perhaps, the businessmen and hence rich people.

The word *sva-rāṭ* (1.69) also indicates that the king was a supreme judge, and perhaps, he used to sit in his court every morning.

In the coronation ceremony of a king, umbrella was regarded as the royal insignia, and the umbrella was made of the feathers of a peacock (Ku. IX. 12). At the time of coronation the king used to ride on an elephant and an umbrella was put over him (Ku. XI. 100).

At the time of coronation many valuable gifts were presented to a king both by the rich and the defeated enemies (Ku. VI. 19; XI. 35). The defeated enemy used to submit some royal insignia to the king. King Bhoja had submitted his golden canopy to Chedīrāja and this was later on presented to Bhīmarāja (Ku. IX. 57).

For administrative purposes, the country was divided into several parts. These are *janapada*, *maṇḍala*, *deśa*, *viṣaya*, *pathaka*, *grāma* and so on. Janapada is a bigger place and the king of a Janapada is considered as an independent king. The Sindhu territory, at that time, was an independent Janapada (Ku. VIII. 116). A Janapada is further divided into Maṇḍalas. Maṇḍalas are administered by governors who are called Māṇḍalikas. H.D. Sankalia (*Archaeology of Gujarat*, Bombay, 1941, p. 202) thinks Maṇḍala was the largest division of Janapada which corresponds to our modern province. In mediaeval India, Gūrjara was called a Maṇḍala. A.K. Majumdar (*Chaulukyas of Gujarat*, Bombay, 1956, pp. 208-209) has noted that there were fourteen Maṇḍalas in Chaulukyan empire as mentioned in the Chaulukyan inscriptions. Maṇḍalas were further divided into *deśas*, *viṣayas* and *pathakas*. Whether Deśas were less than Maṇḍalas in size or not, is not clear from the descriptions, but that Lāṭa and Saurāṣṭra were called Deśas shows that Deśas were smaller than Maṇḍalas. Viṣaya and Pathaka were,

perhaps, smaller than Deśas and the head of a village was called Grāmaṇī (Ku. I. 181). The mountainous areas and forests were called Khalatikas (Ku. III. 84).

In the *Kumārapālacarita*, the names of some official posts are found, but their exact significance is not generally mentioned. These names are Mahāpradhāna (Ku. II. 56), Purohita (III. 80), Māhāmātya (Ku. VI. 26), Māṇḍalika (Ku. VI. 26), Pratihāra (Ku. I. 116), Comūpa (VIII. 90), Āyudhāgārika (XVII. 44). From the secondary sources we come to know that these officers used to perform their duties in the territory. For example, in the *Kumārapālacarita*, it is stated that Jambaka and Jehula were ministers of equal status.

For administrative purposes spies were employed in the country. Apart from *dyūta*, the other term *Nagaraghātas* were also used (Ku. IX. 48). In order to collect secret news for the king the Nagaraghātas used to dress like a sage and collected information from the people of the road. Besides the spies, the king himself used to go out secretly to collect public opinion about his administration. It is said in the text (XIII. 5) that Jayasimha used to go out for this purpose.

The condition of the country depended on the good administration of the king. The aim and ideal of a good king was to establish the Rāmarājya. The Chaulukya king had that ideal in his mind (VII. 4). In the *Kumārapālacarita* (VIII. 28) it is stated that people were living calmly and happily. The law and order of the country was maintained and there were no thieves in his kingdom. (VII. 28.). This truthful character of the then Indians was also recorded by the Mohammedan conquerors of India. Idrisi in his Geography (written in the 11th century) summed up the foreign opinions in the following manner :

“The Indians are naturally inclined to justice, and never depart from it in their actions. Their good faith, honesty, and fidelity to their engagements are well-known,

and they are so famous for their qualities that people flock to their country from every side<sup>4</sup>."

Incidentally, it can be mentioned that this truthful character of the then Indians was also recorded by later foreign writers. Marco Polo, for instance, in the thirteenth century noted as follows : "You must know that these Brahmins (the term used by him was *Abraiaman*) are the best merchants in the world, and the most truthful for they would not tell a lie for anything on earth."<sup>5</sup> Similarly, in the fourteenth century Friar Jordanus told us that the people of lesser India (South and Western India) "were true in speech and eminent in justice". Max Müller cites another example. "In the fifteenth century"<sup>6</sup>, says Max Müller, "Kamaledin Abd-errazak Samarkandī (1413-1482), who went as ambassador of the Khakan to the prince of Kalikut and to the king of Vidyānagara (about 1440-1445), bears testimony to the perfect security which merchants enjoy in that country". Max Müller further says that from the records of the *Ain i Akbari* written by Abul Fazal, the minister of the emperor Akbar, in the sixteenth century this truthfulness of the then Indians was remarkable. "The Hindus", says Abul Fazal, "are religious, affable, cheerful lovers of justice, given to retirement, able in business, admirers of truth, grateful and of unbounded fidelity; and their soldiers know not what it is to fly from the field of battles".<sup>7</sup>

We can go on quoting from book after book on this truthful character of the then Indians as recorded by the foreign travellers, till the advent of the Englishmen in Indian history. But the fact that Hemacandra recorded this incident in his *Kumārapālacarita* is the most important one.

4. Max Müller, Indian, what can it teach us ? p. 56.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

The personal life of a king as can be gleaned from the personal life of the king Kumārapāla delineated in the *Kumārapālacarita* of Hemacandra is fascinating. Though the duties of a king are enunciated by Manu, Yājñavalkya, and even by Lakṣmīdhara in the *Rājadharmā* section (xi) of his *Kṛtyakalpataru*, the duties of a king as recorded in the *Kumārapālacarita* are practical. It is stated there that after getting up in the morning, the king must pay respect to his favourite deities (Ku. 1. 72-73). The king will also perform other periodical religious rites (II. 9) including his daily morning prayer. The *Śrauta* Brahmins usually performed the morning prayer along with the king (II.55). The king then used to come to the Mātṛgrha (Ku I. 84) to worship *mātr̥s*. After performing daily exercises (Ku. I. 90), the king used to attend the people in the morning (Ku. 1. 70) in his council-hall (II. 58) sitting down upon his *Simhāsana* (III. 77). As regards the education of the king, it is mentioned that the king must be educated in the Vedas and the religious scriptures as well as in all the fine arts (VI. 4, 6). The council-hall of the king was adorned by the august presence of poets and writers (XI. 66). Though Hemacandra did not mention how the literary court of a king should be exhibited, we can supply this information from the *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* of Rājaśekhara who was a senior contemporary with Hemacandra. Rājaśekhara, a poet of the tenth century, says in his *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* (pp. 54-55 of Gaekwad's edition) the position of poets and artists in the literary hall of a king in the following manner:

"The king-poet should have a special chamber for testing literary compositions. The chamber should have sixteen pillars, four doors, and eight turrets. The pleasure-house should be attached to this chamber. In the middle of the chamber there should be an altar one hand high with four pillars and jewelled floor. Here the king should have his seat. On its northern side should be seated Sanskrit poets and behind them Vaidikās, logicians (*prāmāṇikās*),



Paurāṇikās, Smārtās, physicians (*Bhiṣajas*), astrologers (*Mauhūrttikās*) and such others; on the eastern side the Prakrit poets (*prākṛtā kavayaḥ*), and behind them actors (*naṭa*), dancers (*narttana*), singers (*gāyana*), musicians (*vādaka*), bards and such others; on the western side the vernacular poets (*apabhraṁśinaḥ kavayaḥ*) and behind them painters (*citralepyakṛtaḥ*), jewel-setters (*māṇikyabandhakāḥ*), jewellers (*vaikaṭikāḥ*), goldsmiths (*svaṇakārāḥ*), carpenters (*vardhakilohakārāḥ*) and blacksmiths and such others; and on the southern side Paśācha poets (*bhūtabhāṣākavayaḥ*), and behind them, paramours, courtezans, rope-dancers, jugglers, wrestlers and professional soldiers". (Introduction p. xxxvi - vii).

Whether this was the prevalent practice of the king or not, was not clear from Rājaśekhara, but it was a picture of how a king in the mediaeval India used to organise a poetic assembly in his kingdom. And we can gauge at the moment that that was the practice of the Indians at that time and this picture was reflected by Rājaśekhara in his *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*.

From the *Kumārapālacarita*, we can also infer that Hemacandra says that the kings must be religious-minded and he must go to pilgrimages after defeating his enemies (V. 132). In their old age, the kings should live in pilgrimages by observing asceticism (VIII. 15).

## II. Social Thoughts of Hemacandra

As I have said in my earlier part of this article that it was difficult for me to elicit the political thoughts of Hemacandra from his works, so also in the case of social thoughts, it is equally difficult to find out the social gleanings of Hemacandra from his writings. We must remember that Hemacandra has not written any book on social order of the country, but from some of the words used by him relating to social structure, we can build the edifice of sociology to some extent at the time of

Hemacandra counterchecked by contemporary evidence. We must also know at the same time that the sources for studying the social history of the time are indeed very meagre. Yet we will have to collect some valuable information from his writings as well as from the accounts of the contemporary authors.

### *Structure of Society*

From Hemacandra's *Kumārapālacarita* it appears that society looked like a feudal organisation with the king at its head. The other officials were next in rank to the king. These noble officials used to enjoy some special honours and privileges. As a result, we can imagine that there was a difference in the standard of living between the common people and the privileged officials. The rich people, because of their abundant wealth, indulged in luxury. The food and dress of the wealthy people were rich and gaudy. The rich people lived in highly decorated palatial buildings and probably amused themselves with outdoor and indoor games. Besides the rich people, there was a "middle class" also who used to live on a standard suited to their professions.

From a perusal of the *Kumārapālacarita*, it appears that there were four castes (*caturvarṇa*) in his time. The names of the castes were, as usual Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra (I. 183. II.2). But Hemacandra used different terms to signify these four castes. His names were *dvija* for *brāhmin*, *kṣatra* for *kṣatriya*, *viṭ* for *vaiśya* and *śūdra* for *śūdra* (V. 116).

It seems that the main duty of the brahmins was to study the Vedas and to perform sacrifices (I.75) as the term *śrotriya* (V. 91) indicated. In his time, the brahmins used to get immense power and prestige. From his reference to XVIII. 19, it seems that a brahmin should not be killed by a *kṣatriya*. From H.D. Sankalia (*Archaeology of Gujarat*, p. 209), we come to know that

the brāhmins were given grants for performing the five great sacrifices (*pañca mahāyajñas*) which are —

*adhyāpanam brahmayajñam pitryajñastu tarpaṇam/  
homo daivo balir bhāuto nṛyajño' tithipūjānam//*

(Manu. III. 70)

“The five Mahāyajñas are (i) *brahmayajña* or the study of the Vedas, (ii) *pitryajña*, or libations given unto the Father, (iii) *devayajña* or sacrificial ceremonies, (iv) *bhūtajajña* or offerings into the creatures, and (v) *nṛyajña* or hospitality.”

Sankalia further adds that for the sacrifices of Darśa, Pūrṇamāsa, Agnihotra, Vājapeya and Rājasūya, grants were usually made. From the pages of history, it is seen that in the time of Chaulukyas Brāhmins used to enjoy lots of privileges.

The Kṣatriyas were the ruling class and the king must belong to the Kṣatriya family. In the *Kumārapālacarita* two types of *Kṣatriyas* are mentioned. These are *śuddha-kṣatriya* and the *brāhmaṇakas*. The *śuddha-kṣatriyas* are pure kṣatriyas, born of kṣatriya parents (cf - XIX. 115), whereas, the *brāhmaṇakas* are those whose livelihood was thrown out of the society and as a result, adopted warfare as their livelihood.

As usual, the Vaiśyas were the merchants. Hemacandra used the terms *ārya* (XI. 15), *vaṇika* or *dhānyamcya* to denote them. These terms show that the main occupation of the Vaiśyas was to measure grains (XI. 43).

Hemacandra did not mention the status of the śūdras. It can be assumed then that the life-style of the śūdras was not something different from the previous centuries.

Apart from these four castes, the names of some tribes are also mentioned. These are Ābhira (XV. 85), Kirāta (XIV. 23.), Cāṇḍāla (IV. 38), Jāṅgala (XVIII. 71), Niṣāda (V. 50), Bhilla (I. 179), Takka (1.54), Māheya (XVI. 6) and Khasa (VI. 26). Besides, some tribes which seem to be foreign are also mentioned. These are Cina (VIII. 58),

Barbara (VIII. 58), Mleccha (IV. 33), Turuṣka (Ku. VI. 96), Yavana (XV. 26), Śaka (XV. 26) and Huṇas (VII. 102). Some of the foreign names also occurred in earlier Sanskrit literature. The mention of these tribes shows that at the time of Hemacandra Indian society was heterogeneous, and each one has a part to play in the society.

### ***Education***

It goes without saying that there was nothing like modern system of education. But we can believe that some sort of primary and secondary education existed. The kings used to encourage such education by granting lands or money to different monasteries, individual saints and *āśramas*. The usual name of the educational institution is Vidyā-maṭha (I. 7). The students, both boys and girls, used to reside in *Gurukulas* and studied various branches of learning (XV. 37). These Vidyāmaṭhas were patronized by the kings (XV. 120-121). The *gurus* or *sādhus* (sages) were the teachers. The students were normally asked to learn a subject by heart (I. 66). There were discourses among students (I. 43). The teachers were highly respected. (I. 33).

It will not be unwise to presume that at the time of Hemacandra, at least, four principal languages were prevalent and these were Sanskrit, Prakrit, Apabhramśa and Pāli. It was the time of the birth of modern Northern Indian languages—like Mārāṭhī, Gujarātī, Bengali and others. But from the subjects of study it can be inferred that Sanskrit studies were mainly in vogue. So I believe that Sanskrit schools continued to function for the benefit of the students. It can also be surmised that the Prakrit language was also studied mainly by the Jain Sādhus and Sādhvīs. As it was the time of Apabhramśa, lots of Jain scholars composed their treatises in Apabhramśa. The Pali was studied only by the Buddhists.

### Subjects of Study

From the study of the *Kumārapālacarita*, we can frame our ideas about the subjects of study. The four Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads were studied seriously. Then the *śaḍaṅgas* were equally studied. The Purāṇas, Grammar and Philosophy got prominence in the Vidyāmaṭhas. From the mention of some Classical Sanskrit literature it is assumed that Classical Sanskrit was also studied. The *arthaśāstra*, Poetics and Medicine were also in their curriculum.

The Ṛgveda was studied with various pāṭhas. There are eight Vedic pāṭhas which are—

*jaṭā-mālā-śikhā-lekhā dhvajo daṇḍo ratho ghaṇaḥ /  
aṣṭāu vikṛtayaḥ proktāḥ krama-pūrvāḥ maṇiṣibhiḥ //*

“Jaṭā, Mālā, Śikhā, Lekhā, Dhvaja, Daṇḍa, Ratha and Ghana are eight kinds of Vikṛtipāṭhas each headed by krama”.

Of these eight types of pāṭhas, the *padapāṭha* and *kramapāṭha* were generally taught (XV. 124). Two recensions of the *Ṛgveda* — Sākala (XVI. 85) and Ṛgayana (XVI. 75) — were taught. Among the Yajurvedas, the Kaṭha (XVI. 88) recension was also read. Other recensions of the Vedas are also mentioned.

Among the Brāhmaṇas, the Śatapatha and the Śaṣṭhipatha are mentioned (XV. 122). As the Brāhmaṇa literature is mainly meant for the sacrifice, it is believed that the practice of sacrifice was also in vogue.

The study of the Upaniṣad as a *jñānagūhya vidyā* (XI. 23) was very much prevalent.

As the dictum *svādhyāyo' dhyetavyaḥ* “The Vedas are to be studied along with the Vedāṅgas”, the study of *śaḍaṅgas*, was also current at that time. Hemacandra mentions the name *śaḍaṅga* in several places of his Kāvya (XV. 120-21, I. 108; XVI. 75). The six Vedāṅgas are—

(i) Śikṣā, (ii) Kalpa, (iii) Vyākaraṇa, (iv) Nirukta, (v) Chandaḥ, and (vi) Jyotiṣa.

- 1) Śikṣā : The śikṣās including the Prātiśākhya are science of phonetics. It deals with letters (vowels and consonants), accents (acute, grave and circumflex), moras (short, long and prolated), efforts (*yatnas*) and euphonic combination. But Hemacandra did not categorically mention the name *śikṣā* as a separate subject of study. It is included in the word *ṣaḍaṅga*.
- 2) Kalpa : The Kalpasūtras are the ritualistic texts. It is a collection of the texts of the Samhitās which are to be applied to a particular ceremony. Hemacandra mentions Kalpasūtras (XV. 120-21). He also mentions *kalpa* by Paiṅgi (XVI. 90), Kāśyapin (XVI. 90) and Kauśika (XVI. 90). Hemacandra calls the ritualistic education as Yājñika Vidyā (XV. 120-25).
- 3) Vyākaraṇa (Grammar) : Grammar is taught for the regulation of a language. In ancient times, there were nine authoritative grammarians and these are—Pāṇini, Aindra, Cāndra, Kāsakṛtsna, Kaumāra, Śākaṭāyana, Sārasvata, Āpiśala and Śākala. Of these grammars Hemacandra has only mentioned the grammars of Pāṇini, Vārttikas of Vararuci (XVI. 92, XVI. 88, XVI. 1). The sūtras of Vārttika are called *Vārttikasūtrikā* (XV. 120-21). From this term, it seems that both the sūtras of Pāṇini and Vārttikakāra were taught simultaneously. Hemacandra calls the grammarians as *Padakāras* (XV. 67), or *Padikas* (V. 122), or *Lakṣaṇikas* (XV. 118).
- 4) Nirukta : The Nirukta is nothing but the explanatory text of the Vedic verses. It is sometimes called the supplement to the grammar. Hemacandra calls the Nirukta as *Anupadika* (XV. 118).

- 5) Chandaḥ (Metre) : This is a book on prosody. The *Chandaḥ śāstras* are mentioned by Hemacandra (XIII. 46).
- 6) Jyotiṣa : This is a science of astronomy. This science of astronomy is also mentioned by Hemacandra (XVI. 94).

The mentioning of the different branches of six Vedāṅgas shows that the Vedic studies including ritualist education were prevalent at the time of Hemacandra. In fact, Hemacandra has mentioned Agniṣṭoma (XV.119) and Puroḍāśa (XVI.74) in the *Kumārāpālacarita*.

Apart from these above mentioned subjects, the Purāṇas were also studied (XV. 118). From Hemacandra's reference to the Purāṇas, it appears that at the time of Hemacandra, the Purāṇas were very much popular in the mountainous area (XVI. 46) and it is also mentioned that the Purāṇas were sung at the Arbuda mountain (XVI. 46).

Similarly, from his reference to verse XVI. 1, we can come to the conclusion that all systems of philosophy were taught at the time of Hemacandra. Logic (XIII. 46) is also mentioned. The Cārvāka philosophy was called *Laukāyita* (XV. 120-21). The Mīmāṃsā philosophy was also taught (xv. 124).

This short survey describes in a nutshell the political and social systems of India at the time of Hemacandra<sup>8</sup>.

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8. For this article I have freely used Dr. S.P. Narang's book, A Study of the Dvyāśrayakāvya.

## **PART III — JAIN LITERATURE**





# CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAIN LITERATURE

SATYA RANJAN BANERJEE

In the following pages an attempt has been made to put all the main literary records and big events which have taken place in the history of Jainism into a simple chronological order. In order to show the events of Jainism in the context of world culture, I have started the chronology for the period from 4000 B.C. to A.D. 2000. It is my intention to show that from this series of charts, one can very quickly see when any particular work was written or what other events took place at the same time in the same period. This chart will help the scholars, I believe, to look at the events at a glance.

The six thousand years (from 4000 B.C. to 2000 A.D.) have been broken up into several historical periods of India. These periods have been calculated in accordance with the historical periods of India. These historical periods of India are taken from the *History and Culture of the Indian People* by R.C. Majumdar which was published by the Bhāratiya Vidyā Bhavana, Bombay, in several volumes, from 1950 onwards. Most of the historical dates used in this dissertation are taken from the above book. Apart from this book, the *History of Indian Literature*, Vol-II, by Maurice Winternitz, Calcutta University, 1933, has also been consulted for the dates of Jain works and authors. Besides these, the three books of H.R. Kapadia, namely, *History of the Canonical Literature of the Jains* (Bombay, 1941), *Jain Religion and Literature*, Vol-I, part 1 (Lahore, 1944), and *Jinaratnakoṣa*, Vol-I,

(Poona, 1944) have also been consulted for the history of Jain authors and works. In addition to these, Albrecht Weber's *Sacred Literature of the Jains* (published by Jain Bhawan, Calcutta, 1999) has also been taken into consideration. Moreover, the introductions to the different editions of the works of H. Glasenapp, W. Schubring, A.N. Upadhye, Hiralal Jain and many others have also been consulted.

It should be noted that in the earlier parts the dates of Jain authors and works are in the doldrums; no definite periods can be assigned to them. But as I will have to start from somewhere, I have accepted the dates, traditional or otherwise, of the works. For example, the dates of Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmī, Kundakunda, Vaṭṭakara, Kārttikeyasvāmī, Siddhasena Divākara, Samantabhadra and the like are in a floating stage and they vary from the first century A.D. to the 7th century A.D. The dates of all these authors need not be taken for granted. All the dates are liable to be changed in accordance with researches in subsequent years.

It goes without saying that these charts can be useful only if they are used in the right way. The main purpose of this chronology is to get an idea of which works of which authors are to be put in which century. It is a century-wise development of Jain works and authors.

The aim of this article is simple. It gives only the factual information, such as, the dates of an important author or work as the case may be or the time of a religious or philosophical movement. The main purpose of this chart is to put the events or the names of authors or works into a chronological order, so that one can see which works belong to which century. I believe that it will help scholars to write the history of Jainism in a chronological order.

There is no need to say that this chronological chart is not complete in any way. One can utilise this chart only to write the history of Jainism. The history of Jainism is rather complicated and not systematic. It develops in India

in a different way. This chart might help scholars to write the history of Jainism in a proper way.

The main chart has several sub-sections. The authors and works not mentioned in the main chart may be found in sub-sections. All these charts are complementary and supplementary to each other. I believe that there may be many authors and works whose names may not be found in any of the lists, but that will not deter the main purpose of this chart. The readers are only requested to fill in the omitted authors and works within the purview of this chart. This is a sort of working model upon which the literary history of Jainism can be built up. It should be remembered that the entire mass of Jain literary sources cannot be encompassed into the limited space and time. The works which are not published are not included here, except in a few cases which have a history in Jainism. The Jain works in Prakrit (including Māhārāṣṭrī, Śaurasenī, Apabhraṃśa) and Sanskrit are only included.

### Prehistoric Age : 4000 B.C. to 1500 B.C.

Chronology by centuries	Main Events
4000 B.C.	<b>Mesopotamia</b> : Sumerian settlements of Sumer and Akkadia in the Tigris and Euphrates Valley.
	<b>Egyptians</b> settled in the Nile Valley
	<b>Development of Agriculture in Egypt.</b>
	First written records ( <i>Cunneiform writing</i> ) in Mesopotamia
3500 B.C.	First Assyrian settlements in Mesopotamia. Invention of Hieroglyphics in Egypt.
3102 B.C.	Epoch of the Kali Yuga and of the Bhārata War according to one school of astronomers.
3000 B.C.	Pyramid texts (completed)
3000-2500 B.C.	Chinese settlement in the Yellow River Valley.

	<b>Migration of Indo-Hittite People.</b>
	<b>Agricultural Communities in Baluchistan.</b>
	<b>Growth of cities in Harappa and Mohenjodaro in the Indus Valley (3000-2500 B.C.)</b>
2800 B.C.	<b>Semitic Documents in Akkadia</b>
2700 B.C.	<b>Period of Indus Valley seals found in Kish. Some Jina Images of Mohenjodaro and Harappa.</b>
2500-2000 B.C.	<b>Migration of the Indo-European People.</b>
2449 B.C.	<b>Date of heroes of the Bhārata War according to a second group of astronomers and chronologists.</b>
2000-1750 B.C.	<b>Indo-Iranian settlement.</b>
1750-1500 B.C.	<b>Movement of one group of the Indo-Iranian People towards India (Proto-Iranian and Proto-Indo-Aryan stages of Indo-Iranian languages).</b>
1500 B.C.	<b>Settlement of the Indo-Aryan People.</b>
1435 B.C.	<b>Aryan kings in Western Asia.</b>
1414 B.C.	<b>Date of the Bhārata War according to certain Purāṇas.</b>
1375 B.C.	<b>Worship of Aryan deities in the land of Mitanni.</b>

### **Historic Age : The Vedic Period : 1500 B.C. to 7th/6th centuries B.C.**

<b>Chronology by centuries</b>	<b>Main Events</b>
1500-1250 B.C.	<b>Early Vedic Stage :</b> The composition of the Ṛgveda.
1250-1000 B.C.	<b>Middle Vedic Stage :</b> The composition of the first, eighth to the tenth Maṇḍala of the Ṛgveda; and Sāmaveda, Yajurveda and Atharvaveda.
1000-800 B.C.	<b>Late Vedic Stage :</b> Brāhmaṇas (Aitareya, Śatapatha, Taittirīya and others). Ariṣṭanemi (1000 B.C.)
900 B.C.	<b>The Mahābhārata War.</b>
817 B.C.	<b>The traditional date of the birth of Pārśvanātha.</b>

800-700 B.C.	Āraṇyakas
700-600 B.C.	The period of Upanisads : The beginning of <i>ātmaśāstra</i> .
600-500 B.C.	The birth of Lord Vardhamāna Mahāvira (599 B.C.) and Nirvāṇa (527 B.C.) The Ājivikas, Gosāla Maṅkhaliputra.
563-483 B.C.	Gautama Buddha
542-480 B.C.	Bimbisāra, King of Magadha.
490-458 B.C.	Ajātaśatru, King of Magadha.
465 B.C.	Gautama, Sudharmā and Jambūsvāmī were the propagators and they all attained Nirvāṇa.
365 B.C.-357 B.C.	There were five <i>śruta-kevalins</i> : Viṣṇunandi, Nandimitra, Aparājita, Govardhana and Bhadrabāhu, Bhadrabāhu-Kalpasūtra, Nirukti.
327-324 B.C.	Invasion of India by Alexander
324-298 B.C.	Rise of the Maurya Dynasty : The Period of the Maurya Chandragupta (322-298 B.C.)
318-17 B.C.	Thera Bhadrabāhu was the head of the community. During the famine, Thera Bhadrabāhu went to the south and Sthūlabhadra remained in Magadha. Origin of two sects.
313 B.C.	Jain date of the year of Chandragupta's accession, probably as a ruler of Avanti.
298-273 B.C.	Bindusāra.
273-232 B.C.	The Reign of Aśoka. Aśokan edicts. The literature of Aśokan Prakrits.
187-147 B.C.	Rise of the Dynasty of Puṣyamitra Śuṅga

## The Age of Imperial Unity : 7th cent B.C. to 320 A.D.

Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
1st cent. A.D.	Kushāṇa invaded North-western India	Traditional dates of Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmi, Kundakunda, Vaṭṭakera, Kārttikeya Svāmi, Vimala Sūri	
	78-101 Śaka The reign of Kaṇiṣka		The beginning of Paṭṭāvalis, Therāvalis, Genealogical lists of Jain teachers.
	79 A.D.	The Digambara Āgamas were written	
2nd cent. A.D.		By the first and second centuries A.D. the Jains were split into Śvetām- baras and Digambaras.	
		Puṣpadanta and Bhu- tavali	Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama
		Guṇadharācārya	Kaśāya-pāhuḍa
		Bhūtavali	Mahābanda
		Śivārya	Bhagavati-Ārādhanā
		Hāla	Gāthāsaptasāti
		Kundakunda	Pañcāstikāya, Prava- canasāra, Samayasāra, Niyamasāra, Śaṭ-prā- bhṛta etc.
		Vaṭṭakera  Kārttikeya Svāmi	Mulācāra (Ācāravṛtti —a commentary on Mulācāra) Trivaraṇācāra. Kaṭṭhigeyāṇupekkhā
3rd cent. A.D.		Mānatuṅga	Bhaktāmara-stotra, Bhayahara-stotra (a hymn to Pārśva).
		Vimala Sūri (3rd/4th cent A.D.)	Paūmacariyaṃ
		Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmi	Tattvārthādhigama sūtra, Praśamarati- prakaraṇa
		Nāṭyaśāstra	Dhruvāgāna

## The Classical Age : 320-740 A.D.

Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
4th cent. A.D.			
5th cent. A.D.		Pādalīptācārya (before 5th cent. A.D.)	Taraṅgavati (lost)
		Devanandin (or Puṇyapāda Jinendra- buddhi)	?
		Bhadrabāhu	Uvasaggahara-stotra
	454 A.D.	Final redaction of Ardhamāgadhī texts in the second council at Valabhī in Gujarat under Devardhi Gaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa	
6th cent. A.D.		Māṇikyanandi (528 A.D.)	Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra
		Yogendradeva (=Joindudeva)	Paramātma-prakāśa, Yogasāra, Śrāvakācāradohaka, Dohāpāhuḍa
		Śaṅghadāsagaṇi	Vasudevahiṇḍī
		Samantabhadra (600 A.D.)	Bṛhat-svayambhū- stotra (Caturviṃśati- jina-stotra)
		Siddhasena Divākara	Nyāyāvatāra, Kalyāṇa- mandira-stotra, (Vardhamāna)- Dvātriṃśikā, Sammāti-tarka-sūtra.
		Pravarasena (5th or 6th cent. A.D.)	Setubandha (or Rāvaṇavaho)
7th cent. A.D.	Harṣa- vardhana of Kanyakubja (606-647 A.D.)	Raviṣeṇa (650 or 678 A.D.) Puṇyapāda	Padma-purāṇa (Skt.) (ch. x Tīrthaṅkara) Iṣṭopadeśa, Samādhi- śataka.
		Jinendrabuddhi (=Puṇyapāda 700 A.D.)	
		Yatīrṣabhācārya	Triloka-prajñapti



## The Age of Imperial Kanauj : 740-1000 A.D.

Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
8th cent. A.D.		Haribhadra Sūri (705-775 A.D.)	Samarāicca-kathā (Pkt.) Lokatattvanirṇaya, Nyāya-praveśa (a comm. on Diñnāga), Yogadrṣṭi- samuccaya, Dharma- bindu, Śaḍ-darśana- samuccaya, Yogabindu, Dhūrtākhyāna, Aṣṭakāni, Upadeśapada (Pkt.) Śrāvaka prajñapti (Pkt.)
		Akalankadeva (720-780 A.D.)	Tattvārtharājavārtika (a comm. on Tattvārtha- sūtra), Pramāṇasaṃgraha, Aṣṭaśati (a comm. on Āptamīmāṃsā), Nyāya- vinīścaya, Laghīyastraya, Svarūpaśāmbodhana, Prāyaścitta-granthas
		Bappabhaṭṭi (bet. 743 & 833 A.D.)	Sarasvatī-stotra, Caturviṃśati-jina-stuti.
		Samantabhadra (1st half of the 8th cent. A.D.)	Devāgama-stotra (or Āptamīmāṃsā), Yuktyanuśāsana, Ratna- karaṇḍa-śrāvaka-cāra, Bṛhat-svayambhū-stotra (or Caturviṃśati-jina- stavana)
		Uddyotana sūri (779 A.D.)	Kuvalayamālākahā
		Jinasena (705 śaka = 783 A.D.)	Harivaṃśa-purāṇa
		Vākpatirāja (750 A.D.)	Gauḍavaho.
		Dharmadāsa (before 9th cent. A.D.)	Uvaesamāla (Pkt.)
		Vidyānanda (Pātrakeśarin)	Patrakeśarī-stotra Aṣṭasaḥsri (a comm. on Aṣṭaśati), Tattvārtha-

Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
			śloka-vartika, Āptaparikṣā, Patraparikṣā Pramāṇa-nirṇaya, Pramāṇa-parikṣā
		Nandisena (earlier than 9th cent. A.D.)	Ajiya-santi-thaya (Pkt.)
		Subhacandra, (8th-9th cent. A.D.)	Jñānārṇava (or Yoga- pradīpādhikāra)
		Svayambhū	Paūmacariu Svayambhūcchandaḥ
		Koūhala (800 A.D.)	Lilāvaikahā
9th cent. A.D.		Jinasena (770-850 A.D.)	Triṣaṣṭi-lakṣaṇa- Mahāpurāṇa, Pārsvābh- yudaya (Skt.), Ādipurāṇa, Harivaṃśapurāṇa
		Guṇabhadra (a pupil of Jinasena) (879 A.D.)	Uttarapurāṇa (completed in 879 A.D.), Ātmānuśāsana
		Śīlācārya (868 A.D.) or Śīlāṅka (862 or 872 A.D.)	Mahāpuruṣa-carita (completed in 868), wrote two commentaries on the first two Āgamas.
		Puṇyapāda Devanandi	Sarvārthasiddhi, Jainendra-vyākaraṇa
		Śākaṭāyana	Śākaṭāyana-vyākaraṇa
		Vimala (candra)	Praśnottara-ratnamālā
		Devasena (894 A.D.)	Darśanasāra
10th cent. A.D.		Amṛtacandra (904 A.D.)	Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya (or Jina-pravacana rahasya-kośa) (Skt.) Tattvārthasāra, Tattvadīpikā
		Siddharṣi (906 A.D.)	Upamiti-bhava-pra- pañcakathā.
		Vijayasimhasūri (918 A.D.)	Bhuvanasundarikahā
		Hariṣena (931/32 A.D.)	Bṛhat-kathā-kośa.

Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
		Somadevasūri (950 A.D.)	Yaśastilaka-campū, (completed in 959 A.D.) Nītivākyāṃṛta
		Dhanapāla (a Śvetāmbara)	Tilakamañjarī (970 A.D. or 1018-1055 A.D.) Pāṇalacchīnāmamālā (completed in 972 A.D.)
			Rṣabha-pañcāśikā (completed in 972 A.D.)
		Cāmuṇḍa Rāya (bet. 974 & 984 A.D.)	Erected the statue of Gommaṭa in Śravaṇa Beḷagola in about 980 A.D. Cāmuṇḍa-rāya-purāṇa (in Kanarese in 978 A.D.) Cāritrasāra
		Devasena (894-933 A.D.)	Darśanasāra (933 A.D.) (Pkt.) Śrāvakācāra (933 A.D.) (Pkt.) Ārādhanāsāra (Pkt.) Tattvasāra (Pkt.) Alāpa-paddhati
		Śobhana (2nd half of the 10th cent. A.D.)	Śobhana-stuti
		Śricandra Amitagati (10th + 11th cent. A.D.)	Kathākośa (Apa) Subhāṣitaratna- samdoha, (994 A.D.), Vardhamānanīti (1011 A.D.) Dharmaparīkṣā (1014 A.D.) Yogasāra, Dvātrīṃśikā
		Puṣpadanta • Vādirāja Sūri	Nāyakumāra-cariu (Apa) Jasaharacariu (Apa) Tisaṭṭhimahāpurasa- guṇālankāra Jośodhara-carita
		Dhanapāla (a Digambara)	Bhavisatta-kahā
		Rājaśekhara (10th cent. A.D.)	Karpūramañjarī

Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
		Virahāṅka (10th cent. A.D.)	Vṛtta-jāti-samuccaya
		Nemicandra Siddhānta Cakravartī (10th- 11th cent. A.D.)	Davvasaṃgaha (Pkt.) Gommaṭasāra (or Pañcasamgraha) (Pkt.), Labdhisāra, Trilokasāra, Kṣapaṇāsāra (or Pratiṣṭhānapaṭa)
		Vardhamāna Sūri	Ācāradinakara
		Dhavalā-kavi (10th- 11th cent. A.D.)	Harivaṃśapurāṇa
		? (10th cent. A.D.)	Samkhitta-taraṅgaval- kahā

### The Struggle for Empire : 1000-1390 A.D.

Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
11th cent. A.D.		Jinacandra Gaṇi (also Devagupta) (1015 A.D.)	Navapaya (Pkt.) (1015 A.D.)
		Vādirāja Sūri (1025 A.D.)	Pārśvanātha-carita.
		Durgadeva (1089 vs = 1032 A.D.)	Riṣṭasamuccaya, Arghakāṇḍa
		Sānti Sūri (died in 1040 A.D.)	Jivaviyāra (Pkt.)
		Nayanandi (1044 A.D.)	Sudarśanacarita (Apa)
		Abhayadeva (1060/1070 A.D.)	Jaya-tihyaṇa-stotra Commentaries of the Āgama texts.
		Kanakāmara Muni (1065 A.D.)	Karakāṇḍa-cariu (Apa)
		Sādharaṇa (1123 vs = 1066 A.D.)	Vilāsavaikahā

Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
11th cent. A.D.		Śricandra (1072 A.D.)	Sanatkumāracarita (Pkt.)
		Devendra Gaṇi (1073 A.D.)	Sukhabodhā, commentary on the Uttarādhyayana- sūtra
		Guṇacandra Gaṇi (1082 A.D.)	Mahāvīracariyaṃ (written in 1082 A.D.)
		Nemicandra (or Devendra Gaṇi (1085 A.D.)	Mahāvīra cariyaṃ (Pkt.) (written in 1085 A.D.)
		Jinadatta Sūri (1075-1154 A.D.)	Upadeśa-rasāyana-rāsa Kālasavarūpa-kulakam (Apa), Caccari (Apa)
		Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.)	See 12th cent. entry.
		Jineśvara (1092 A.D.)	Kathānaka-kośa
		Surācārya (11th cent. A.D.)	Nemināthacarita (Skt.)
		Oḍeyadeva Vāḍibha-siṃha (beginning of 11th cent. A.D.)	Kṣatracūḍāmaṇi Gadyacūḍāmaṇi
		Haricandra (a Digambara)	Jivandharacampū
		Dhaneśvara (1100 A.D.)	Surasundarīcariyaṃ (Pkt.) Śatruñjaya-Māhātmya
		Vāgbhaṭa	Neminirvāṇa (in 15 cantos)
		Vikrama	Nemidūta
		Dharmila	Paṭma-siri-cariu (Apa)
12th cent. A.D.		Nanditādhyā	Gāthālakṣaṇa
		Vardhamāna (1103 A.D.)	Ādināthacarita
		Devacandra (1103 A.D.)	Śāntinātha-carita (Pkt.)
	The period of two	Śānti Sūri (1104 A.D.)	Prthvicandracarita (Pkt.)

Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
12th cent. A.D.	Chālukya kings :	Devabhadra (1108 A.D.)	Pārśvanātha-carita (Pkt.)
	Jayasimha Siddharāja (1094-1143 A.D.) and Kumāra- pāla (1143- 1174 A.D.)	Jinavallabha (died in 1110 A.D.) Maladhāri Hema- candra (1107, 1113 A.D.)  Municandra Sūri (died in 1122 A.D.)	Ullāsikkama-thaya (Pkt.)  Jīvasamāsa (1107 A.D.) Bhavabhāvanā (Pkt.) (composed in 1113 A.D.) Nemināthacarita  Gāthakośa (Pkt.)
		Yaśaścandra (1124 A.D.)	Mudrita-kumuda-candra- prakaraṇa
		Śricandra (1137 A.D.)	Munisuvrata-svāmi- carita (Pkt.)
		Lakṣaṇagaṇi (1143 A.D.)	Supāsanāhacariyaṃ (Pkt.)
		Malayagiri (bet. 1150 & 1160 A.D.)	Commentators.
		Haribhadra (1159 A.D.)	Neminātha-cariu (Apa), Mallinātha-carita, Sanat-kumāra-carita (Apa) Candraprabha-carita
		Somaprabhācārya (second half of the 12th cent. A.D.)	Sumatinātha-carita (Pkt.), Suktimukhāvalī, Śātār- tha-kāvya, Kumārapāla- pratibodha (1184 A.D.)
	Hemacandra initiated Kumarapāla (1143-1174 A.D.) into Jainism	Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.)	Haima-śabdānuśāsana (or Siddhahemacandra) Dhātupāṭha : Dhātu- pārāyaṇa, Dhātumālā, Uṇādisūtra-vṛtti, Lingānuśāsana, Abhidhānacintāmaṇi, Nāmamālā, Nāma- mālāśeṣa, Anekārtha- saṃgraha, Anekārtha- śeṣa, Nighaṇṭu-śeṣa-

Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
12th cent. A.D.			Śeṣa-saṃgraha, Śeṣa-saṃgraha-sāroddhārā, Deśināmamālā (or Deśī-śabda-saṃgraha), Ekākṣara-nāmamālā, Chandonuśāsana, Kāvyaṇuśāsana with Alaṅkāracuḍāmaṇi, Pramāṇamīmāṃsā, Bālābala-sūtra-bṛhad-vṛtti, Yoga-śāstra, Kumārapāla-carita (or Dvyāśraya-kāvya); Triṣaṣṭi-śālākā-puruṣa-carita, Vibhramasūtra, Vitarāga-stotra (or Mahāvīra-stotra), Dvātriṃśikā Ayogavya-vacchedā, Anyayoga-vyavacchedā etc.
		Rāmabhadra Muni (1185 A.D.)	Prabuddha-rauhineya (in six acts).
		Devasūri (vs. 1254=1197 A.D.)	Siri-paūma-ppaha-sāmi-cariyam
		Dharmavardhana (1200 A.D.)	Ṣaḍ-bhāṣā-nirmita-pārśva-jina-stavana
		Maladhārī Devaprabha Sūri (1200 A.D.)	Pāṇḍava-carita
		Kṛṣṇadāsa (?)	Vimala-purāṇa
		Haricandra	Dharma-sarmābhyudaya Jivandhara-campū
		Vardhamāna Sūri	Vāsupujya-caritra Manoramā-kahā
		Yaśaḥpāla	Moharāja-parājaya
		Bālacandra	Karuṇa-vajrāyudha
		Meghaprabhācārya	Dharmābhyudaya
		Viragaṇin	Ajiya-santi-thaya (Pkt.)
		Jayaśekhara	Ajita-santi-stava (Skt.)
		Bhāvaprabha Sūri	Nemibhaktāmara
		Suprabhācārya	Vairāgyasāra (Apa)

Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
13th cent. A.D.		Pārśvadeva (1210 A.D.)	Saṅgīta-samaya-sāra, Saṅgīta-ratnākara
		Māṇikyacandra (1217 A.D.)	Pārśvanātha-carita, Śāntinātha-carita,
		Amarakīrti (1218 A.D.) Āśādhara (1st half of the 13 cent. A.D.) Jayasiṃha Sūri (bet. 1219 and 1299 A.D.)	Chakkammuvaeso (=Ṣaṭ-karmopadeśa), Dharmāmṛta (wrote a comm. on 1243 A.D.) Hammira-mada-mardana (1229 A.D.)
		Devendra Sūri (bet. 1241 and 1251 A.D.)	Vandāru-vṛtti (a comm. on Śrāddha-pratikra- maṇa-sūtra), Suddha- pañcāśikā (an extract from Diṭṭhivāya in 50 stanzas), Upamiti-bhava- prapañca-kathā-sāro- ddhāra, Karmagrantha.
		Prabhacandra and Pradyumnasūri (1250-1277 A.D.)	Prabhāvakacarita (written in 1250 by Prabhā, and revised by Pradyumna in 1277 A.D.)
		Prabhācandra	Comm. on Tattvārthā- dhigama, Comm. on Samayasāra, Comm. on Puṇyapāda's Samādhi- śataka, Comm. on Samantabhadra's Ratna- kāraṇḍa-svayambhūstotra.
		Bhāvadeva Sūri (1255 A.D.)	Pārśvanātha-carita
		Dharmāgahoṣa (died 1270 A.D.)	Yamaka-stuti Catuvimśati-jina-stuti
		Dharmakumāra (1277 A.D.)	Śalibhadra-carita (revised by Pradyumna Sūri)



Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
13th cent. A.D.		Deva Sūri (1284 A.D.)	Śāntinātha-carita
		Hastimalla (1290 A.D.) Maliṣeṇa (1292 A.D.) with Jinaprabha Sūri	Vikrānta-kaurava (six acts) Syādvāda-mañjarī (written in 1292 A.D.) (a comm. on the 32 verses of Hema's Anya- yoga-vyava-cchedikā).
		Maladhāri Devaprabha (13th cent.)	Mṛgāvati-caritra
		Ajitaprabha (?) Asaga (?)	Śāntinātha-caritra Śānti-purāṇa
		Dharmasāgara Gaṇin	Gurvāvali-sūtra (a list of the teachers of Tapāgaccha)
		Dharmakumāra	Śālibhadracaritra
		Rāmacandra Vijayapāla	Nirbhaya-bhīma-vyayoga Draupadi-svayaṃvara
		Udayaprabha Sūri	Maithili-kalyāṇa (in five acts), Sukṛta-kīrti kallolini.
		Dharmaghosa (13/14 cent A.D.)	Iṣimaṇḍala (Pkt.)
		Ratnākara (?)	Vitarāgastotra (or Ratnākara-pañca- viṃśatikā).
		Devanandin	Siddhipriya-stotra Mahāvīra-stava (Pkt.) Nemi-jina-stava
		Jayatilaka Sūri	Catur-hārāvali-citra- stava, Malaya-sundari-caritra.
		Candramahattara	Pañca-saṃgraha
		Śiva śarmā Sūri Abul Rahmān	Karmaprakṛti (in 475 gāthās) Sandeśa-rāsaka
		Ācārya Nemicandra Sūri	Siri-Ananta-nātha-jina- cariu.

Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
14th cent. A.D.		Merutuṅga (1305/ 1306 A.D.)	Mahāpuruṣa-caritra (Rṣabha, Nemi, Śānti, Pārśva and Mahāvira). Prabandha-cintāmaṇi (completed in 1306 A.D.)
		?	Kavidarpaṇa (1308 A.D.)
		Maheśvara Sūri (earlier than 1309 A.D.)	Therāvali Saṃyama-mañjarī (Apa) in 35 dohās.
		Jinapadma (1325-1344 A.D.)	Ṣaḍ-bhāṣā-vibhūṣita- śāntinātha-stavana
		Jinaprabha Sūri (bet. 1326 and 1337 A.D.)	Caturviṃśati-jina-stuti Tīrthakalpa (kalpapradīpa vividha)
		Jayakīrti (by 1337 A.D.)	Silvaesamālā (in 116 Pkt. stanzas) (a commentary by Somatilaka was written in 1337 A.D.)
		Jayavallabha (1336 ?)	Vajjālagga (written before 1336 A.D.)
		Rājaśekhara (1348 A.D.)	Prabandhakośa (written in 1348 A.D.) Anta-kathā-saṃgraha
		Munibhadra (1359 A.D.)	Śāntināthacaritra
		Nayacandra (1365-1478 A.D.)	Rambhāmañjarī
		Ratnaśekhara (1371 A.D.)	Śrīpālacaritam, Guṇasthānakramāroha, (vs. 1449) Chandaḥkośa
		Muni Sundara Sūri (died in 1379 A.D.)	Jina-stotra-ratna-kośa
		Dharmacakra (14th cent. A.D.)	Malaya-sundarī-katho- ddhāra.
		Piṅgālācārya	Prākṛtapīṅgala.

Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
15th cent. A.D.		Caritrasundara (1420 A.D.)	Mahīpālacaritra Kālakācāryakathānaka Śīladūta
		Jinamaṇḍana Upādhyāya (1435/36 A.D.)	Kumārapālacarita
		Siṃhasena (or Raidhu) (1439 A.D.)	Mehesara-cariu (Apa)
		Jinamahāśa (1440 or 1445 A.D.)	Rayaṇa-sehara-ṇaravaī- kahā
		Somacandra (1448 A.D.)	Kathāmahodadhi
		Udayadharmā (1450 A.D.)	Dharma-kalpa-druma
		Śubhaśīla gaṇi (1452 A.D.)	Bharadādi-kathā (1452 A.D.) Pañca-śati-prabodha- sambandha.
		Jñānasāgara Sūri (mid or second half of the 15th cent. A.D.)	Ratnacūḍakathā
		Sakalakīrti (died in 1464 A.D.)	Pārśvanāthacarita, Śāntinātha-carita, Harivaṃśa (in 39 sargas)
		Śrutasāgara (1495 A.D.)  Māṇikyasundara	Jainendra-yajña-vidhi, Tattvārtha-dīpikā, Ṣaṭ-prābhṛta Mahābala-Malaya- sundarī-kathā
		Bhāvadeva Sūri Jinakīrti (15th cent. A.D.)	Kālakācārya-kathānaka Campaka-śreṣṭhī-kathā naka, Pālagopāla- kathānaka.
16th cent. A.D.		? ?	Dāna-kalpa-druma Ambaḍa-caritra
		Nemidatta (1530 A.D.) Subhacandra (1551 A.D.)	Ārāḍhanākathakośa Pāṇḍava-purāṇa (or Jaina Mahābhārata written in 1551 A.D.)
	Akbar the great 1556-1605	Padmasundara (1565 A.D.)	Pārśvanātha-carita

Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
16th cent. A.D.		Dharmasāgara (1573 A.D.)	Kupakṣa-kaśika- sahasra-kiraṇa (Pkt.) written in 1573 A.D.
		Devavijaya Gaṇin (1596 A.D.)	Rāmacaritra (completed in 1596 A.D.)
		Udayavīra (1597 A.D.)	Pārśvanātha-carita
		Śānticaṇḍra gaṇin (16th cent. A.D.)	Rṣabha-stava Ajita-śānti-stava
		Siddhicandra Upādhyāya (honoured by Akbar)	Bhānucandracarita
17th cent. A.D.		Hemavijaya (1600 A.D.)	Kathāratnākara
		Devavijaya Gaṇin (1603 A.D.)	Pāṇḍavacaritra (Prose)
		Yaśovijaya (1624- 1688 A.D.)	Adhyātma-parikṣā (Pkt., Jñāna-bindu-prakarāṇa, Jñāṇasāra (or Aṣṭaka- prakarāṇa).
		Samayasundara (1630 A.D.) ?	Gāthā-sahasri
		Vinayavijaya (1649 A.D.)	Taraṅgalolā (in 1643 A.D.) Lokaprakāśa (an encyclopaedic work).
		Rudradāsa (1660 A.D.)	Candralekhāsaṭṭakam
		Mānavijaya (1681 A.D.)	Dharma-saṃgraha
		Mārkaṇḍeya (17th cent. A.D.)	Vilāsavatī
		?	Bhavavairāgya-śatakam
		Vijaya Dharmasūri	Pramāṇa-paribhāṣā, Jaina-tattva-jñāna,
18th cent. A.D.		Muni Nyāyavijaya	Adhyātma-tattvāloka, Nyāya-kusumāñjali
		Ghanaśyāma (1700-1750 A.D.)	Ānandasundarī
		Rāmapāṇivāda	Usāṇiruddho (Pkt.) Kāṃsavaho (Pkt.)

Chronology by centuries	Historical events	Authors	Works
18th cent. A.D.		Viśveśvara (18th cent. A.D.)	Śrngāramañjarī
19th cent. A.D.	Sepoy Mutiny 1857-1862 A.D.	Yaśovijaya (=Ātmārāmji) 1837-1897 A.D.)  Vijaya Dharma Sūri (1868- 1922 A.D.)	Yaśovijaya-jaina-granthamālā, Aitiḥāsika-Rāsa-saṃgraha, Jaina-tattva-jñāna (published in 1917).

## Chronological Development of Jaina Logic

(based on S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's *A History of Indian Logic* including his dates) compiled by Satya Ranjan Banerjee

Dates by centuries	Ancient Indian Logic	Jain Logic	Buddhist Logic
B.C.			
1500-900 B.C.	Origin of Indian logic in Vedic literature : knowledge, action and worship.		
900-600 B.C.	Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka and Upaniṣad. Origin of <i>ātma vidyā</i> , 'self-realisation' and its development	Mahāvīra Svāmi (599-527 B.C. or 659-587 B.C.). The birth of Jaina logic as can be gleaned from Jain Canons.	Gautama Buddha (570-490 B.C.)
600-100 B.C.	Origin of <i>Ānvikṣikī Vidyā</i> (650 B.C.)  Birth of Indian logic : Cārvāka (650 B.C.),	Indrabhūti Gautama (607-515 B.C.)	Origin of the Buddhist logic (490-76 B.C.)

	Kapila (650-575 B.C.), Dattātreya (650 B.C.) Punarvasu Ātreya (550 B.C.) Sulabhā (550-500 B.C.), Aṣṭāvakra (550-500 B.C.), Medhātithi Gautama (550 B.C.)	Bhadrabāhu I (433-357 B.C.)  Bhadrabāhu II (1st cent. B.C.)	Pali Tripiṭaka. Origin of different <i>saṃghas</i> . <i>Suttanipāta</i> , <i>Vinayapiṭaka</i>
A.D.			
1st cent.	<i>Nyāyasāstra</i>	Division of Śvetām- bara and Digambara sects	Origin of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna (78).
2nd cent.	Akṣapāda Gautama's <i>Nyāyasūtra</i> (150)		Milinda Paṇha (100)
3rd cent.		Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmi (or 5th cent. A.D.)	Nāgārjuna (250-320)
4th cent.			Āryadeva (320- 520)
5th cent.	Vātsyāyana's <i>Nyāyabhāṣya</i> (500)	[Bhadrabāhu II (450-520)] Siddhasena Divākara (480-550), Jinabhadra Gaṇi (484-588)	Maitreya (400), Ārya Asaṅga (405- 470) <i>Vasubandhu</i> (410-490). <i>Diṅnāga</i> (450-520)
6th cent.		Siddhasena Gaṇi (600), Samanta- bhadra (600)	Paramārtha (498- 569), Śaṅkara Svāmi (500)
7th cent.	Uddhyotakara's <i>Nyāya-vārttika</i> (600 or 635)		Dharmapāla (600- 635), Ācārya Śīlabhadra (695), Dharmakīrti (635- 650), Devendra Bodhi (650), Śākyabodhi (675)
8th cent.		Akalāṅkadeva (750) Vidyānanda (800) Māṇikya- nandi (800)	Vinitadeva (700), Ravigupta (725), Jinendrabodhi (725), Śāntarak- ṣita (749), Kamalaśīla (750)

9th cent.	Vācaspati Miśra's <i>Nyāya-vārttika- tātparyāṭkā</i> (841)	Prabhācandra (825) Mallavādin (827) Rabhasanandi (850)	Kalyāṇa Rakṣita (829), Dharmo- ttarācārya (857), Muktākumbha (900), Arcata (900), Aśoka (900)
10th cent.	Udayanācārya's <i>Nyāya-vārttika- tātparyāṭkā- Parīśuddhi</i> , <i>Kusu- māñjali</i> , <i>Āmatattva- viveka</i> (984), Jayan- tabhaṭṭa's <i>Nyāya- mañjarī</i> (10th cent.)	Amṛtacandra-sūri (905), Devasena Bhaṭṭāraka (899- 950), Pradyumna Sūri (980), Abhayadeva Śūri (1000), Laghu-Śam- antabhadra (1000), Kalyāṇacandra (1000).	Candraśomin (925), Prabhākara Gupta (940), Ācārya Jetāri (940-980), Jina (940), Ratnakūṭi (940-1000), Ratna Vajra (979-1040)
11th cent.		Ananta Virya (1039), Deva Sūri (1086-1169)	Jina Mitra (1025), Dānaśīla (1025), Jñāna-śrī Mitra (1040), Ratnākara Śānti (1040), Jñāna Śrī Bhadra (1050), Yāmari (1050), Śaṅkar- ānanda (1050), Śubhākara Gupta (1080), Mokṣākara Gupta (1100).
12th cent.	Śaśadhara (1125), Varadarāja (1150), Ballabhācārya (1200), Gaṇeśa's <i>Nyāyalīlāvatt</i> (1200), Gaṇeśa Upādhyāya's <i>Tattvacintāmaṇi</i> (1200)	Hemacandra (1088-1172), Candraprabha Sūri (1102), Nemi- candra (1150), Ānanda Sūri and Amaracandra Sūri (1093-1135), Haribhadra Sūri (1120), Pārśva- deva Gaṇi (1133), Śrī Candra (1137- 1165), Devabhadra (1150), Candra- sena Sūri (1150), Ratnaprabha Sūri (1181), Tilakā- cārya (1180-1240).	

13th cent.	Vardhamāna Upādhyāya (1250), Keśava Miśra (1275), Tarkabhāṣā Pakṣadhara Miśra (1275), Vāsudeva Miśra (1275), Rucidatta Miśra (1275).	Malliṣeṇa Sūri (1292)	
14th cent.	Bhagīratha (1400), Maheśa Ṭhākura (1400)	Rājaśekhara Sūri (1348), Jñāna- candra (1350)	
15th cent.	Śrī Kaṇṭha (1409), Abhaya Tilakopā- dhyāya (1409), Śaṅkara Miśra (1450), Vācaspati Miśra (1450), Misaru Miśra (1475), Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma (1450-1525), Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (1477- 1547), Haridāsa Nyāyālaṅkāra Bhaṭṭācārya (1480- 1540)	Guṇaratna (1409), Śrutasaṅgara Gaṇi (1493).	
16th cent.	Durgādatta (1550), Jānakīnātha Śarmā (1550), Kaṇāda Tarkavāgīśa (1560), Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭācārya (1560), Devanātha Ṭhākura (1562), Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa (1570), Guṇānanda Vidyāvāgīśa (1570), Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārva- bhauma (1575), Madhusūdana Ṭhākura (1575)	Dharmabhūsaṇa (1600)	



17th cent.	<p>Annambhaṭṭa (1623), Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra (1625), Harirāma (1625), Rājacūḍa-maṇi (1630), Viśvanātha Nyāya-pañcānana (1634), Govinda (1650), Gopinātha Mauni (1650), Raghunātha (1650), Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya (1650), Śrī Kṛṣṇa Nyāya-lāṅkāra (1650), Rāmabhadra (1660), Nṛsiṃha (1675), Rāmadeva Cirañjīva (1700), Rāmarudra Tarkavāgīśa (1700), Jayarāma Tarkā-lāṅkāra (1700)</p>	<p>Yaśovijaya Gaṇi (1608-1688), Vinaya-vijaya (1613-1681)</p>	
18th cent.	<p>Gaurikānta Sārva-bhauma (1725), Rudrarāma (1750), 'Buno' Rāmanātha (1780), Kṛṣṇakānta Vidyāvāgīśa (1780), Mahādeva Puntam-kara (1790).</p>		
19th cent.	<p>Raghunātha Śāstri (Parvata) (1815)</p>		

## Chronological Development of the Śrāvaka Literature

(mainly based on Rober Williams' *Jaina Yoga*)

compiled by Satya Ranjan Banerjee

Chronology by centuries	Śvetāmbara	Digambara	Works
1st cent. A.D.		Vaṭṭakera	Mulācāra
2nd cent. A.D.		Kundakunda	Cāritra-prābhṛta (Pkt.)
3rd cent.	Umāsvāti (5th cent. A.D.)	Umāsvāmi (5th cent. A.D.)	Śrāvaka-prajñapti Tattvārtha-sūtra
4th cent.		Kārttikeya	Dvādaśānuprekṣā
5th cent.		Samantabhadra (450 A.D.)	Ratna-karaṇḍa- śrāvakācāra
6th cent.	Haribhadra Virahāṅka (529 A.D.)	Pūjyapāda	Pañcāśaka  Sarvārthasiddhi.
7th cent.			
8th cent.	Haribhadrasūri (yākinī-putra) (705-775 A.D.)	?	Ratnasāra Dharmabindu, Lalitavistara, Āvaśyaka-bhāṣya
9th cent.	Siddhasena Gaṇi	Jinasena (late 9th cent. A.D.)	Tattvārthasūtrāṭīkā Ādipurāṇa
10th cent.		Devasena (early 10th cent. A.D.)	Bhāva-saṃgraha
		Somadeva (959 A.D.)	Yāśas-tilaka
	Dhanapāla (970 A.D.)		Śrāvaka-vidhi
		Amitagati (993 A.D.) Cāmuṇḍarāja (1000 A.D.)	Subhāṣitaratna- sandoha-Śrāvakācāra Cāritrasāra.

11th cent.		Amṛtacandra	Puruṣārtha-siddhyu- pāya
		?	Śrāvaka-dharma- dohaka
	Devagupta (1016 A.D.)		Navapada-prakarāṇa (with commentary)
	Śāntisūri (1040 A.D.)		Dharma-ratna- prakarāṇa
	Abhayadeva (bet. 1061 and 1068)		Upāsakadaśā-ṭikā (1061 A.D.) Pañcāśakaṭikā (1068 A.D.)
	Nemicandra (late 11th cent.)		Pravacana-sāroddhāra
12th cent.	Yaśodeva (1116 A.D.) Municandra (1122 A.D.) Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.) Siddhasena Sūri (1185 A.D.)	Vasunandi (1100 A.D.)      Padmanandin	Śrāvakācāra  Pañcāśaka-ṭikā  Dharmabindu-ṭikā  Yogaśāstra  Pravacanasāroddhāra- ṭikā Dharma-rasāyana
13th cent.		Āśādhara (1240 A.D.)	Sāgāra-dharmāmṛta
		Māghanandin (1260 A.D.)	Śrāvakācāra
	Devendra (1270 A.D.)		Śrāddha-dina-kṛtya, Vandāru-vṛtti-ṭikā, Bhāṣya-traya
	Dharmaghoṣa (1270 A.D.)		Śrāddha-jita-kalpa, Saṅghācāra.
	Jinadatta Sūri (1300 A.D.)	Guṇabhūṣaṇa (1300 A.D.)	Śrāvakācāra  Caitya-vandana- kulaka.
14th cent.	Jinadatta		Viveka-vilāsa
	?	?	Pūjā-prakarāṇa
15th cent.	Vardhamāna (1411 A.D.)	Padmanandin Yāmadeva Sakalakīrti	Śrāvakācāra Bhāva-saṃgraha Prašnottara-śrāvakā- cāra Ācāra-dinakara

	Cāritrasundara (1430 A.D.) Jinamaṇḍana (1441 A.D.) Ratnaśekhara (1450 A.D.)		Ācāropadeśa Śrāddhaguṇa-śreṇi- saṃgraha. Śrāddha-vidhi
16th cent.		Medhāvin (1504 A.D.)	Dharma-saṃgraha- śrāvakācāra.
		Brahmanemi datta (1530 A.D.)	Dharma-piṇḍa- śrāvakācāra
		Rājamalla (1584 A.D.)	Lāṭi-saṃhitā
17th cent.	Yaśovijaya (1624-1688 A.D.)	Śivakoṭi Somasena (1610 A.D.)	Ratnamālā Traivarnikācāra  Dharmasaṃgraha- ṭīkā

### Chronological Development of the Kathānaka Literature

compiled by Satya Ranjan Banerjee

Chrono- logy by centuries	Author	Works	Contents and comments
1st cent. A.D. (?)	?	Kālakācārya- kathānaka (Pkt.)	It is the story of Kālaka who transferred the date of <i>pariyuṣaṇa</i> festival from the fifth to the fourth of the first half of the month of Bhādra. It is recited by the monks at the end of the Kalpa- sūtra
10th cent.	Harīṣeṇācārya	Bṛhatkathākośa (composition 931- 32 A.D.) (Skt.)	More than 157 tales
	Śricandra (941-996 A.D.)	Kathākośa (Ap)	53 tales
	Bhadreśvara (1064-94 A.D.)	Kathāvali (Pkt.)	It narrates the accounts of 63 Śālākāpuruṣa.

	Dhanapāla, a Svetāmbara Jain	Tilaka-mañjari (wrote in 970 A.D.)	It was composed in about 970 A.D. under Muñja Vākpatirāja of Dhārā.
11th cent.	Devendragani (1073 A.D.)  ?  Jineśvara Sūri (1092 A.D.) Soḍḍhala	Kathāmaṇikoṣa (Pkt.) (or Ākhyāna- maṇikoṣa) Kathākoṣa (last quarter of the 11th cent.) Kathākoṣa (Pkt.)  Udayasundarī- kathā (composed bet. 1026 & 1050 A.D.)	41 chapters   27 Stories  239 gāthās
12th cent.	Devabhadra (1101 A.D.)  Vinayacandra (1109 A.D.)	Kathākoṣa/or Kathāratnakoṣa (Pkt. + Skt.) Kathānakakoṣa (Pkt.)	Stories in Prakrit and Sanskrit.  140 gāthās
13th cent.	Bhāvadevasūri (1255 A.D.) Dharmagoṣa	Kālakācārya- kathānaka (Pkt.) Kathārṇava (Pkt.)	102 gāthās  208/218 gāthās
14th cent.	Merutuṅga  Maladhārī Rājasekhara (1348 A.D.)  Rājasekhara Sūri (1348 A.D.)	Prabandha- cintāmaṇi (com- pleted in 1306 A.D.) Antarakathā- saṃgraha/or Kathāsaṃgraha (Skt.) Prabandhakoṣa (Skt.)	Divided into five prakāśas  100 stories  24 stories ( <i>prabandhas</i> )
15th cent.	Jinasāgara (1435 A.D.) Somacandra (1448 A.D.) Udayadharma (1450 A.D.) Śubhaśīla (1452 A.D.)	Karpūraprakaraṇa śikā (Skt. + Pkt.) Kathāmahodadhi (Pkt. + Skt.) Dharmakalpa- druma (Skt.) Kathākoṣa/or Bharatādi-kathā (Pkt.)	150 stories  157 stories  It contains many stories and its <i>vr̥tti</i> is written in Sanskrit.

	<p>Sarvasundara (1453 A.D.) Naracandra Sūri (1463 A.D.) ?</p> <p>Jinakīrti (mid 15th cent.)</p> <p>Padmanandin (1496 A.D.)</p>	<p>Kathāsamgraha</p> <p>Kathāratna- sāgara Pañcaśatī Prabandha-sam- bandha (1464 A.D.) Campaka-sreṣṭhi- kathānaka (Skt.) Pālagopāla- kathānaka (Skt.) Kathārṇava</p>	<p>15 taraṅgas</p> <p>600 stories. These stories are of the nature of fantastic fairy-tales.</p>
16th cent.	<p>Nemidatta (1530 A.D.) Śrutasaṅgāra (mid 16th cent.)</p>	<p>Ārādhanaśoṣa</p> <p>Kathāśoṣa (Skt.)</p>	
17th cent.	<p>Hemavijaya- gaṇi(1600 A.D.)</p> <p>?</p> <p>?</p> <p>?</p> <p>?</p> <p>?</p> <p>?</p> <p>Uttamarṣi</p> <p>Jinabhadra Sarvanandī Ānandasundara Somasundara Gaṇi ?</p>	<p>Kathāratnākara (Skt., Pkt. Apa. Guj + Old Hindi)</p> <p>Kathāśoṣa (Skt. + Pkt.) Uttamakumāra- carita-kathā (Skt.) Pāpabuddhi- Dharma-buddhi- kathānaka (Skt.) Samyaktva- kaumudī (Skt. with Pkt. gāthās) Kathāśoṣa</p> <p>Kathāśoṣa</p> <p>Kathāmaho- dadhi (Skt.) Kathāratnākara (Skt.) Upadeśamālā Kathāsamāsa Kathāsamgraha Kathāśoṣa</p> <p>Aghaṭakumāra kathā</p>	<p>258 stories in 10 taraṅgas; mostly of fools, rogues and artful women.</p> <p>Collection of popular tales</p> <p>Stories are allegorical and didactic.</p> <p>Allegorical and didactic stories</p> <p>27 stories</p> <p>Ref. found in Jaina Sāhitya Itihāsa p. 168 (trs. by C.H. Tawney, London, 1895). 179 verses. Its commen- tary contains 150 tales.</p>













